Introduction
Over
at least last 50 years or so, since Sack’s (1992) seminal
lectures, there is little doubt that alongside social anthropology and
discursive psychology, conversation analysis has highlighted numerous
ways in which cultural forms of perceiving and acting in the world are
rooted in socially shared normativity. However, when consideration
turns to the origins and purposes of human affect and emotion,
conversation analysis appears to face particular challenges regarding
the relations between action and emotion that may arise from the
over-arching focus on sense-making practices found in this approach (Sorjonen
and Peräkylä, 2012). As follows, the suggestion will be made that
the researchers interested in the primary roots of socially shared
normativity may have an unrecognized difficulty with breaking away
from deeply held assumptions regarding affective or emotional
dimensions of human experience, particularly the notion that these
remain private or individuated (pertaining only to a specific
individual’s private experience). In order to help dispel or
disabuse such unrecognized presuppositions, a case is made for
considering new psychoanalytic approaches to affect and emotion, where
one finds a socially saturated conception of what constitutes
psychological life – specifically in what have become known as
object-relation approaches.
The
first part of the article will highlight research in conversation
analysis (CA form here) that has explicated the fact that from birth,
an infant’s earliest experience is bound up with those procedures,
practices, and social actions that make up what are termed members’
methods. Observations will then be offered that draw attention to a
certain avoidance or elision regarding the domain of affect and to
detailed discussion of what kind of implicit model(s) of subject-hood
are oriented to by researchers in child-focused CA. Having highlighted
challenges CA work faces when studying the interdependence of affect
and action, the second part of the article outlines a partial summary
of developmental psychoanalytic thought, specifically some of the key
ideas in the object-relations school. This forms the basis for
suggesting that child-focused CA may find this perspective a rich
source for developing a discourse of affective-normativity.
Child-Focused
Ethnomethodologically Informed Conversation Analysis
From
the beginning, an infant’s earliest experience is bound up with the
practices and social actions that make up what ethnomethodology call
members’ methods. In the emerging child-focused conversation
analytic literature, there are indications that the domain of what
constitutes “talk-in-interaction” has expanded considerably.
Numerous studies document and explicate the diverse range of social
practices that together form the rich nexus of multi-modal events that
together form the acculturation frame for the infant and young child.
We find representative examples of recent work for instance on touch,
embodiment, crying, laughter, whining, pleasure, and affect (Wiggins,
2002; Laurier and Wiggins, 2011; Fantasia
et al., 2014, 2015a,b; Cekaite,
2015; Jenkins and Hepburn, 2015; Berducci,
2016; Walker, 2017; Butler and
Edwards, 2018). This research seems to indicate that in child-focused
conversation analysis (CA from here), the boundaries of what would
normally come under the umbrella term “talk-in-interaction”
continue to expand. However, there may be a slight ambiguity or
unrecognized difficulty with such expansion as it seems to indicate a
move away from the methodological foundation stone (or lodestone) of
reflexive accountability. Consider the following comment from Livingston
(1987) that highlights the all-pervasive nature of
the ethnomethodologically informed CA project:
What
the common person knows or does not know is not at issue. Instead,
the central issue and the central research problem is the
examination of the unwitting, without extrinsic motivation,
production of the ordinary social object. …[it is a] massive
domain of phenomena - the domain of practical action and practical
reasoning. It is this omnipresent domain of practical
methods, through
which and wherein people make
of the things they are doing the things
that they accountably are, that the ethnomethodologist
seeks to investigate. By examining those methods in the material
detail of their always-idiosyncratic embodiments, the
ethnomethodologist seeks to understand those methods in and as that
same, endlessly diversified, identifying specificity. (p. 12 –
emphasis in original)
In
effect, all social
practices are open to analysis, including the practices and procedures
of scientists, social researchers, and conversation analysts
themselves. A couple of things are noticeable about this programmatic
statement. First, there is the elision or avoidance of terms and
concepts that presuppose knowledge, mental states (and one would
surmise, emotion and affect), and anything that might be said to be
“inside” or private to the individual. While this reflects the
healthy skepticism CA and discursive psychology exhibit toward the
logocentric excesses of traditional psychology (Coulter, 1999; Edwards
and Potter, 2005), we can ask whether such elision may raise
difficulties for understanding affective dimensions of
talk-in-interaction. As Sorjonen and Peräkylä
(2012) put it, “we do not yet have a satisfactory
understanding of the relation between action and emotion.” (p. 9).
Second,
methodic practice is both omnipresent and at the same time, evidenced
through procedures of reflexive accountability, a competency that an
infant or young child is unlikely to possess and which thus positions
her in a kind of ethnomethodological limbo. The classic CA position
regarding membership of a culture is that it is something that is
gradually attained, in the sense that a child has to learn those
performances and practices that constitute “doing” membership
appropriately (Garfinkel and Sacks, 1970). However, as Shakespeare
(1998) argues, because children are not effectively
full members, the child’s role in interaction is constructed in
terms of them building toward becoming a competent person, where much
of their experience is replete with examples from adults concerning
how to achieve full membership. Do infants and young children learn
how to display affect and emotion from adults – simply as a set of
actions or stances? Or do we assume that (spontaneous, innate) emotion
states are molded by adults such that display reflects cultural
dimensions of normativity? Questions of this nature seem to indicate a
role for developing a discourse of affective-normativity.
Becoming
a full member then presupposes possessing the skills and competencies
that surround whatever it is taken as the appropriate performance or
display of emotion. Sorjonen and Peräkylä (2012) suggest
that perhaps the closest relation between emotion and action (methodic
practice) is to be found in “displays of emotion that, at least in
some context, can be considered as action” (p. 9). If we think about
the areas where expressions of affect are being studied (such as
crying, whining, complaining, and laughing), it seems that child
focused CA is moving closer to a position where affect and emotion is
conceptually associated with normativity. Whatever we understand by
the terms affect and emotion, the question remains whether this is
something – a dimension or domain – that remains unique (private)
to the individual, or instead part of those members methods (social
practices) that ultimately depend on learning what counts as
appropriate performance.
Some
discussion regarding normative dimensions or domains of affect seems
important given the emergence of infant and child-focused CA work.
Recent research documenting and describing the subtle and delicate
nature of multi-modal social practices underpinning early parent-child
talk-in-interaction is drawing attention to the social-semiotic
embodied dimensions of affective-normativity (e.g., Cekaite,
2016; Kern, 2018; Holm Kvist,
2018). From the outset, whatever we are calling the infant’s
“experience” or consciousness is interdependent with the specific
social and cultural practices surrounding birth, childhood, dependency,
mothering, asymmetry – i.e., whatever makes up the matrix of social
practices surrounding the infant. However, even to use a term such as
“surrounding” immediately draws attention to difficulties
regarding what is presupposed by categories and constructs such as
personhood, individuality, separation, subject, and object, and in
fact, all those terms and associations brought into play when we seek
to understand what makes for a socially shared normativity. One can
imagine that a CA perspective on what an affect-focused socially
shared normativity would constitute, would be one where whatever we
understand as mutual engagement, is something where the mutuality
being displayed is viewed as evidence that there exists (and is in
play) a normative system oriented to by the participants who are
involved in “doing engagement” or joint participation. However,
can one successfully “perform” doing-being-emotionally engaged,
such that said performance is open to scrutiny and reflexive
accountability? Part of the difficulty surrounding thinking about
affective dimensions of normativity (i.e., those conventions and
practices associated with the display and performance of emotion) may
be linked to the empirical requirements of CA, particularly that
analytic interpretation should rest upon identifiable
participant-oriented evidence in talk-in-interaction itself. Such a
requirement may engender an avoidance for developing a theoretically
informed discourse or set of descriptions for what constitutes affect
or emotion.
Recent
work in CA highlights the various interdependencies between sequential
organization and the display of emotion or participant’s
“emotional stance” (Goodwin, 2007; Stivers,
2008; Voutilainen et al., 2014), and understandably
this line of work exhibits a pervasive focus on the performance
details of the fine-grained orderliness, in what one might call an
example of methodological “affect avoidance.” Maynard
and Freese (2012), for example, in a subtle and detailed analysis,
draw out the significance of intonation during the on-going production
and reception of good and bad news, making the point that their
approach,
Shares
the constructionist commitment to studying display of emotion in
interaction and remaining
agnostic about the existence of internal
accompaniments to such displays. (p. 94). [emphasis added]
What
is interesting here is that this agnosticism nevertheless presupposes
a possible backdrop of internal emotional states – which remains
beyond discussion (for empirical reasons). Similarly, for Goodwin
and Goodwin (2000) emotion is a social phenomenon
that is made visible or constructed in and through the systemic
practices lodged within the processes of situated action, “used by
participants to build in concert with each other the events that make
up their life world” (p. 569). What does warrant comment is the
difficulty that CA and related discursive approaches appear to have
regarding terms such as affect and emotion.
Building
on work in philosophy, aesthetics and critical theory (e.g., Massumi,
2002; Deleuze and Guattari, 2013) a number of
writers emphasize a recent affective
turn, characterized as a movement toward understanding domains of
experience outside of the dominant paradigm of representation (Clough
and Halley, 2007). In a recent special issue on affect and
subjectivity, Lara et al. (2017) make
the point that the “missing subject” is one of the predominant
critiques of the turn to affect, where there is “considerable unease
about what a vacated subject meant for questions of power and agency.”
(p. 32).
Examining
these developments, Wetherell (2013) describes
the aim of affect theory [an approach that emphasize processes, beyond, below, and past discourse,
(e.g., Massumi, 2002; Thrift,
2008)], as a perspective that aims to “deliver the tools required
for lively, textured research on embodied social action and for
productive insights into the entangled forms of assembling
constituting social life moment to moment.” (p. 351). Describing
example views of affect theory, Wetherell (2013) comments
on Massumi’s (2002) affect
as excess viewpoint, where:
“He
[Massumi] maintains that affect is thus a kind of intensity, making
a difference below the threshold of consciousness, thrusting the
subject into particular kinds of relations with the material, and
social world…[and]…discourse works on a different track from
affect – a ‘quality’ track as opposed to the ‘intensity’
track. The quality track leads to naming, and to the framing of
affect in conventional discursive, linguistic and cultural terms. If
affect is a kind of chaotic excess and the unprocessed push, then
the moment of discursive representation is bureaucratic and
organizational. For Massumi, it is the process by which potentially
‘wild’ affect is tamed, turned into something people can
recognize, talk about to each other and communicate as
‘domesticated’ emotion.” (p. 354).
Attempting
to build a productive dialogue between traditions in discourse studies
(e.g., CA) and new lines of research in affect and emotion, Wetherell
(2013) examines a sequence from Goodwin’s
(2006) work on children’s playground games, noting
that Goodwin seeks to explore affect and discourse equally, assuming
that, “these are entangled in the sense that embodied action (on a
scale of intensity) tends to be bound up with talk at some point in a
flow of activity” (p. 360). Her analysis concludes that research
such as Goodwin’s (2006) moves
beyond a simple binary divide of “affect vs. discourse” given that
this work,
effectively
conveys the feel and patterning of bodies in action, the lively flow
of social life and sticks closely to participants’ perspectives…(and)…it
puts both affect and discourse back where they should be within
emergent patterns of situated activity, and makes the patterns, as
they need to be, the main research focus. (Wetherell, 2013, p. 364).
Certainly,
there is little doubt that the Goodwin’s have been significant in
developing the notion of affective stance loosely defined as “a
positioning accomplished through conduct and thereby made publicly
accessible” (Sorjonen and Peräkylä, 2012, p. 5). Whatever affects
are within CA, they can be utilized as resources – something that
people in talk-in-interaction can draw on. Following their helpful
explication of bodily compliance by children Goodwin
et al. (2012) argue that alongside the traditional
study of facial expression and the psychology of emotion, research
should consider,
the
relevant actions and bodily displays of the parties they are
interacting with. We argue specifically that the body of the party
producing an emotional display cannot be examined in isolation.
Crucial to the organization of emotion as public practice is the way
in which individuals display rapidly changing stances toward both
other participants, and the actions currently in progress. (p.
39–40)
For Goodwin
et al. (2012), affective stance and emotion are not “add-ons” but
“constitute central components of the situated actions participants
build to carry out the mundane activities that make up the lived
social world they inhabit together.” (p. 40).
Interestingly,
such comments are not so far removed from those emotion theorists in
developmental psychology who 20 years ago, and coming from the
opposite direction, called for a move away from a focus on the
unifying role of a “central feeling state” toward a realization of
what the child is doing to adapt his or her goals to the environment,
and to modify the environment to fits said goals (Campos et al.,
1989). Described as “emotion regulation,” displays of affect
involved, “regulating the action tendencies of the other
facilitating action tendencies when desirable, redirecting them when
necessary, or preventing them when culture or danger dictates” (Campos
et al., 1989, p. 397). While understanding, what does seem clear is
that in CA theoretical elaboration regarding discourses of affect and
emotion tends either to be avoided or deemed unnecessary, given that
whatever it might be, it is reducible to social praxis – will always
remain an empirical question linked to requirements of
participant-orientation and the display of methodic practice. This
suggestion here is that such a constraint may be unhelpful when
considerations turn to theoretical underpinnings of socially shared
normativity.
Before
moving to the main focus of this article, certain psychoanalytic
perspectives on affect and emotion (with regard to discourse, methodic
practice, and normativity), some comments are warranted regarding
conceptions of the infant/child’s mind we find in CA. Understandably,
given the work that CA and discursive psychology have done so as to
provide and alternative view to that found in traditional
developmental psychology (Leslie, 1987; Perner,
1992) commentators are certainly suspicious or circumspect about
presupposing a foundational or causal significance to “internal”
development (e.g., cognitive development, emotional maturation,
neurobiological change and so on). In their critique of the
overemphasis on “theory of mind” and its relation to cognitive
competence in developmental psychology, Lerner et
al. (2011) make the point that cognitive
representational conceptions of underlying skills should conform to,
“the actual requirements of the observable interaction order and
participant in it – for example, the structurally afforded ability
to recognize, project, and contingently employ unfolding structures of
action in interaction with others.” (p. 45). For CA whatever
cognitive capacities are found to underwrite interactional order, the
specification of the relevant elements of this domain requires a close
and systematic analysis of naturally occurring interaction addressed
to the manifold contingencies of everyday life, and the
social-sequential structures that enable human interaction. Lerner
et al. (2011) comment;
It
seems to us that very young children only require the in
situ practiced capacities required to
recognize, in each particular case, the formal structures of the
in-progress actions that recurrently fill their social interactional
world and the practical skills to participate in each
context-specific realizations of those structures of action as they
are progressively realized, and as each next element in its
progressive realization, projects a next constituent of that
structure. (p. 57).
What
underscores CA child-focused analysis, is that while there may be some
recognition that social interaction may in part depend on evolved
neural mechanisms of (an individual’s) brain, there is no defensible
basis for the presupposition that the skills and competencies employed
derive from cognitive representational entities in the mind. For Lerner
et al. (2011) the young child’s abilities are to
be understood as akin to affordance-like capacities intimately
connected with detecting patterns in the ongoing sequence of actions
and events made available to them through talk-in-interaction.
Similarly,
in recent work by Keel (2015), when summarizing
pre-school children’s skills and competencies when building up a
normative position of the surrounding world, comments;
my
detailed study of how children deploy assessments to achieve
self-praise, noticings, announcements, complaints, or requests
displays their orientation toward participants’ membership
categories, the responsibilities and rights that are bound to them,
and the larger praxeological context, adapting their way of
packaging their initial assessment and mobilizing different
sequential, formal, linguistic and embodied resources accordingly.
(p. 218).
The
picture of the child’s mind here is of an entity who can “package
assessments” and adapt them to circumstances, and mobilize resources
of various kinds. The entity is certainly constructivist but further
commentary on what constitutes the “being-who-is-constructing” is
avoided or evaded. A similarly cautious or circumspect perspective can
be seen in the earlier work of Wootton (1997) when
discussing children’s emerging competences underpinning their
capacity to use local and public understanding(s):
Around
that time (aged two years old) the child develops the skill to
identify and draw on local knowledge which has been made apparent
within prior interaction. Because this knowledge is contingent and
local I have chosen to use the term “understanding” to describe
it rather than a term like “representation,” the latter indexing
forms of knowledge which have a more enduring status within the mind.
(Wootton, 1997, 192–193).
Notice
that understandings are something that are now public and accountable
– social objects produced and reproduced in the ongoing dynamics of
interaction. However, the idea or notion of the child’s mind (as
nevertheless existing and being something separate from that which is
experience) remains in the background in CA. Beyond the assumptions
that this agent is a learning being who accrues the skills and
abilities to employ available resources (e.g., the competencies to
draw on local knowledge), discussion regarding emotion or affect
seems to be something to be avoided.
There
are then a number of challenges that CA faces when seeking to
understand the relationship between action and affect/emotion,
particularly for child-focused research. The members method criteria
underpinning membership status (e.g., reflexive accountability) seems
to be glossed over once the detail of adult-child engagement and
participation begins to be examined (Forrester and Reason, 2006; Filipi,
2009). In addition, while considered and important insights have come
from research on affective stance, such insights still seem to rest on
the possible existence of person-experience affect/emotion state(s).
There remains an understandable reluctance to discuss or develop a
conceptual framework or discourse regarding affect. Parallels to such
avoidance or elision can be found in the guardedness or skepticism
regarding cognitive dimensions of the developing child in early
child-focused CA work. Although such caution has helped counter the
excessive formalisms of the dominant and traditional approaches in
disciplines such as developmental psychology (e.g., Leslie,
1987; Perner, 1992); this seems to have left a
vacuum or absence when it comes to trying to think through what a
discourse of affective-normativity might look like. Psychoanalytic
approaches may offer some helpful suggestions in this regard, as other
critical theorists have pointed out (Frosch, 2003; Hollway,
2011).
Object-Relations
Perspectives on Affect
We
can begin by noting that the psychoanalytic developmental account of
the emergence of emotion or affect comes from a perspective that is
not only at odds with CA accounts but is somewhat different from the
dominant views found in developmental psychology. In psychoanalytic
thinking, the forces at play in the mind are dynamic and unceasing and
motivated by primitive and ultimately biologically oriented forces of
energy, both positive and negative (traditionally termed “instincts”).
The objects and entities said to make up the unconscious are a motley
collection of undesirable, and unrealizable/incomprehensible elements,
some constitutional others acquired and constantly seeking to
undermine whatever we understand as the coherence of the ego. This is
a view of mind where the human (adult, child, or infant) is a being
who possesses certain attributes and characteristics of mind that
forever seek to undercut whatever notions one has of possessing a
stable mind (conscious-self) entity. Leaving aside the long-discussed
issues surrounding methodology and empirical support1,
this perspective certainly stands in stark contrast to the perspective
found in CA or in contemporary developmental psychology.
One
particularly different and noticeable aspect about the psychoanalytic
view of the developing child is the idea that from the beginning the
issue of separateness and “self-identity” is called into question
– this is the significance of the Freudian legacy of the later 19th
century. Rather than just assuming there is a sense of separateness
accompanying the infant’s experience of the earliest moments of
life, the psychoanalytic view asks under what conditions are we to
understand how an infant “attains” or moves to the position of
experiencing “separateness” or “individuation” in the first
place? Psychoanalytic thought requires or demands a critical
examination of any assumptions and presuppositions surrounding
awareness, self, or whatever we might want to call consciousness of
separateness. Theoretically developed accounts of the developing self
are to be found in the object-relations view of Klein
(1949, 1957) and Winnicott
(1960, 1974), and in recent psychosocial approaches
(e.g., Stern, 1985; Hollway, 2006; Walkerdine,
2014).
The
psychoanalyst Donald Winnicott, for example, consistently emphasized
the role of affective states said to be (constituted) by movement
between states of ego disintegration and partial integration of “self-awareness.”
In this account to “exist” as an infant at all is to some extent
an achievement. To paraphrase Green (1999),
Winnicott’s unique contribution was to show that at the beginning
the notion of a separate baby is incoherent, and that,
it
is necessary to include the mother in the indissoluble couple that
they form. That
is to say, no discourse on the affect can be sustained that does not
take account of the mother’s affects, her tolerance of the
child’s regressive needs, even of a state of informal chaos, the
necessary conditions for the establishment of a kernel of vital
affective continuity (emphasis in the original, p. 77).
Psychoanalysts
such as Green (1999) draw
attention to the constraining representation-affect opposition
prevalent in psychology and philosophy and instead seek to confront
the affective basis of the sense of existence, as well as encouraging
the development of an affect discourse. Possibly one of the
difficulties we encounter when addressing affect and emotion is the
pervasive or all-encompassing (and yet elusive) nature of what it is
we are trying to get at, or to quote Green (1999) again,
that
the essence of affect is its dynamic attribute, its capacity to seep
into other domains and inhabit them and finally to transform both
itself and products of the area of the mind that it has occupied.
(p. 285).
Part
of the problem when thinking through what might constitute an
affective-normative dimension to social life is the possibility that
such a dimension undercuts or rather permeates all aspects of life.
For now, let us continue the psychoanalytic narrative regarding
beginnings and the emergence of early psychic life for the infant.
Building
on Freud’s concept of instinct, the “object” of object-relations
theory is anything that is employed by the instinct(s) in order to
achieve its aim, Klein (1963) describes
in detail how the child moves through different stages of psychic
development, starting from an initial biologically determined state
where both “life” and “death” instincts are in play. From the
beginning the dangers, challenges, and opportunities engendered by
these contrasting instinctual forces leads to a psychic splitting or
differentiation of “good” and “bad” objects:
Even
the child who has a loving relation with his mother has also
unconsciously a terror of being devoured, torn up, and destroyed by
her. (Klein, 1963, p. 277)
The
model of the early mind is of a fragile ego that is sensitive to
processes of dissociation and fragmentation – fragmentation due of
the piecemeal way in which the world is “introjected,” and
dissociative because there is the ever-present inherent (internal)
danger expressed as anxiety (i.e., determined by the death instinct).
Working on the assumption that the human organism is likely to come
into the world with a rudimentary ability to sense danger, Klein
associated life’s first experiences of anxiety not with acquired or
learnt mental abilities, but with an internal registering of
unconscious tendencies that Freud had termed the death instinct. In
other words, survival meant that the baby was born knowing about death
and sensing her internal destructive instincts, and this first
knowledge took the form of a primordial terror or annihilation.
Anxiety is thus basic to all living states, however immature, and it
is this underpinning sense of danger and potential disintegration that
gives rise to a spontaneous splitting. At this point is should be
emphasized that this discussion focused on the earliest moments of
infancy and young childhood – approximately the first year of life (leaving
aside later the complications and challenges of sibling and peer
socialization).
In
a related commentary on the intersubjective approach to the self that
originated in object relations theory, Hollway
(2006) highlights the dynamic dimension of the
unconscious, noting,
At
a time before the infant can experience any self boundaries, these
are provided by the mother…[and]… Bion (1967) saw
this in terms of the container (mother) and contained (infant).
Projective identification for him is a form on unconscious
communication which enables a receptive mother to experience the
feelings of her baby, transform them by using her mind, and through
her body and emotional state communicate these modified, hopefully
detoxified, feelings back to the infant, who can feel them to be
bearable. The infant in this way borrows the mother’s mind, which
only gradually becomes internalized to the point where it is the
baby’s own resource. (p. 475).
Building
on Klein’s ideas, Winnicott (1974) coined
the well-known phrase the “good-enough” mother, said to be
somebody who can “contain” both negative and positive
identifications coming from the infant, transform and re-project such
identifications, but which are now in modified from. The point worth
emphasizing here is that such maternal or paternal projective
identifications should be understood as part and parcel of ongoing
unconscious relational dynamics. Hollway (2006) commenting
on what relational or intersubjective psychoanalytic accounts have in
common,
is
the notion of a dynamic unconscious: “the way in which our mind
transforms new relations into old ones (transference); others into
parts of ourselves (introjection); and parts of ourselves into
others (projection)” (Alford, 2002, p. 3), and it is this that
distinguishes them from relational theories which revert to an idea
of relationship between conscious, intentional bounded individuals.
(p. 475).
One
of the first puzzling questions we can ask is how the an extremely
fragile ego constantly under threat of disintegration could introject and project in
the first place, especially as these are said to be psychic processes
that require some degree of stability and boundedness. Essentially
what seems to be involved in holding even the first elements of what
might constitute a personality or ego together, is that this
“keeping together” experience is “performed initially from
outside.” Bick (1968) suggests
that the baby has to struggle for the capacity to introject, and that
this achievement of both infant and mother is related to embodiment,
“The stage of primal splitting and idealization of self and object
can now be seen to rest on this earlier process of containment of self
and object by their respective ‘skins’” (Bick, 1968, p. 484).
Embodiment presupposes containment and the establishment of boundaries,
and it would seem that before the infant can do anything at all, it
has to experience an object in such a way that it intuits the concept
of a space that can hold things. In other words, interdependent with
the experience of being fed, is the creation of an “inside,” and
that,
(Bick)…
showed the baby struggling for the capacity to introject and that
this is a function of the skin, or rather a function of skin
sensations which arouse fantasies of a containing object
…(and)…the first introjection is the introjection of an object
which provides a space into which objects can be introjected. Before
projection can happen there has to be an internal object capable of
containing which can be projected into an object before that object
can be felt to contain a projection. (Hinshelwood, 1989, pp.
193–4).
It
is in this way that the creation of a unified space comes about, where
before there was none. Only with the existence of an internal
psychologically enclosing space can the capacity to introject emerge.
The first achievement is to win the concept of a space that holds
things, “the infant in gaining the nipple in his mouth has an
experience of acquiring such an object – an object that closes the
hole (the mouth and other orifices) in the skin boundary. (Hinshelwood,
1989, p. 194).” This experience is fundamentally rooted in the
somatic-affective domain. Whatever might constitute consciousness
emerges from somatic, embodied, material-physical, tactile/affective
experience – that is, a
fundamentally social milieu.
Although
the Kleinian account of psychic development starts from
neurobiological assumptions regarding survival and existence (e.g.,
instincts) the boundaries between what constitutes the “external”
and “internal” are initially very blurred. In other words, while
it is assumed that at some basic level the infant orients to the fact
that the breast-sustenance (part-object) is very much external, it is
just as much a construction from within, or as Kristeva
(2001) puts it:
(an)
internal image, to the extent that the fragile ego, as it constructs
and deconstructs the boundary between the inside and outside, is
where this quasi-object (or this object-being-constituted) is formed.
From the outset, then, the primal
object of the paranoid-schizoid position
emerges, in Klein’s view, if and only if it is an internal
object constructed through a fantasy of
omnipotence.
The
initial experience for the infant became known as the
paranoid-schizoid position, so called in that it amounts to the
totality of the infant’s instinctual desires and unconscious
phantasies – where the libidinally invested breast as the primary
good object reflects the power of the life instinct. For the infant
the experience of the immediate satiation of hunger/distress is not
something that is “happening-to-me” as a separate individual but
rather a state of vacillating “omnipotence-to-pain/annihilation” (thus
the term “paranoid-shizoid” position)2.
The metaphor of positions and movement between and within them should
be understood as a shifting affective-dynamic psychic vantage point.
Gradually however, and realized in part through neurobiological
maturation (around 3–6 months), the rudimentary and fragile elements/part-objects
begin a gradual synthesis or coming together. There are both negative
and positive aspects of this moving toward the rather sombrely termed
“depressive position3”.
The account here is that the infant begins to recognize that this
gradually solidify “whole mother” is “understood to be the sole
site of both sustenance and privation, and while this is much closer
to reality, it necessarily ushers in a sense of the painful
imperfections and limitations of life.” (Likierman, 2001, p. 101). A
representative account is that:
The
infant loses the precious sense that there exists, somewhere, an
ideal object of unlimited pleasure and satisfaction. This triggers
an experience of a “loss of the loved object.” The whole mother
initially represents a despoiled perfection and provokes sorrow and
indignant rage in turn. … It is this recognition that triggers the
depressive position (Likierman, 2001, p. 101).
The
depressive position, amongst other things, describes the initial
recognition of awareness of separateness. In the paranoid-schizoid
position there is no such awareness. Before such inklings there is in
effect, no infant, in other words, no subjectivity, no experience, no
memory. However, there is a history that is marked on the body – it
is just that there is no word-based history. This is what Winnicott
(1974) meant when he states there is no
such thing as an infant initially, only the
mother-infant unit. The danger or challenge of becoming human is that
of relating to people who ultimately you have no control over (i.e.,
unlike in the paranoid-schizoid position with the phantasy of
omnipotent control). Winnicott describes the infant as becoming
capable of the capacity for “ruth” – the possibility of feeling
concern for another person. This arises through the gradual awareness
that another person is a subject as well as an object. Gaining
relatedness and a sense of subjectivity involves the giving up and
loss of omnipotence and unity-of-twoness (i.e., there is no awareness
of separateness in the mother-infant unit). The assumption is that at
some level this is an affective/emotional loss but nevertheless a
necessary and required element of psychological development and growth. Hollway
(2006) makes the point that Winnicott, and
psychoanalysis more generally:
sees
separation and the ability to differentiate between one’s own
wishes and those emanating from outside as being crucial in the
gradual achievement of self. Babies struggle to achieve unit status,
and total independence is not the outcome of development. Winnicott
(1968) understands children as proceeding from
“absolute dependence, rapidly changing to relative dependence, and
always travelling towards (but never reaching) independence” (p.
90). (Hollway, 2006, p. 476).
The
gradual shifting away from the paranoid-schizoid position also
engenders in the infant the desire to make reparation for the damage
or destruction of the lost object (the phantasised internal object she
used to have control over) who no longer exists. Hinshelwood
(1989) comments that reparation, though it is
concerned primarily with the state of the internal world and the good
object (said to form the core of the personality) is usually expressed
in action toward the mother. Kristeva (2001) makes
the point that,
Klein’s
depressive position offers yet another innovation, one that will
eventually encourage creativity: the feeling of depression mobilizes
the desire to make
reparation to objects. The baby, by believing
that he is responsible for the loss of his mother, also imagine that
he can undo the nefarious effects of his aggression through her love
and care for him. “The depressive conflict is a constant struggle
between the infant’s destructiveness and his love and reparative
impulses.” (Segal, 1990, p. 60). To deal with the depressive
suffering that results from his feeling of having damaged the
external and internal object, the baby tries to make reparation and
restoration to the good object. His love only grows in the process.
(p. 79)
The
fact that the move into, or rather the overlaying over [the
paranoid-schizoid position] of the depressive position, is
interdependent with affective-semiotic-discursive dimensions of
normativity underpins affective developmental psychoanalytic thought
(Green, 1999). Keeping in mind that from the outset we are dealing
with a mother-child unit, the initial precursors to any process that
leads to awareness involves something that you might call an
affect-laden emotional mirroring that constitutes the interactive/participative
expression of the mother-infant unit (i.e., we need to remember, there
are initially no separate entities). To paraphrase Winnicott’s
description of the infant’s initial experience, “When I look I am
seen [by
somebody else], so I exist; I can now afford to look and see” (emphasis
added). This apparently simplistic phrase requires some unraveling.
What
is being suggested is that the baby sees herself and gradually attains
some intuition of the “self” through the reflection seen.
Initially, what you (see about your “self”) is what the mother
sees:
What
does the baby see when he or she looks at the mother’s face? I am
suggesting that, ordinarily, what the baby sees is himself or
herself. In other words, the mother is looking at the baby and what
she (the baby) looks
like is related to what she (the mother) sees
there. All this is too easily taken for granted.’ (Winnicott,
1971, p. 151 [Italics in the original]).
It
is important to understand that what “she sees there” – will be
the mother’s own projections, wishes and desires regarding the “baby-entity.”
Needless to say, these projections and desires are saturated, in fact
interdependent with, the particular cultural discourses prevailing in
any particular context (see Demuth et al., 2012; for
interesting examples of parental discursive difference across cultural
contexts). And when the baby moves from existing (through being seen),
and begins to “look and see,” what the infant sees (seeing with)
is already colored by the desire or intentionality of the mother - -
the infants experience of the mother’s desire for it to exist [as an
infant]; in other words, something akin to: “‘I want them to want
me’ and that is the condition for my wanting them.” It is this
complex interpenetration that forms the basis for the suggestion that
the “inside” that is coming into being is already interdependently
saturated with the “outside” (what is reflected back – through
action, discourse, social semiosis of all forms).
In
order to highlight the significance of action, transaction and affect
in these mother–child dynamics Winnicott (1960) introduced
the idea of a transitional space – which despite the everyday
connotation that this amounts to something that exists between individuals,
should be understood as both within-and-without – as well as
potentially present (internal) even when the young child is on their
own. As an example of the affective dynamics of the transitional
space, Winnicott (1974) for
example, proposed that through the projection out of, and onto, the object the
child produces the conditions which allow recognition of
“feeling”(s) possible. Here, the use of the phrase “produces the
conditions” is significant because it is not as if the child is
first feeling bad and then simply “puts the badness” outside.
Rather, it is the projection that amounts to a defense against the
badness (the infant or young child represses the recognition of the
“internal” badness’ – caused by hunger, aggressive impulse,
constitutional characteristics or whatever - by spontaneously
producing the projection). And then, once projected outside, it can
then (the badness) be recognized as something “not very nice” but
now, and very importantly no longer “inside,” but instead
controllable and containable by being “in the other,” or “in the
object.”
One
can begin to see the significance of the idea of the transitional
space for understanding affect, emotion, the identification of
feeling(s) and how such experiences are related to the emergence of
self-hood. In other words, in order to know that what is being
experienced is “feeling” or affect never mind identifying what
that feeling is, this will involve object-relations – interacting
with others and objects within a transitional space. Such an approach
to subjectivity is echoed in the work of Hollway
(2006) who argues that we are psycho-social
“because we are products of a unique life history of anxiety- and
desire- provoking life events and the manner in which they have been
transformed in internal reality…(and)…because unconscious defences
are an intersubjective process.” (p. 466).
It
was with reference to transitional dynamics that Winnicott
(1974) suggested the mother should be seen as the
infant’s psychological matrix. In the beginning the mother provides
the psychological or mental space within which the infant generates
experience. Only gradually does the maternally provided psychological
matrix begin to erode, and the infant tentatively initiates his/her
own psychological matrix, one within which she/he develops the
capacity to deal with separateness. What we have then is this gradual
transformation from “mother-as-environment” toward “mother-as-object.”
As the infant gradually attains individuation or awareness of
“I-ness” she/he simultaneously begins to recognize the
separateness of “infant-mother,” i.e., infant as self/object, and
mother as other/object. Psychoanalysts after Winnicott draw attention
to that element of taking up (attaining) a place in the “depressive
position” where the mother provides “presence but absence” i.e.,
paradoxically being physically present with the child yet
psychologically absent and contrastively, being psychologically
present with/to the child and yet physically absent. Ogden
(1992) highlights the ambiguous nature of this
process, commenting,
This
paradox can be understood in the following way: the mother is absent
as object, but is there as the unnoticed, but present containing
space in which the child is playing. The mother must not make her
presence as object too important, for this would lead to child to
become addicted to her as omnipotent object. The development
of the capacity to be alone is a process in
which the mother’s role as invisible co-author of potential space
is taken over by (what is becoming) the child. In this sense, the
healthy individual, when alone, is always in the presence of the
self-generated environmental mother. (p. 182) [emphasis added]
The
proposal that the “internal,” private experiential domain is in
effect initially interpenetrated with the experiences of another (the
mother) necessitates accommodating a somewhat paradoxical way of
thinking – certainly one at odds with ideas on the construction of
the self in cognitive-developmental psychology (e.g., Harter,
1999; Pfeifer and Peake, 2012). The suggestion that
the formulating elements of a sense of self are in effect co-authored,
with the infant initially possessing no recognition of what is going
on, points to a certain ambiguity regarding symbolization and the
social-semiotic basis of self-ness. In a way this could be understood
as the sense of self forever containing the “shadow of the other”
(mother) in addition to the observation that entering or taking up a
self-position in discourse and language presupposes the appropriation
of the available discourses in context.
Concluding
Comments
Part
of the impetus for this review topic is the concern with examining the
interdependence between psychological phenomena and the discursive and
embodied practices of social interaction. Earlier the suggestion was
made that part of the reason why CA has particular difficulties with
addressing the relationship between affect and action, is the
avoidance or elision of discussion regarding any construct or concept
that presupposes an interiority of mental states, internal psychic
life or inaccessible affective state. Such a view is certainly
defensible given the suspicion over the excessive formalism of
contemporary cognitive science allayed with debatable ascriptions
regarding the causal dynamics of the cognition-emotion-behavior link (Coulter,
1999). It is also defensible given the participant-oriented empirical
criteria of CA and the associated skepticism regarding
over-interpretation. But at the same time, there may be a sense in
which CA, in avoiding theoretical dialogue with psychoanalytic thought
is missing an opportunity to examine implicit presuppositional
assumptions that may lie behind adopting agnostic positions. In other
words, the manner in which elision take place seems to result in there
nevertheless remaining (if “neutral”) an implicit model of the
infant/child mind, e.g., a resource identifying pattern detecting
entity (Wootton, 1997; Lerner et al., 2011). The
participant-oriented evidential requirements of CA may engender a
reticence to consider what alternative, if somewhat marginalized
perspectives such as object-relations theory and psycho-social
approaches might have to offer. The proposal is that CA may find in
psychoanalytic thinking a fruitful framework for understanding the
interdependence between affect and action.
A
number of possible directions for an empirically grounded CA theory of
personhood/subjectivity could emerge from studies that for example,
examine in detail the earliest moments of parent-infant engagement,
documenting and explicating the multi-modal dimensions of
participation, action, and affect. Mondada (2019) in
a recent commentary on expanding multi-modal analysis in CA, makes
that point that participants engage with their bodies not only to
communicate with each other, but also in sensing the world – arguing
that multisensorial practices are intersubjectively organized.
Infant-focused CA studies of the earliest sensorial experiences
following birth might help highlight how the status of
“subjectivity” or personhood comes about in the first instance.
Furthermore, examining these earliest moments longitudinally would
help identify the circumstances within which the presuppositional
grounding of the “infant-as-subject” begins to emerge. One could
also begin to examine, given Winnicott’s (1968) argument,
whether in the talk and discourse that mothers and fathers first
direct toward infants, we find evidence of culturally specific
representations of idealized infancy (e.g., along lines similar to Demuth
et al., 2012). Finally, we might conjecture that if whatever we
understand as unconscious defenses are in fact intersubjectively
constituted, then by examining early parent–child interaction at a
sufficiently level of granularity, we should be able to highlight
those circumstances whereby the infant/young child learns what not to
say – learning that there is much beyond language that needs to be
kept under control (inappropriate actions, non-verbal misdeeds and
associated behaviors that might contravene the “doing being
ordinary” of everyday members’ methods).
By
way of a concluding comment one can say that in the work of
psychoanalysts such as Klein and Winnicott we are presented with a
thoroughly relational conception of human nature. Phenomenologically,
psychic life is already socially (and discursively) saturated. From
this perspective it would seem that some form of affective-normativity
suffuses the earliest experiences of the infant’s life, given that
from the outset identificatory phenomena (introjection and projection)
are not only part and parcel of embodiment, but are also conveyed,
recognized and produced within and through the prevailing discourses,
which constitute social action. However, this is not to presuppose the
methodological shadow of a discursive or CA “master-discourse.” Hollway
(2011) adopting a psycho-social perspective and
commenting on the growing need to go beyond the “empty” subject of
discourse analysis, argues that inner psychic processes are not
“purely psychological,” if that means sealed off from the external
world, and that the boundaries between the inner and outer are porous,
neither autonomous or static, and that psychoanalytic theory,
specifies
the way processes like splitting and identification act on social
and cultural material (through meaning making and the expression of
agency in practices). It does provide accounts of “how internal
mental contents might be transformed” (citing Wetherell,
2003, p. 115; Hollway, 2011, p. 11).
Essentially,
the proposal developed above highlights the tantalizing possibility
that all “psychic” or psychological life (whatever we understand
that to be) is somehow inherently social or infused with a socially
shared normativity. We are of course still left with the challenge of
how the affect-laden socially normativity that may underpin embodied
parent-infant practices seen at the beginnings of life, finds
expression – particularly given the suggestion that the essence of
affect is “its capacity to seep into other domains and inhabit them”
(Green, 1999, p. 285). Contemporary research in child-focused CA
appears to be explicating how such seepage finds expression.
|
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