

MARCO FORLIVESI

A Man, an Age, a Book

1. *A man*

Bartolomeo Mastri was born in Meldola, near Forlì, on 7th December, 1602, into the lower aristocracy of the town. He entered the Order of Friars Minor Conventual in about 1616 and was educated at the Order's *studia* in Cesena, Bologna, and Naples. After a brief period of teaching logic in the *studia* of the Order in Parma and Bologna, he completed his period as a student in the 'Collegio di S. Bonaventura' in Rome in the years 1625-1628. From 1628 to 1638 he was Regent, together with his fellow Brother Bonaventura Belluto from Catania, of the Order's *studia* in Cesena and Perugia. In 1638 he was promoted, together with Belluto, to the post of Regent of the 'Collegio di S. Antonio' in Padua, a post he retained until 1641. From that year, which according to the customs of the time marked the end of his career as a teacher, until 1647 he resided alternately either in Meldola or Ravenna, a city where he held the post as private theologian to Cardinal Luigi Capponi. In the meantime, together with Belluto, from 1628 to 1647 he planned, wrote and published his first great work: a *cursus* of Scotist philosophy articulated into logic, physics, and metaphysics. In 1647 he was elected Minister of his Order for the Province of Bologna. When this assignment was completed, in 1650, he returned to Meldola, where he lived until 1659 and compiled most of his theological works. From that year, until 1665, he was frequently a member of the retinue of the General Minister of his Order, Giacomo Fabretti from Ra-

venna. In particular, in 1662 he held the post of General Vicar. On failing to be elected as General Minister in 1665, he returned to Meldola, where he concluded the compilation of his theological works. He died on 11th January, 1673.

Mastri was the author of four works. The first, of an explicitly philosophical nature, was planned and, to a large extent, written in collaboration with Belluto. It was published in seven quarto tomes divided according to subject matter from 1637 to 1647 (tomes which were partly revised from 1644 to 1652 by Mastri alone) and was reprinted after the deaths of its authors under the title of *Philosophiæ ad mentem Scoti cursus integer*. A second work, of a polemical nature, aimed at his fellow friar Matteo Frée, was published in a single quarto volume in 1650 entitled *Scotus et scotistæ Bellutus et Mastrius expurgati a probrosis querelis ferchianis*. A third work was published in four folio volumes from 1655 to 1664 and is generally referred to as *Disputationes theologicæ in quatuor libros Sententiarum*. The last is a weighty *Theologia moralis*, published in a single folio volume in 1671. The title of the first work fully corresponds to its contents: it is a philosophical treatise divided into logic, physics, and metaphysics. The titles of the last two works, on the other hand, do not express equally as clearly their contents, since they incorporate philosophical themes both as tools for argumentation and in the matters discussed.¹

There are many sides to Bartolomeo Mastri, both as a person and as a writer. Pleading and obsequious in the letters of the summer of 1646 to Olimpia Aldobrandini Jr., even going as far as to say, “rephrasing” a passage from the Bible, that «il core de principi è in mano di Dio», he, however, also presents himself in the same letters as «uno dei primi soggetti» of his Order.² In the final years of his life, this high self-esteem, along with a concept of government posts also as a form of remuneration for merits

1. For Mastri's life and the editions of his works, cf. M. FORLIVESI, “*Scotistarum princeps*”. *Bartolomeo Mastri (1602-1673) e il suo tempo*, (Fonti e studi francescani, 11), Padova: Centro studi antoniani, 2002. For Belluto, cf. Fr. COSTA, “Il p. Bonaventura Belluto, OFMConv (1603-1676)”, in *Miscellanea francescana*, 73 (1973), pp. 81-136 e 387-437; 76 (1976), pp. 125-208.

2. Cf. FORLIVESI, “*Scotistarum princeps*”..., pp. 191-199.

achieved in other fields, becomes a protest at not having been conferred *dignitates*: «Ut vero desideria tua [i.e.: of the reader] labore meo sint tandem adæquata, remanet ultimus, et supremus moralis theologiae tomus complendus, ac in lucem edendus (...). Eius tamen compositioni iam incumbo, exordio a prævijs disputationibus de conscientia, et legibus auspicato, et sine intermissione prosequar, si vita, et sanitas supererint, nec aliud obvenerit regiminis impedimentum, ut plane pluribus de causis non obvenerit opinor; sed præsertim ob rationem politicam a doctissimo p. Fabro nostro adductam 4. d. 45. de restitutione cap. 5. n. 138. et experientia ab ipso comprobata, ubi ait quod Religiones quædam *litteratis velut equis, et mulis utuntur, idest, solum ad labores, ad dignitates autem, et regimina dicunt esse ineptos*, quasi litteræ, et virtutes in Religionibus sint præcipua ad dignitates consequendas impedimenta».³

In his works he does express praise for other scholars but also, and perhaps more frequently, blame. He is often caustic. When stigmatizing the “neoteric” Jesuits’ habit of not comparing themselves with authors of other Orders, he concludes: «hanc scribendi rationem noviter adinventam superbiam in eis arguere, dum cum exteris disserere renuunt, vel timorem».⁴ When setting about confuting some of the Theatine Zaccaria Pasqualigo’s arguments, he writes: «quamvis plurimæ eius rationes coincidunt, ut eius moris est in arguendo, omnes tamen referam, quæ minus coincidunt, ne ullam subterfugere videamur».⁵ At times Matri is even scornful, for example, when addressing his fellow friar Francesco Pontelonghi, without mentioning him by name, he invites him to go along the «Pontem longum, et arctum asinorum, a dialecticis pro tardioribus ingeniis erudiendis institutum»;⁶ elsewhere, referring to the scanty attention he had paid to the criticism made of him by another co-religionary, Alessandro Rossi, he writes: «Aquila quam mea ostentant gentilicia, muscas <non> ca-

3. MASTRIUS, *Lectori benevolo*, in IDEM, *In IV Sent.*, Venetiis 1664, cc. a3v-4r; his italics. On this topic, see FORLIVESI, “*Scotistarum princeps*”..., pp. 254-256.

4. MASTRIUS – BELLUTUS, *In De gen.*, disp. 5, q. 3, a. 1, n. 78, Venetiis 1640 (archetypal edition Venetiis 1652), p. 259a.

5. MASTRIUS, *In Met.*, disp. 2, q. 2, n. 40, 2 vol., Venetiis 1646-47, vol. I, p. 98b.

6. MASTRIUS, *Ad lectorem*, in IDEM, *In I Sent.*, Venetiis 1655, c. a3r-v.

pit».⁷ However, it is the Irish Recollect, John Punch, and the Dalmatian Conventual, Matteo Frée, who arouse this author's most irate tones. This is Mastri, in a single *quæstio* dedicated to Punch, protesting mockingly: «rationes adduco quibus Poncius non respondebit, si annos Mathusalæ viveret». He then exclaims disconsolately: «bone Deus, quomodo talis compositio imperfectionem non involvet, si est ex actu, et potentia?». Finally he concludes indignantly: «restat ergo ut hæc potentia passiva perfectionem dicens, non nisi ex tenebris sui cerebri in lucem prodiret».⁸ Frée is even the object of an entire polemical work, published moreover without the consent of the General Minister of the Order: this is the previously mentioned *Scotus et scotistæ Bellutus et Mastrius expurgati a probrosis querelis ferchianis*.⁹

On the speculative level, we find in Mastri's texts indications that are surprisingly modern (taking the term perhaps more in a moral than in an historical sense). First of all are the passages that I have quoted as epigraphs to this volume. The first shows a view of truth that opens the way to a hermeneutic conception of it (obviously not in the Heideggerian sense): «formalitas veritatis non consistit in simplici adæquatione, sed in similitudine quadam intentionali; sed similitudo suo modo dicitur suscipere magis et minus; ergo et veritas».¹⁰ The second features the craving of the mind *zu den Sachen selbst*: «evidentia, et claritas perficit actum intellectus secundum naturalem eius exigentiam, quæ talis est, ut suum assensum præbere quærat ex proprio, et non ex alieno testimonio rem in seipsa cernendo, et intuendo, unde experimur intellectum nunquam quiescere, quousque rem in seipsa cernat, et intueatur».¹¹ Moreover, in Mastri's works there is a conception of the scientist as an *artifex*, who chooses «ex suo arbitrio» to «assumere aliquam rerum seriem declarandam», and of

7. MASTRIUS, *Ad lectorem*, in IDEM, *In III Sent.*, Venetiis 1661, c. a4v. Re. the disputes between Mastri and Pontelonghi, and between Mastri and Rossi cf. FORLIVESI, "Scotistarum princeps"..., pp. 244-252.

8. MASTRIUS, *In I Sent.*, disp. 2, q. 8, a. 2, n. 327, p. 159a e n. 329, p. 160a. On the dispute with Punch, cf. FORLIVESI, "Scotistarum princeps"..., pp. 208-218.

9. Cf. *Id.*, pp. 202-207.

10. MASTRIUS – BELLUTUS, *In Org.*, disp. 10, q. 2, a. 4, n. 47, Venetiis 1646, p. 788b.

11. MASTRIUS, *In I Sent.*, disp. 1, q. un., a. 1, n. 17, p. 6b.

science as a *scientifica fabrica*, whose unity is that of a «unum quoddam artificiosum». ¹² Further, there is a reference to the essential role of language in philosophical enquiry, to the connection between the object and the language of research: «nil magis ad veritatem indagandam conferat quam verus, et proprius loquendi modus». ¹³

At the same time, Mastri and Belluto profess that their philosophy is clearly oriented, being not only Scotist in character but also serving the Catholic faith and theology: «licet Aristotelis philosophiam sumpserimus, et commentariis illustrandam, et disputationibus enucleandam, tamen quia eam conscribere philosophiam intendimus quæ nostræ theologiæ famulari possit, et debeat, cum Philosophus in multis erraverit variaque principiis fidei nostræ repugnancia assenderit, ideo postquam sensum Philosophi breviter explicuerimus, si principiis fidei non erit consentaneus limites aristotelicæ philosophiæ egrediemur, et philosophiam secundum se trademus». Here, however, it can be seen that the instruments of such a task are the nature of things and natural reason, whereas the contents of faith seem to be, and indeed are, used only as an extrinsic criterion of evaluation: «ipsi naturæ lumini ac naturali rationi, quantum fieri potest, innixi, quæ apud nos semper et ubique magis valebit quam nuda Aristotelis auctoritas». ¹⁴ It is, therefore, the very nature of things and our ability to capture it, rather than a revelation, that must perforce lead, according to Mastri, to a convergence of opinions: «adversarii veritate coacti tandem et ipsi veritati subscribunt». ¹⁵ Conforming to the dictates of the Catholic Church is undoubtedly the cause of his philosophical theses as far as his intentions

12. *Id.*, disp. 12, q. 2, a. 6, n. 48, p. 854a.

13. MASTRIUS, *In I Sent.*, disp. 2, q. 8, a. 2, n. 319, p. 154a.

14. MASTRIUS – BELLUTUS, *In Phys.*, q. proœmialis, [prologus], n. 1, Venetiis ²1644, pp. 1b-2a. I should warn the reader that, in my opinion, Mastri and Belluto use the distinction between “physics in itself” and “physics according to Aristotle” ambiguously, since the meaning that they attribute to them oscillates between the “distinction between authentic physics and that proposed historically by Aristotle” and the “distinction between physics as it can be developed by human intellect *ex natura potentiæ* and physics as it can be produced by the intellect *pro statu isto*”.

15. MASTRIUS, *In Met.*, disp. 2, q. 1, n. 14, vol. I, p. 78b.

are concerned, but it is not the cause of them with regard to his argumentations. Even theology, in our author's view, claims the independence of philosophical theses from itself. In discussing the appearance of *stellæ novæ*, when faced with the hypothesis that this may occur through divine intervention, Mastri and Belluto admit that this is possible but add: «Attamen axioma est theologicum non esse concedenda miracula, ubi non adest necessitas, atqui nulla est necessitas inducendi tot miracula, quot novæ stellæ fuere».¹⁶ It should be noted, however, that such a principle aims at defending the religious faith rather than at expressing any hint of agnosticism: the two Conventuals, indeed, proceed to clarify that the *necessitas* of a miracle is to be found in edification and that, given this, it is not possible to see what the cause or the purpose of the apparitions of such stars are, if one were to suppose that they are miraculous events.¹⁷

It will have to be the theoreticians' task to evaluate whether these perspectives are compatible with the spirit of the Modern Age or not. There is no doubt that Mastri and Belluto's theses in the field of astronomy are contrary to those of modern times, yet they are the product of a careful collection of information and of a precise, up-to-date knowledge of the debate then taking place.¹⁸ In point of fact, in Mastri's work there are frequently examples and doctrines which it might seem surprising to find when stated by a single author. In this regard, another good epigraph to this volume could also have been a passage from *Compendium totius Theologiæ moralis Bartholomæi Mastrii* by Giacomo Garzi, where we find at the same time the statement of the primacy of the individual's conscience as a rule of morality, a concept of woman as bearing rights, together with a view of the practice of sex as tolerable solely in marriage and even as an obligation accepted by tak-

16. MASTRIUS – BELLUTUS, *In De cælo*, disp. 2, q. 3, n. 114, Venetiis 1640, p. 92a.

17. *Ib.*

18. See, for instance, elsewhere in the work *In De cælo* the various questions dedicated to the movement and position of the Earth and the planets in the universe; in particular, consider Mastri and Belluto's reply to Galileo's considerations concerning the impossibility of establishing the state of immobility or that of uniform rectilinear movement in a closed system on the basis of observations effected on that sole system.

ing the marriage vows: «si quis accederet ad uxorem non suam, putans invincibiliter esse suam, non peccat; et si uxor non sua, ab ipso putata pro certo sua, debitum petat, tenetur reddere».¹⁹

2. An age

2.1 *The vitality of the studies concerning the history of academic philosophy from late Middle Ages to early Modern Age*

For over twenty years, historians of philosophy have had at their disposal studies that provide highly competent illustrations of the underlying ideas of the history of philosophy at the time when Mastri's works were written. I refer to the works of Kristeller and Schmitt on thought from the 15th to the 17th century,²⁰ to those of Oberman on the late Middle Ages and on the con-

19. Iacobus GARZIUS, *Compendium totius theologiæ moralis (...) Bartolomæi Mastrii de Meldula (...) in varios casus per omnes materias congestum*, De conscientia, dub. 4, Ravennæ 1686, p. 6 (second series). The text is not found word for word in Mastri's *Theologia moralis*, but faithfully illustrates both his doctrine about the worth of the wrong conscience and that concerning the nature of marital duty: cf. MASTRIUS, *Th. mor.*, disp. 1, q. 2, a. 1, n. 20, Venetiis 1723 (archetypal edition Venetiis 1671), p. 5b e *Id.*, disp. 20, q. 6, a. 1, n. 123, p. 490b.

20. P.O. KRISTELLER, *Renaissance Thought. The Classic, Scholastic, and Humanist Strains*, (Harper Torchbooks – The Academy Library), New York: Harper and Row, 1961. ID., *Renaissance Philosophy and the Mediaeval Tradition*, (Wimmer Lecture, 15), Latrobe: The Archabbey Press, 1966. ID., *Le thomisme et la pensée italienne de la Renaissance*, Institut d'études médiévales, Montreal – Paris: Vrin, 1967. Ch.B. SCHMITT, *John Case and Aristotelianism in Renaissance England*, (McGill-Queen's Studies in the History of Ideas, 5), Kingston – Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1983. ID., *Aristotle and the Renaissance*, (Martin Classical Lectures, 27), Cambridge (MA) – London: Oberlin College – Harvard University Press, 1983. ID., *The Aristotelian Tradition and Renaissance Universities*, (Collected Studies Series, 203), London: Variorum, 1984. ID., *Galilei and the Seventeenth-Century Text-Book Tradition*, in *Novità celesti e crisi del sapere. Atti del Convegno internazionale di studi galileiani*, ed. by P. Galluzzi, Firenze: Giunti – Barbera, 1984, pp. 217-228. To these must be added the numerous essays by Mahoney on the "Aristotelianism" of the Renaissance, although they are more fragmentary; in particular, I suggest E.P. MAHONEY, "Aristotle and Some Late Medieval and Renaissance Philosophers", in *The Impact of Aristotelianism on Modern Philosophy*, ed. by R. POZZO, (Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy, 39), Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2004, pp. 1-34, and ID., *Two Aristotelians of the Italian Renaissance. Nicoletto Vernia and Agostino Nifo*, (Variorum Collected Studies Series, 697), Aldershot – Burlington: Ashgate 2000.

nection between the Middle Ages and the Reformation,²¹ to the work of Solana about the history of Spanish philosophy,²² to the studies of Jansen, Wundt and Di Vona on philosophy at the universities in the 17th century,²³ and to the essays of Nuchelmans on the themes of the history of the doctrines of knowledge.²⁴ They document the wealth of the philosophy that developed in European institutes of learning from the 15th to the 17th century and show, or at least suggest, the great debt that modern philosophy has towards it.²⁵ They hereby also constitute the

21. H.A. OBERMAN, *Forerunners of the Reformation. The Shape of Late Medieval Thought*, New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966. ID., *The Harvest of Medieval Theology. Gabriel Biel and Late Medieval Nominalism*, Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co.,²1967.

22. M. SOLANA, *Historia de la filosofía española. Epoca del Renacimiento (siglo XVI)*, vol. III, Madrid: Asociación española para el progreso de las ciencias, 1941.

23. J. JANSEN, "Die scholastische Philosophie des XVII Jahrhunderts", in *Philosophisches Jahrbuch*, 50 (1937), pp. 401-444. ID., *Die Pflege der Philosophie im Jesuitenorden während des XVII-XVIII Jahrhunderts*, Fulda: Parzeller, 1938. ID., "Die scholastische Psychologie vom 16. bis 18. Jahrhundert", in *Scholastik*, 26 (1951), pp. 342-363 (The numerous studies by Bernhard Jansen about the seventeenth-century Catholic Scholasticism in Germany are listed in J. DE VRIES, "Zur Geschichte und Problematik der Barockscholastik in Deutschland", in *Theologie und Philosophie* (Freiburg), 57/1 (1982), p. 3, footnote 10). M. WUNDT, *Die deutsche Schulmetaphysik des 17. Jahrhunderts*, Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1939. P. DI VONA, *Studi sulla scolastica della controriforma. L'esistenza e la sua distinzione metafisica dall'essenza*, (Pubblicazioni della Facoltà di Lettere e Filosofia dell'Università di Milano, 48 – Sezione a cura dell'Istituto di Storia della filosofia, 14), Firenze: La Nuova Italia, 1968. ID., "La scolastica dell'età post tridentina e del Seicento", in *Storia della filosofia*, ed. by M. Dal Pra, vol. VII, Milano: Vallardi, 1976, pp. 755-777 e 948-949 (cf. also his three volumes on Spinoza).

24. G. NUCHELMANS, *Late-Scholastic and Humanist Theories of the Proposition*, (Verhandelingen der Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen, Afd. Letterkunde, Nieuwe Reeks, 103), Amsterdam – Oxford – New York: North-Holland, 1980. ID., *Judgment and Proposition. From Descartes to Kant*, (Verhandelingen der Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen, Afd. Letterkunde, Nieuwe Reeks, 118), Amsterdam – Oxford – New York: North-Holland, 1983. ID., *Studies on the History of Logic and Semantics, 12th-17th Centuries*, (Collected Studies Series, 560), ed. by E.P. Bos, Aldershot: Variorum, 1996.

25. These are, obviously, not the only widescale studies dedicated to the history of academic philosophy before the mid-eighties of the 20th century. Authors and works in German from von Elswich to Wundt are summarized by W. SPARN, *Wiederkehr der Metaphysik. Die ontologische Frage in der lutheri-*

best proof *in actu exercito* of the need to carry out research on this period in the history of philosophy. Nonetheless, the reader who should wish to tackle with justifications *in actu signato* of this field of studies could also read what was written as early as 1821 by Giacomo Leopardi,²⁶ or ponder over the considerations – which are not always homogeneous and at times even divergent – proposed in some of the publications of the last twenty years²⁷

schen Theologie des frühen 17. Jahrhunderts, (Calwer theologische Monographien, 4), Stuttgart: Calwer, 1976, pp. 6-13. For the Netherlands, mention should be made of P. DIBON, *La philosophie néerlandaise au siècle d'or, 1 L'enseignement philosophique dans les universités à l'époque précartésienne (1575-1650)*, Paris – Amsterdam – London – New York: Elsevier Publishing Company, 1954. From the 19th century, interest has also been shown in Italy in the history of academic philosophy, as testified not only by the works of Pietro Ragnisco but also by the short essay by A. PASTORE, *Giovanni Caramuel di Lobkowitz e i primordi della teoria della quantificazione del predicato*, Aosta: G. Allasia, 1905. Noteworthy, although marked by theoretical presuppositions and aims, are also the works of É. GILSON, *Études sur le rôle de la pensée médiévale dans la formation du système cartésien*, (Études de philosophie médiévale), Lille – Paris: Desclée De Brouwer – J. Vrin, ²1930, and C. GIACON, *La Seconda Scolastica*, 3 vol., (Archivum Philosophicum Aloisianum, Serie II, 3-4.6), Milano: Fratelli Bocca, 1944-50.

26. G. LEOPARDI, *Zibaldone di pensieri*, thoughts of the 13th July, of the 7th and 8th August, 1821; ed. by G. Pacella, (I libri della spiga), Milano: Garzanti, 1991, vol. I, pp. 801-802 and 876-878.

27. Cf. for example: J.S. FREEDMAN, *European Academic Philosophy in the Late Sixteenth and Early Seventeenth Centuries. The Life, Significance, and Philosophy of Clemens Timpler (1563/4-1624)*, (Studien und Materialien zur Geschichte der Philosophie, 27), 2 vol., Hildesheim – Zurich – New York: Olms, 1988, in particular vol. I, p. ii; J. HALDANE, “Editorial Introduction: Scholasticism – Old and New”, in *The Philosophical Quarterly*, 43 (1993), pp. 403-411; P. DI VONA, *I concetti trascendenti in Sebastián Izquierdo e nella Scolastica del Seicento*, (Libertà della mente, 3), Napoli: Loffredo editore, 1994, pp. 5-11; R. RASHED, “Préface”, in *Descartes et le Moyen Âge. Actes du Colloque organisé à la Sorbonne du 4 au 7 juin 1996 par le Centre d'histoire des sciences et des philosophies arabes et médiévales (URA 1085, CNRS/ÉPHÉ) à l'occasion du quatrième centenaire de la naissance de Descartes*, ed. by J. Biard – R. Rashed, (Études de philosophie médiévale, 75), Paris: Vrin, 1997, pp. 7-8; St.F. BROWN, “Preface” to *Meeting of the Minds. The Relations Between Medieval and Classical Modern European Philosophy. Acts of the International Colloquium held at Boston College June 14-16, 1996 Organized by the Société Internationale pour l'Étude de la Philosophie Médiévale*, ed. by St.F. Brown, (Rencontres de Philosophie Médiévale, 7), Turnhout: Éditions Brepols, 1998; Fr. BOTTIN, “Presentazione” to *Medioevo*, 24 (1998), pp. IX-X; J.S. FREEDMAN, “Introduction. The Study of Sixteenth- and Seventeenth-Century Writings on Academic Philosophy: Some Methodological Considerations”, in *Philosophy and the Arts in Central Europe*,

and, in this book, by Ghisalberti, Piaia, and Burgio. In actual fact, during the last twenty years, research into the history of philosophy at the universities from the 15th to the 17th century has flourished. Comprehensive presentations of this research can today be found in the volumes pertaining to the history of philosophy from the late Middle Ages to the 17th century published by Cambridge University Press;²⁸ in the entries on Aristotelism and Scholasticism in the *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy* and in the *Blackwell Companion to Early Modern Philosophy*;²⁹ in

1500-1700. Teaching and Texts at Schools and Universities, (Variorum Collected Studies Series, 626), Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999, article 1; A. GHISALBERTI, "Prefazione", in *Dalla prima alla seconda Scolastica. Paradigmi e percorsi storiografici*, ed. by A. Ghisalberti, (Philosophia, 28), Bologna: Ed. Studio domenicano, 2000, pp. 9-13; U. BALDINI, "Premessa" to *Saggi sulla cultura della Compagnia di Gesù (secoli XVI-XVIII)*, Padova: CLEUP, 2000, pp. 9-14; J. SCHMUTZ, "Bulletin de scolastique moderne (I)", in *Revue thomiste*, 100 (2000), pp. 270-341, in particular pp. 271-282; G.H. TUCKER, "Introduction: Petrarch's Curious Mountain of Virtue", in *Forms of the "Medieval" in the "Renaissance": A Multidisciplinary Exploration of a Cultural Continuum*, ed. by G.H. Tucker, (EMF Critiques), Charlottesville: Rookwood, 2000, pp. 1-25; J. DEELY, *Four Ages of Understanding. The First Postmodern Survey of Philosophy from Ancient Times to the Turn of the Twenty-First Century*, (Toronto Studies in Semiotic), Toronto – London – Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 2001, in particular pp. 473-483; O. BOULNOIS, "Pour une histoire philosophique de la scolastique du XVII^e siècle", in *Les Études philosophiques*, 2002, n. 1, pp. 1-2; R. POZZO, "Introduction", in *The Impact...*, pp. vii-xvi.

28. *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy. From the Rediscovery of Aristotle to the Disintegration of Scholasticism. 1100-1600*, ed. by N. Kretzmann – A. Kenn – J. Pinborg – E. Stump, Cambridge – New York – Port Melbourne – Madrid – Cape Town: Cambridge University Press, 1982; *The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy*, ed. by Ch.B. Schmitt – Q. Skinner – E. Kessler – J. Kraye, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988; *The Cambridge History of Seventeenth-Century Philosophy*, ed. by D. Garber – M. Ayers, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. The authors of nearly all the contributions on the single topics felt the need, in order to provide explanations of the themes debated within the fields discussed by them, to refer to doctrines not only of ancient times but also of the Renaissance and the Middle Ages. Nevertheless, cf. in particular the contributions of Menn, Trentman, and Tuck.

29. E.P. MAHONEY – J. SOUTH, "Aristotelianism, Renaissance", in *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. by E. Craig, London: Routledge, 1998, vol. I, pp. 404-413; R. ARIEW, "Aristotelianism in the 17th Century", in *Routledge Encyclopedia...*, vol. I, pp. 386-393; M.W.F. STONE, "Aristotelianism and Scholasticism in Early Modern Philosophy", in *A Companion to Early Modern Philosophy*, ed. by St. Nadler, (Blackwell Companions to Philosophy, 23), Mal-

the numerous, very well documented sections dedicated to it in the new edition of the part relevant to the 17th century in the *Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie*;³⁰ in the third and fourth volumes of the *Storia della teologia* published by Piemme;³¹ in Beuchot's monographs on the Spanish-American academic authors;³² in several chapters in the volume on *Le filosofie del Rinascimento* edited by Pissavino.³³ The monographs on authors or specific themes of the history of academic philosophy (not to mention the contributions in reviews and miscellaneous volumes) have for some time ceased to be a rarity³⁴ and, to the

den – Oxford – Carlton – Berlin: Blackwell Publishing, 2002, pp. 7-24. To these must be added Z. KALUZA, "Late Medieval Philosophy, 1350-1500", in *Routledge History of Philosophy*, vol. III *Medieval Philosophy*, ed. by J. Marenbon, London – New York: Routledge, 1998, pp. 426-451.

30. *Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie*, (founded by Fr. Ueberweg), *Die Philosophie des 17. Jahrhunderts*, 4 vol., ed. by J.-P. Schobinger – H. Holzhey – W. Schmidt-Biggemann, Basel: Schwabe, 1988-2001. I refer in particular to the contributions by Ashworth, Baldini, Blum, Brockliss, Dibon, Flower, Furlong, Jones, Henry, Rivera de Ventosa, Rogers, Schmidt-Biggemann, Schmitt, Shepherd, Sparn, Vanpaemel.

31. *Storia della teologia*, vol. III *Età della Rinascita*, ed. by G. D'Onofrio, Casale Monferrato: Edizioni Piemme, 1995; vol. IV *Età moderna*, ed. by G. Angelini – G. Colombo – M. Vergottini, 2001.

32. For brevity, and owing to its availability, I cite only M. BEUCHOT, *Historia de la filosofía en el México colonial*, Barcelona: Herder, 1997, of which an English translation is also available: ID., *The History of Philosophy in Colonial Mexico*, Washington D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1998. Complementary to Beuchot's works from a theological point of view, cf. *Teología en América Latina*, directed by J.I. Saranyana: vol. I *Desde los orígenes a la Guerra de Sucesión (1493-1715)*, Madrid: Iberoamericana, 1999; vol. II/1 *Escolástica barroca, Ilustración y preparación de la Independencia (1665-1810)*, Madrid – Frankfurt a.M.: Iberoamericana – Vervuert, 2005.

33. *Le filosofie del Rinascimento*, ed. by P.C. Pissavino, (Sintesi), Milano: Bruno Mondadori, 2002. In particular I refer to the contributions by Armogathe, Bianchi, Kraye, and Vasoli.

34. Among the monographs published in the last ten years (omitting essays concerning biographical history and those dedicated specifically to the history of institutes of learning) I point out briefly, merely to give some examples: M. BEUCHOT, *Pensamiento filosófico de San Vicente Ferrer*, 1995; D. FERRARO, *Itinerari del voluntarismo. Teología e politica al tempo di Luis de León*, 1995; W. REDMOND – M. BEUCHOT, *La teoría de la argumentación en el México colonial*, 1995; U.G. LEINSLE, *Einführung in die scholastische Theologie*, 1995; Fr. RIVA, *Analogia e univocità in Tommaso de Vio "Gaetano"*, 1995; E. RUMMEL, *The Humanist-Scholastic Debate in the Renaissance and Reformation*, 1995; L. SPRUIT, "Species intelligibilis": from Perception to Knowledge, vol. II *Renaissance*

same extent, the editions and translations of texts have also be-

sance Controversies, Later Scholasticism, and the Elimination of the Intelligible Species in Modern Philosophy, 1995; J.A. VAN RULER, *The Crisis of Causality: Voeitius and Descartes on God, Nature and Change*, 1995; E.J. BAUER, *Thomistische Metaphysik an der alten Benediktineruniversität Salzburg. Darstellung einer philosophischen Schule des 17./18. Jahrhunderts*, 1996; M. BEUCHOT, *Filosofía y ciencia en el México dieciochesco*, 1996; D. DES CHENE, "Physiologia". *Natural Philosophy in Late Aristotelian and Cartesian Thought*, 1996; M.A. GRANADA, *El debate cosmológico en 1588. Bruno, Brabe, Rothmann, Ursus, Röslin*, Napoli 1996; E. GRANT, *The Foundations of Modern Science in the Middle Ages: Their Religious, Intellectual, and Institutional Context*, 1996; H.C. KUHN, *Venetischer Aristotelismus im Ende der aristotelischen Welt. Aspekte der Welt und des Denkens des Cesare Cremonini (1550-1631)*, 1996; G. RONCAGLIA, "Palaestra rationis". *Discussioni su natura della copula e modalità nella filosofia scolastica tedesca del XVII secolo*, 1996; E. BAERT, *Aufstieg und Untergang der Ontologie. Descartes und die nachthomastische Philosophie*, 1997; A.S. BRETT, *Liberty, Right and Nature. Individual Rights in Later Scholastic Thought*, 1997; F. FIORENTINO, *Cesare Cremonini e il "Tractatus de Paedia"*, 1997; I. JERICÓ BERMEJO, *Fray Luis de León. La teología sobre el artículo y el dogma de la fe*, 1997; G. KNOCH-MUND, *Disputationsliteratur als Instrument antijüdischer Polemik. Leben und Werk des Marcus Lombardus, eines Grenzgängers zwischen Judentum und Christentum im Zeitalter des deutschen Humanismus*, 1997; St. MEIER-OESER, *Die Spur des Zeichens: Das Zeichen und seine Funktion in der Philosophie des Mittelalters und der frühen Neuzeit*, 1997; F. PIRONET, *The Tradition of Medieval Logic and Speculative Grammar from Anselm to the End of the Seventeenth Century: A Bibliography (1977-1994)*, 1997; A. POPPI, *L'etica del Rinascimento tra Platone e Aristotele*, Napoli 1997; T. RAMELOW, *Gott, Freiheit, Weltenwahl. Der Ursprung des Begriffes der besten aller möglich Welten in der Metaphysik der Willensfreiheit zwischen Antonio Pérez S.J. (1599-1649) und G.W. Leibniz (1646-1716)*, 1997; G. SANHUEZA, *La pensée biologique de Descartes dans ses rapports avec la philosophie scolastique. Le cas Gomez-Pereira*, 1997; J. WOLLOCK, *The Noblest Animate Motion: Speech, Physiology and Medicine in Pre-Cartesian Linguistic Thought*, 1997; P.R. BLUM, *Philosophenphilosophie und Schulphilosophie. Typen des Philosophierens in der Neuzeit*, 1998; J.Á. GARCÍA CUADRADO, *La luz del intelecto agente. Estudio desde la metafísica de Báñez*, 1998; Fr. GÓMEZ CAMACHO, *Economía y filosofía moral: la formación del pensamiento económico en la escolástica española*, 1998; Th.P. FLINT, *Divine Providence: The Molinist Account*, 1998; T. LÓPEZ RODRÍGUEZ, *Mancio y Bartolomé de Medina. Tratado sobre la usura y los cambios*, 1998; T. RINALDI, *Francisco Suárez. Cognitione singularis materialis: De anima*, 1998; P.C. WESTERMAN, *The Disintegration of Natural Law Theory. Aquinas to Finnis*, 1998; R. ARIEW, *Descartes and the Last Scholastics*, 1999; M. BEUCHOT, *Juan de Santo Tomás. Semiótica, filosofía del lenguaje y argumentación*, 1999; O. BOULNOIS, *Être et représentation. Une généalogie de la métaphysique moderne à l'époque de Duns Scot (XIII^e-XIV^e siècle)*, 1999; J.-P. COUJOU, *Suárez et le refondation de la métaphysique comme ontologie. Étude et traduction de l'Index détaillé de la Métaphysique d'Aristote* de F. Suárez, 1999; J.-Fr. COURTINE, *Nature et empire de la loi. Etudes suarezziennes*, 1999; J.Á. GARCÍA CUADRADO, *Domingo Báñez (1528-1604). Introducción a su obra filosófica y teo-*

come increasingly numerous, although usually not of complete

lógica, 1999; A. GOUDRIAAN, *Philosophische Gotteserkenntnis bei Suárez und Descartes. Im Zusammenhang mit der niederländischen reformierten Theologie und Philosophie des 17. Jahrhunderts*, 1999; V. LABRADA RUBIO, *Filosofía jurídica y política de Jerónimo Castillo de Bobadilla*, 1999; M.J. LAPIERRE, *The Noetical Theory of Gabriel Vasquez, Jesuit Philosopher and Theologian (1549-1604): His View of the Objective Concept*, 1999; P. PÉREZ-ILZARBE, *El significado de las proposiciones. Jerónimo Pardo († 1502) y las teorías medievales de la proposición*, 1999; A. RIVERA GARCÍA, *La política del cielo. Clericalismo jesuita y estado moderno*, 1999; A. ROMANO, *La Contre-Réforme mathématique: Constitution et diffusion d'une culture mathématique jésuite à la Renaissance (1540-1640)*, 1999; J. BELDA PLANS, *La Escuela de Salamanca y la renovación de la teología en el siglo XVI*, 2000; J. BROWN SCOTT, *The Spanish Origin of International Law: Francisco de Vitoria and His Law of Nations*, 2000; S. BURGIO, *Filosofía e controforma. Contributi alla storia intellettuale del Seicento*, 2000; M. CAMEROTA – M. OTTO HELBING, *All'alba della scienza galileiana: Michele Varro e il suo "De motu tractatus". Un importante capitolo nella storia della meccanica di fine Cinquecento*, 2000; D. DES CHENE, *Lifes Forms. Late Aristotelian Conceptions of the Soul*, 2000; S. DI LISO, *Domingo de Soto. Dalla logica alla scienza*, 2000; H. HOTSON, *Johann Heinrich Alsted (1588-1638) between Renaissance, Reformation, and Universal Reform*, 2000; Sv.K. KNEBEL, *Wille, Würfel und Wahrscheinlichkeit. Das System der moralischen Notwendigkeit in der Jesuitenscholastik 1550-1700*, 2000; G.F. PAGALLO, *Alla ricerca dei principi. Ermeneutica e questioni di metodo nei primi scritti di Cesare Cremonini*, Padova 2000; St. PERFETTI, *Aristotle's Zoology and its Renaissance Commentators (1521-1601)*, 2000; J. SECADA, *Cartesian Metaphysics. The Late Scholastic Origins of Modern Philosophy*, 2000; W.J. VAN ASSELT, *Reformation and Scholasticism*, 2000; H. WELS, *Die "Disputatio de anima rationali secundum substantiam" des Nicolaus Baldelli S.J. nach dem Pariser Codex B.N. lat. 16627. Eine Studie zur Ablehnung des Averroismus und Alexandrismus am Collegium Romanum zu Anfang des 17. Jahrhunderts*, 2000; J. FRANKLIN, *The Science of Conjecture: Evidence and Probability before Pascal*, 2001; J.C. GARCÍA DE VICENTE, *Homicidio por necesidad. La legítima defensa en la teología tardomedieval*, 2001; Ch. MERCER, *Leibniz's Metaphysics. Its Origin and Development*, 2001; M. SANGALLI, *Università, accademie, gesuiti. Cultura e religione a Padova tra Cinque e Seicento*, 2001; Fr. TODESCAN, *Le radici teologiche del giusnaturalismo laico*, vol. III *Il problema della secolarizzazione nel pensiero giuridico di Samuel Pufendorf*, 2001; W.J. VAN ASSELT, *The Federal Theology of Johannes Cocceius (1603-1669)*, 2001; V. CARRAUD, "Causa sive ratio". *La raison de la cause, de Suárez à Leibniz*, 2002; D.A. LINES, *Aristotle's "Ethics" in the Italian Renaissance (ca. 1300-1650). The Universities and the Problem of Moral Education*, 2002; G. CAVALLAR, *The Rights of Strangers: Theories of International Hospitality, the Global Community, and Political Justice since Vitoria*, 2002; A. GOUDRIAAN, *Jacobus Revius. A Theological Examination of Cartesian Philosophy. Early Criticisms (1647)*, 2002; L. HONNEFELDER, *La métaphysique comme science transcendante*, 2002; C. LEIJENHORST, *The Mechanisation of Aristotelianism. The Late Aristotelian Setting of Thomas Hobbes' Natural Philosophy*, 2002; I. MACLEAN, *Logic, Signs and Nature in the Renaissance: The Case of Learned Medicine*, 2002; J.D. MOSS – W.A. WALLACE,

texts.³⁵ If we add to all this that the difficulty in mastering the immense array of academic thinkers and their doctrines involves

Rhetoric and Dialectic in the Time of Galileo, 2003; W. REDMOND, *La lógica del siglo de oro*, 2002; M. BEUCHOT, *Humanismo novohispano*, 2003; G. COPPENS, *Spinoza en de scholastiek*, 2003; E. RAPETTI, *Percorsi anticartesiani nelle lettere a Pierre-Daniel Huet*, 2003; J.-I. SARANYANA, *La filosofía medieval. Desde sus orígenes patrísticos hasta la escolástica barroca*, Pamplona 2003; M. SCATTOLA, *Dalla virtù alla scienza. La fondazione e la trasformazione della disciplina politica nell'età moderna*, 2003; M. CAMEROTA, *Galileo Galilei e la cultura scientifica nell'età della Controriforma*, 2004; R. DARGE, *Suárez' transzendente Seinsauslegung und die Metaphysiktradition*, 2004; H. HOPFL, *Jesuit Political Thought. The Society of Jesus and the State, c. 1540-1630*, 2004; Fr. MARKUS, *Die Grenzen der Vernunft. Theologie, Philosophie und gelehrte Konflikte am Beispiel des Helmstedter Hofmannstreits und seiner Wirkungen auf das Luthertum um 1600*, 2004; S. ORREGO SÁNCHEZ, *La actualidad del ser en la "primera escuela" de Salamanca*, 2004; L. INGALISO, *Filosofía e Cosmología in Christoph Scheiner*, 2005; B. KOCH, *Zur Dis- / Kontinuität mittelalterlichen politischen Denkens in der neuzeitlichen politischen Theorie. Marsilius von Padua, Johannes Althusius und Thomas Hobbes im Vergleich*, 2005; J. KRAYE, *Moral Philosophy On The Threshold Of Modernity*, 2005.

35. Among the editions and translations published as monographs (there are also several texts published as contributions) in the last ten years, I should like to point out briefly, merely to give some examples: *Escolástica ibérica post-medieval. Algunas teorías del signo*, ed. by M. Beuchot, 1995; João POINSOT (JOANNES DE S. THOMA), *El libro de los predicamentos*, ed. by G. Ferrer – M. Beuchot, 1995; Francisco SUÁREZ, *On Beings of Reason (De Entibus Rationibus)*. *Metaphysical Disputation LIV*, ed. by J.P. Doyle, 1995; Juan ZAPATA Y SANDOVAL, *Disceptación sobre justicia distributiva y sobre la acepción de personas a ella opuesta, Segunda parte*, ed. by M. Beuchot, 1995; Bartolomé de LAS CASAS, *Sozialethische und staatsrechtliche Schriften*, ed. by M. Lauble, 1996; Francisco SUÁREZ, *Disputationes metafísicas. 1-3*, ed. by C. Esposito, 1996; Juan José de EGUIARA Y EGUREN, *La filosofía de la trascendencia (Selectae Dissertationes Mexicanae, tract. I, dissert. 1-2)*, ed. by M. Beuchot, 1997; Francisco de VITORIA, *On Homicide and Commentary on Summa Theologiae IIa-IIae, Q. 64 (Thomas Aquinas)*, ed. by J.P. Doyle, 1997; Cesare CREMONINI, *Le orazioni*, ed. by A. Poppi, Padova 1998; [Giovanni PICO –] St.A. FARMER, *Syncretism in the West: Pico's Nine Hundred Theses (1486). The Revolutions and Philosophical Systems*, 1998; Francisco SUÁREZ, *Disputes métaphysiques. I, II, III*, ed. by J.-P. Coujou, 1998; COLLEGIUM CONIMBRICENSE, *Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis in libros De generatione et corruptione Aristotelis (Mainz, 1606)*, 1999; Tomás de MERCADO, *Antología filosófica*, ed. by M. Beuchot, 1999; Giuseppe MOLETTI, *The Unfinished Mechanics of Giuseppe Moletti. An Edition and English Translation of his Dialogue on Mechanics, 1576*, ed. by W.R. Laird, 1999; Francisco SUÁREZ, *La distinction de l'étant fini et de son être. Dispute métaphysique XXXI*, ed. by J.-P. Coujou, 1999; Francisco SUÁREZ, *Suárez et le refondation de la métaphysique comme ontologie. Étude et traduction de l' "Index détaillé de la Métaphysique d'Aristote" de F. Suárez*, ed. by J.-P. Coujou, 1999; Ulisse ALDROVANDI, *Osservazione di cose straordinarie. Il "De observatione foetus in ovis*

a significant part of publishers' efforts to issue collections of contributions,³⁶ we become aware of the vast amount of even just the

(1564)", ed. by S. Tugnoli Pàttaro, 2000; Juan de CARAMUEL Y LOBKOWITZ, *Gramática audaz*, ed. by P. Arias, 2000; João POINSOT (JOANNES DE S. THOMA), *El signo. Cuestiones 1/5, XXI, XXII y XXIII del "Ars Logica"*, ed. by J. Cruz Cruz, 2000; Domingo de SOTO, *Relecciones y Opúsculos*, 4 vol., 1995-; Francisco SUÁREZ, *On the Formal Cause of Substance. Metaphysical Disputation XV*, ed. by J.P. Doyle, 2000; ALFONSO DE MADRIGAL "El Tostado", *Brevyloquyo de amor e amición (1437-1444)*, ed. by N. Belloso, Pamplona 2001; Pedro de LEDESMA, *Sobre la perfección del acto de ser creado (1596)*, ed. by S. Orrego Sánchez, 2001; João POINSOT (JOANNES DE S. THOMA), *Verdad transcendental y verdad formal (1643)*, ed. by J. Cruz Cruz, 2001; Francisco SUÁREZ, *Creation, Conservation and Concurrence. Metaphysical Disputation XX, XXI, and XXII*, ed. by A.J. Fredoso, 2002; ALFONSO DE MADRIGAL "El Tostado", *El gobierno ideal (De optima politia)*, ed. by N. Belloso Martín, 2003; Domingo BÁÑEZ, *La imagen de Dios en el hombre. Comentario a la 'Suma Teológica', I, q. 93, Sobre el fin o término de la producción del hombre*, ed. by J.Á. García Cuadrado – A. Chacón, 2003; Bartolomé CARRANZA, *Tratado sobre la virtud de la justicia (1540)*, ed. by T. López – I. Jericó Bermejo – R. Muñoz de Juana, 2003; Diego MAS, *Disputación metafísica sobre el ente y sus propiedades transcendentales (1587) (Metaphysica disputatio seu de ente et de eius proprietatibus, quae communi nomine inscribitur de transcendentibus)*, ed. by J. Gallego Salvadores – H. Banyeres – S. Orrego, 2003; João POINSOT (JOANNES DE S. THOMA), *Introduction to the Summa Theologiae of Thomas Aquinas*, ed. by R. McNerny, 2003; Juan SÁNCHEZ SEDEÑO, *Las segundas intenciones y el universal (1600)*, ed. by J. Cruz Cruz, 2003; Caspar SCHOTT, *Physica curiosa sive mirabilia naturae et artis libri XII comprehensa*, 2003; Francisco GARCÍA, *Del Tratado utilísimo y muy general de todos los contratos (1583)*, ed. by M.I. Zorroza – H. Rodríguez-Penelas, 2004; Athanasius KIRCHER, *Musurgia universalis*, 2004; Pietro POMPOZZI, *Expositio super primo et secundo De partibus animalium*, ed. by St. Perfetti, 2004; Francisco SUÁREZ, *A Commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics*, ed. by J.P. Doyle, 2004; Francisco SUÁREZ, *The Metaphysical Demonstration of the Existence of God. Metaphysical Disputations XXVIII-XXIX*, ed. by J.P. Doyle, 2004; João POINSOT (JOANNES DE S. THOMA), *Del alma (1635)*, ed. by J. Cruz Cruz, 2005; Juan SÁNCHEZ SEDEÑO, *La relación (1600)*, ed. by J. Cruz Cruz, 2005. To these works must also be added the editions in electronic format, made available online, of: COLLEGIUM CONIMBRICENSE, *Commentarii in libros Aristotelis de anima* [<http://www.uc.pt/lif/main5.htm>], directed by M. Santiago de Carvalho – A. Manuel Martins; Francisco SUÁREZ, *De anima, De generatione et corruptione, Disputationes metaphysicæ* [<http://www.salvadorcastellote.com/investigacion.htm>], ed. by S. Castellote – J.-P. Coujou – J.P. Doyle – M. Renemann. One should also remember the reprints on microfiches of several texts of academic philosophy from the late Middle Ages to the Early Modern Period carried out by the Dutch publisher IDC, in particular in the series *Catholic Reformation and Philosophy and the Liberal Arts in the Early Modern Period*.

36. Among the collections of the last ten years I should like to mention, just to give some examples: *Aristotelica et Lulliana magistro doctissimo Charles*

recent bibliography concerning this field of studies.³⁷ Owing to

H. Lohr, ed. by F. Dominguez, 1995; *Descartes and His Contemporaries. Meditations, Objections, and Replies*, ed. by R. Ariew – M. Grene, 1995; *La filosofia nel Siglo de Oro. Studi sul tardo Rinascimento spagnolo*, ed. by A. Lamacchia, 1995; monographic number of *Vivarium*, ed. by E.J. Ashworth, 1995; *Descartes, 'Principia philosophiae' (1644-1994). Atti del Convegno per il 350° anniversario della pubblicazione dell'opera*, ed. by J.-R. Armogathe – G. Belgioioso, Napoli 1996; *Studies on the History of Logic*, ed. by I. Angelelli – M. Cerezo, 1996; *Studies on the History of Logic and Semantics, 12th-17th Centuries*, by G. Nuchelmans, 1996; *Descartes et le Moyen Age*, ed. by J. Biard – R. Rashed, 1997; *Hispanic Philosophy in the Age of Discovery*, ed. by K. White, 1997; *Lire Descartes aujourd'hui*, ed. by O. Depré – D. Lories, 1997; *Logic and Workings of the Mind. The Logic of Ideas and Faculty Psychology in Early Modern Philosophy*, ed. by P.A. Easton, 1997; *Method and Order in Renaissance Philosophy of Nature: the Aristotle Commentary Tradition*, ed. by D.A. Di Liscia – E. Kessler – Ch. Methuen, 1997; *Bartolomeo Barbieri da Castelvetro (1615-1697): un cappuccino alla scuola di san Bonaventura nell'Emilia del '600*, ed. by A. Maggioli – P. Maranesi, 1998; *Luis de Molina regressa a Evora*, ed. by I. Borges-Duarte, 1998; monographic number of *Medioevo*, ed. by Fr. Bottin, 1998; *Meeting of the Minds. The Relations between Medieval and Classical Modern European Philosophy*, ed. by St.F. Brown, 1998; *El pensamiento económico en la escuela de Salamanca*, ed. by Fr. Gómez Camacho – R. Robledo, 1998; *Rodrigo de Arriaga († 1667), Philosoph und Theologe*, ed. by T. Saxlová – St. Sousedík, 1998; monographic number of *Acta philosophica Fennica*, ed. by T. Aho – M. Yrjönsuuri, 1999; *Aspects de la pensée médiévale dans la philosophie politique moderne*, ed. by Y.Ch. Zarka, 1999; *The Commentary Tradition on Aristotle's "De generatione et corruptione". Ancient, Medieval and Early Modern*, ed. by J.M.M.H. Thijssen – H.A.G. Braakhuis, 1999; *Descartes et la Renaissance*, ed. by E. Faye, 1999; *The Jesuits: Cultures, Sciences, and the Arts, 1540-1773*, ed. by J.W. O'Malley, 1999; *Johannes Clauberg (1622-1665) and Cartesian Philosophy in the Seventeenth Century*, ed. by Th. Verbeek, 1999; *Philosophy and the Arts in Central Europe, 1500-1700. Teaching and Texts at Schools and Universities*, by J.S. Freedman, 1999; *Philosophy in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries. Conversations with Aristotle*, ed. by C. Blackwell – S. Kusukawa, 1999; *Protestant Scholasticism. Essays in Reassessment*, ed. by C.R. Trueman – R. Scott Clark, 1999; "Sapientiam amemus". *Humanismus und Aristotelismus in der Renaissance*, ed. by P.R. Blum – C. Blackwell – Ch. Lohr, 1999; *Science et religions de Copernic à Galilée*, 1999; *Studies in the Philosophy of the Jesuits in Poland in the Sixteenth to Eighteenth Centuries*, by R. Darowski, 1999; *Cesare Cremonini. Aspetti del pensiero e scritti*, 2 vol., ed. by E. Riondato – A. Poppi, Padova 2000; *Continuity and Change: the Harvest of Late-Medieval and Reformation History*, ed. by R.J. Bast – A.C. Gow, 2000; *Forms of the "Medieval" in the "Renaissance": a Multidisciplinary Exploration of a Cultural Continuum*, ed. by G.H. Tucker, 2000; "Potentia Dei". *L'onnipotenza divina nel pensiero dei secoli XVI e XVII*, ed. by G. Canziani – M.A. Granada – Y.Ch. Zarka, 2000; *Dalla prima alla seconda Scolastica. Paradigmi e percorsi storiografici*, ed. by A. Ghisalberti, 2000; *Rethinking the Scientific Revolution*, ed. by M.J. Osler, 2000; *Saggi sulla cultura della Compagnia di Gesù (secoli XVI-XVIII)*, by U. Baldini, 2000; *La teologia dal XV al XVII secolo. Metodi e pro-*

this state of affairs, some readers might ask to be introduced to the

spettive, ed. by I. Biffi – C. Marabelli, 2000; *Kausalität und Naturgesetz in der Frühen Neuzeit*, ed. by A. Hüttemann, 2001; *Late Medieval and Early Modern Corpuscular Matter Theories*, ed. by Ch.H. Lüthy – J.E. Murdoch – W.R. Newman, 2001; *The Medieval Concept of Time. The Scholastic Debate and Its Reception in Early Modern Philosophy*, ed. by P. Porro, 2001; *Die Ordnung der Praxis. Neue Studien zur spanischen Spätscholastik*, ed. by Fr. Grunert – K. Seelmann, 2001; monographic number of *Osiris*, ed. by J. Hedley Brooke – M.J. Osler – J.M. van der Meer, 2001; *Renaissance Readings of the Corpus Aristotelicum*, ed. by M. Pade, 2001; *Ricerche sulla teologia e la scienza nella Scuola padovana del Cinque e Seicento*, by A. Poppi, 2001; *Whose Aristotle? Whose Aristotelianism?*, ed. by R.W. Sharples, 2001; *Il commento filosofico nell'Occidente latino (secoli XIII-XV)*, ed. by Cl. Leonardi – G. Fioravanti – St. Perfetti, 2002; *Le Contemplateur et les idées. Modèles de la science divine, du néoplatonisme au XVIII^e siècle*, ed. by O. Boulnois – J. Schmutz – J.-L. Solère, 2002; *The Dynamics of Aristotelian Natural Philosophy from Antiquity to the Seventeenth Century*, ed. by C. Leijenhorst – Ch. Lüthy – J. Thijssen, 2002; a double monographic number of *Les Études philosophiques*, ed. by O. Boulnois, 2002; *Melanchton und Europa*, 2 vol., ed. by G. Frank, 2002; *La presenza dell'aristotelismo padovano nella filosofia della prima modernità*, ed. by Gr. Piaia, 2002; *Res et Verba in der Renaissance*, ed. by E. Kessler – I. MacLean, 2002; *Säkularisierung in den Wissenschaften seit der frühen Neuzeit*, ed. by L. Danneberg – Fr. Vollhardt – S. Pott – J. Schonert, 3 vol., 2002-2003; *Sur la science divine*, ed. by J.-C. Bardout – O. Boulnois, 2002; *Figure della guerra. La riflessione su pace, dissidio e giustizia tra Medioevo e prima età moderna*, ed. by M. Scattola, 2003; *Galileo Galilei e la cultura della tradizione*, by C. Dollo, 2003; *Jesuit Science and the Republic of Letters*, ed. by M. Feingold, 2003; *The Medieval Heritage in Early Modern Metaphysics and Modal Theory, 1400-1700*, ed. by R.L. Friedman – L.O. Nielsen, 2003; *Studi sull'aristotelismo del Rinascimento*, by L. Bianchi, 2003; *Contexts of Conscience in Early Modern Europe, 1500-1700*, ed. by H.E. Braun – E. Vallance, 2004; *Domingo de Soto and the Early Galileo: Essays on Intellectual History*, by W.A. Wallace, 2004; *Forming the Mind. Conceptions of Body and Soul in Late Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy*, ed. by H. Lagerlund – O. Pluta, 2004; *Francisco Suárez. "Der ist der Mann". Homenaje al prof. Salvador Castellote*, 2004; „Herbst des Mittelalters“? *Fragen zur Bewertung des 14. und 15. Jahrhunderts*, ed. by J.A. Aertsen – M. Pickavé, 2004; *The Impact of Aristotelianism on Modern Philosophy*, ed. by R. Pozzo, 2004; *Mind, Perception, and Cognition. The Commentary Tradition of Aristotle's De Anima*, ed. by P. Bakker – H. Thijssen, 2004; *Autour de Ramus. Le combat*, ed. by K. Meerhoff – J.-M. Moisan – M. Magnien, Paris 2005; *Saberes y disciplinas en las Universidades Hispánicas*, ed. by L.E. Rodríguez-San Pedro Bezares – J.L. Polo Rodríguez, 2005.

37. The reader will find complete, up-to-date news about the biography and works of the academic authors of the 16th and 17th centuries, relevant publications (monographs and contributions), on-going research, conferences and seminars, scholars and research centres on the Internet site created and conducted by Jacob Schmutz: *Scholasticon. Ressources en ligne pour l'étude de la scolastique moderne (1500-1800)* [<http://www.ulb.ac.be/philoscholasticon/index.html>], 1999-.

essays on Mastri's thought by means of a brief explanation of the lines of development of the history of academic philosophy from the end of the Middle Ages to the beginning of the Modern Age and by a few indications of the main attempts to set historiographically this period. The following pages are dedicated to such readers, with apologies to those who have already been professionally committed to this subject, for all the simplifications herein.³⁸

*2.2 The forms of the complexity and of the dynamism
of academic philosophy in the period
between the Middle Ages and the Modern Age*

From the turn of the 12th century, when scholars in the Latin world became acquainted with Aristotle's works on physics and metaphysics, to the last 25 years of the 17th century, when the *pars valentior* of European authors turned their backs on some of the fundamental theses of the Stagirite's physics, Aristotelianism was continually in a state of agitation, although it was the focal point of "basic" university instruction. Not only was it the object both of condemnation and slating criticism, yet at the same time of consecration and honours, but it was also, above and beyond all this, neither homogeneous nor static. The very adversaries of Aristotelianism made a distinction between Aristotle and Aristotelians, and among the latter, between good and bad followers of the Stagirite. They furthermore indicated the lack of unity among Aristotelians as a clear sign of the inconsistency of the latter's doctrines. In reality, despite the fact that they normally had a common reference point in Aristotle, the academic authors were divided into fiercely conflicting currents of thought and criticised one another as harshly as the anti-Aristotelians criticised them. There was good reason for this: different authors combined Aristotelian and non-Aristotelian doctrines to different degrees and drew inspiration for different theses from the Stagirite's works; different currents had different attitudes towards Aristotle and developed in their midst divergencies and diversi-

38. My indebtedness towards the studies on the history of academic philosophy quoted above is so great that I shall no longer mention them in order to avoid too many references. I shall, on the other hand, refer readers to some essays in which they may find further information.

fied forms of evolution,³⁹ different centres of learning were characterized by different tendencies.

An accurate analysis of academic philosophy from the 13th to the 17th century reveals a picture characterized by the continual proliferation of new ideas. Nevertheless, it also appears to be characterized by a strict traditionalism, by an obedience (or which at least was claimed to be such) to one or the other complex of *auctoritates* and by a diffidence towards *novitates*, seen as intrinsically dangerous. One wonders, therefore, what made it possible for characteristics that seem antithetical to be found at the same time and how in reality authors developed their own thought.

In order to answer this question it must first of all be mentioned that the controversy between conservation and innovation was to be found in all the constitutive elements of the university world: the academic activities of commentary and dispute, the different levels of institutional structures (in particular the institutional structure of the “school”) and the notion of “common doctrine”. Dispute and commentary were what paved the way for the proliferation of innovative doctrines. The former was widely used at the universities (and continued to be so well into the Modern Age) both as a didactic exercise and as a means of testing students.⁴⁰ It was frequently accused, by both non-academic and by academic writers, of being one of the main reasons

39. Cf. Ch. MERCER, “The Vitality and Importance of Early-Modern Aristotelianism”, in *The Rise of Modern Philosophy. The Tension between the New and Traditional Philosophies from Machiavelli to Leibniz*, ed. by T. Sorell, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993, pp. 33-67.

40. Cf. O. WEIJERS, “Quelques observations sur les divers emplois du terme ‘disputatio’”, in *Itinéraires de la raison. Études de philosophie médiévale offertes à Maria Cândida Pacheco*, ed. by J.F. Meirinhos, (Textes et études du Moyen Âge, 32), Louvain-la-Neuve: Fédération Internationale des Instituts d’Études Médiévales, 2005, pp. 35-49. I take the liberty of referring readers to my “Materiali per una descrizione della disputa e dell’esame di laurea in Età moderna” [<http://web.tiscali.it/marcoforlivesi/mf2001m.pdf>], 2001 (Former printed edition: M. FORLIVESI, “Materiali per una descrizione della disputa e dell’esame di laurea in Età moderna”, in *Dalla prima alla seconda Scolastica...*, pp. 252-279). Consult, however, above all the suitable titles to be found in Th. GLONING, “Über Polemik und Kontroversen und ihre Geschichte. Ein bibliographischer Steinbruch” [http://staff-www.uni-marburg.de/~gloning/plmt_bb.htm], 2003.

for the proliferation of new doctrines, which were mainly futile according to the detractors. The reason for accusations of this type is generally obvious: the accusers were interested in substituting a certain range of doctrines with their own. Hence, in his *Discours* Descartes, in stating his refusal to compare himself with those thinkers who had come before him, only takes a custom that existed both inside and outside the universities to its extremes: he withdrew from the task of discussing a whole host of stances by simply labelling them as *cavillationes*. Nevertheless, the capacity for exercising dispute also clearly offered the opportunity to formulate and explore “dangerous” or unusual hypotheses, to submit consolidated theses to innovative criticism, and to besiege the most *probatae* doctrines without respite. No less interesting are the accusations brought against the other fundamental academic didactic method: that of the commentary. Galileo, when speaking of the “interpreters of the Stagirite”, wrote that they used Aristotle to say whatever they wanted.⁴¹ The underlying reason for the capacity of commentary to make room for standpoints that cannot objectively be found in the glossed text lies in the fact that the latter was seen to be authoritative, yet was always seen as closed book appearing in the *Apocalypse*. To open it, with the aim of restoring to the *auctoritas* the *organa vocis* subtracted from it by the course of time and to make its doctrines manifest, was the task of the *magister*. It was a hard, yet creative, task. On the side of the text (or texts), the commentator was often faced with obscure or different translations and conflicting passages. In his position, he usually had to reconcile the author commented on with other authorities, whether religious or philosophical, Ancient or Modern; he had to present the topics therein with a greater order and coherence than those offered by the text he commented on; he had to answer questions that the author annotated did not face; quite frequently he had to do all this in a certain “style”, proposing those solutions that

41. Galileo GALILEI, *Frammenti attenenti alla lettera al principe Leopoldo di Toscana*; quoted by L. BIANCHI, “Una caduta senza declino? Considerazioni sulla crisi dell’aristotelismo fra Rinascimento ed età moderna”, in IDEM, *Studi sull’aristotelismo del Rinascimento*, (Subsidia mediaevalia Patavina, 5), Padova: Il Poligrafo, 2003, pp. 133-183.

some *auctoritas* of reference (usually different from the author of the original text) would have proposed had he been presented with the same questions. It was, moreover, an ever-changing task. The commentary always occurred within the interaction of a complexity of traditions of interpretation, which were, in their turn, continually evolving. Furthermore, if in the 13th century the work of annotating could avail itself of a complexity of aids, within which there was moreover a certain freedom of choice, of an almost exclusively theoretical nature, from the 14th to the 17th century the development of the awareness of the problematics involved in the formation and transmission of texts led to a whole web of interpretations, in which the intentions and the tools, as yet incomplete, of the newly-born study of philology were interwoven and mixed, in different proportions, with the tools and aims of theoretics. Finally, the level of accessibility and knowledge of the various works of an *auctoritas*, and the importance attributed to one or the other of them, changed in the course of time. This, therefore, made room for a vast range of interpretations and for integrations, new versions and reversals, which were more or less intentional, in every possible way.⁴²

42. Cf. J.M.M.H. THIJSSSEN, "Die Stellung der scholastischen Naturphilosophie in der Geschichte der Physik: Herbst des Mittelalters oder Frühling der Neuzeit?", in „Herbst des Mittelalters“? *Fragen zur Bewertung des 14. und 15. Jahrhunderts*, ed. by J.A. Aertsen – M. Pickavé, (Miscellanea Mediaevalia, 31), Berlin – New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2004, pp. 512-521; C. LEIJENHORST – Chr. LÜTHY, "The Erosion of Aristotelianism. Confessional Physics in Early Modern Germany and the Dutch Republic", in *The Dynamics of Aristotelian Natural Philosophy from Antiquity to the Seventeenth Century*, ed. by C. Leijenhorst – Chr. Lüty – J.M.M.H. Thijssen, (Medieval and Early Modern Science, 5), Leiden – Boston – Köln: Brill, 2002, pp. 375-411; Chr. LÜTHY – C. LEIJENHORST – J.M.M.H. THIJSSSEN, "The Tradition of Aristotelian Natural Philosophy. Two Theses and Seventeen Answers", in *The Dynamics...*, pp. 1-29, in particular pp. 1-15; R.W. SHARPLES, "Introduction: Whose Aristotle? Whose Aristotelianism?", in *Whose Aristotle? Whose Aristotelianism?*, ed. by R.W. Sharplees, (Ashgate Keeling Series in Ancient Philosophy), Aldershot – Burlington: Ashgate, 2001, pp. 1-10; M.W.F. STONE, "The Debate on the Soul in the Second Half of the Thirteenth Century: A Replay to William Charlton", in *Whose Aristotle...*, pp. 78-104; SCHMUTZ, "Bulletin..."; D. FERRARO, "L'uso delle 'auctoritates' nella seconda scolastica", in *L'interpretazione nei secoli XVI e XVII. Atti del Convegno internazionale di studi Milano (18-20 novembre 1991) Parigi (6-8 dicembre 1991)*, ed. by G. Canziani – Y.C. Zarka, Milano: Franco Angeli, 1993, pp. 83-101.

Needless to say, the conditions in which thought was elaborated at the universities, and in which, in particular, dispute and commentary were exercised, were not free from restrictions, even very rigid ones. It was perfectly normal for a professional theologian to undergo during his lifetime, or even after his death, at least one ecclesiastic censure. The repeated conflicts about university statutes that marked in the course of time the life of all the universities usually led to the expulsion of an academic party and to the suppression, in a certain seat of learning, of its line of doctrine. Nevertheless, as has already been hinted above, the ties academic authors were subject to were incomplete, complex, changeable, and somehow propulsive. It is enough to consider, for example, the obligation expressed in the *Constitutiones* of the Society of Jesus to follow Aristotle in philosophy and Thomas Aquinas in theology. First of all, as Caruso has already observed, the *Constitutiones* prescribed that these authors should be followed but not that any specific interpretation of them should be respected.⁴³ Secondly, the meaning attached to this prescription by the highest authorities of the Order changed in time, according to the evolution among the Jesuits of the interpretation of the relationship between Aristotle's doctrines and those of the Catholic Church.⁴⁴ Lastly, it should be noted that the prescription in question was not absolute even in the letter of the constitutions: it is followed by the specification that the Masters of the Society should not feel so strongly conditioned by Aquinas as to believe they could not in any field stray from it.⁴⁵ To this must be added that this "obligation" was not a single and unitary one. It differed according to the aim towards which a certain doctrine was being discussed: the study of philosophy with a view to theology, for example, was quite different from its study with a view to professions in the medical or legal fields. The very obligation itself,

43. E. CARUSO, *Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza e la rinascita del nominalismo nella scolastica del Seicento*, (Pubblicazioni del «Centro di studi del pensiero filosofico del Cinquecento e del Seicento in relazione ai problemi della scienza» del Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche, Serie I, 15), Firenze: La Nuova Italia, 1979.

44. Cf. Ch.H. LOHR, "Jesuit Aristotelianism and Sixteenth-Century Metaphysics", in *Parádoxis. Studies in memory of Edwin A. Quain*, ed. by H.G. III Fletcher – M.B. Schulte, New York: Fordham University Press, 1976, pp. 203-220.

45. Cf. FERRARO, "L'uso...".

constituted by needs of a religious nature, was a complex matter. It depended on the university, on the current, on the school, or on religious Order the Master belonged to and on the framework of alliances and political and doctrinal conflicts of the moment. There were numerous, competing “religious authorities” between the end of the Middle Ages and the beginning of the Modern Age: the pope and councils, lay clergy and regular clergy, religious Orders, religious confessions, academic parties and confessional parties. How the different limitations prescribed by each authority merged could only be truly determined *a posteriori*: at times they added, at others they cancelled. Last of all, it should be observed that these obligations were not totally negative; they usually became equally as many forms of active encouragement to pursue certain speculative paths and to develop the instruments with which to strike out at well-defined enemies. In academic philosophy, and even beyond it, philosophical doctrines and theological (or more generally religious) doctrines influenced each other reciprocally in an unbroken web.

The reference point of every academic author’s subject was “common doctrine”. It was born of two presuppositions. The first consists in the conviction that philosophy (differently from the opinion held by many philosophers of today) is a science. This means that it is a type of knowledge that can be communicated and shared, the product of an activity that has a “collective” dimension, such that any confirmations or objections relating to a certain thesis are not restricted to voicing the “inner world” of the person formulating them but are attempts to describe a state of things that may be observed by anybody and, thus, may be evaluated by other experts of the subject. Such knowledge is the *communis opinio*, which is not an institutionally defined set of universally shared theses, but a continually revised field of implicitly admissible variability (as happens in the mathematically formulated sciences of today). As Juan de Mariana writes, common doctrine is like Penelope’s shroud, continually rewoven, with ever-changing threads and patterns to which everyone tries to add further embroidery and designs.⁴⁶ The sec-

46. Juan DE MARIANA, *Discurso sobre las cosas de la Compañía*; quoted by FERRARO, “L’uso...”.

ond presupposition consists in not using a pre-established, standard language in which single terms and operations have a univocal definition. This implies that it is impossible to develop a method in order to demonstrate to the whole community of experts the falsity of a thesis and hence consider it definitively confuted (unlike what happens in mathematically formulated sciences). It means, in these authors' eyes, that any progress to be made in philosophy must consist not in eliminating hypotheses but in refining the *communis opinio*; that the opinions of the ancients should continue to detain (at least abstractly) rights of citizenship in the current theoretical treatises; that should any greater worth be attributed to the doctrines of the *recentiores* (something that occurred to different degrees in different times and contexts) compared to those of the *antiqui*, this happened simply because the latter were less accurate.⁴⁷ A final note: common doctrine, like Pirandello's man, was "One, None and a Hundred Thousand". 'One' because everyone could share in it and contribute to it; 'None' because it cannot be identified as the work of any one specific author; 'a Hundred Thousand' because every institution, current, or school had its own "*particularis*" *communis opinio*, perceived as more or less defined and binding, distinct from other groups' *communes opiniones* and from the doctrine which is "common" to the whole university world.

These considerations enable us to focus briefly also on the question of the "originality" of academic thought from the late Middle Ages to the outset of the Modern Age. If being "original" means solely giving voice to one's inner world – a world which is maintained to be incomparable to anyone else's –, the thought in question is not original in any circumstances. If, on the contrary,

47. For points of view that differ from my own cf. R. SPECHT, "Die Spanische Spätscholastik im Kontext ihrer Zeit", in *Die Ordnung der Praxis. Neue Studien zur spanischen Spätscholastik*, ed. by Fr. Grunert – K. Seelmann, (Frühe Neuzeit, 68), Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 2001, pp. 3-17, which does not examine what I have indicated as the "second presupposition" of the scholastic conception of *communis opinio*, and P. REIF, "The Textbook Tradition in Natural Philosophy, 1600-1650", in *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 30 (1969), pp. 17-32, which presents the *communis opinio* as a rigid, obligatory set of doctrines. It is noteworthy the case of the evolution of the *communis opinio* in the Society of Jesus, which is exhibited by LOHR, "Jesuit Aristotelianism...".

any thought – like that of mathematically formulated sciences – is original in trying to describe the world in a more penetrating manner than any thought of predecessors or colleagues has done, while exploiting the latter to the full, then academic philosophy was in a continual state of ferment and effusion of novelties. One should not be misled by either the systematic adherence to one or other *auctoritas*, by the tendency towards conformity and faithfulness to a line of doctrine, or by the conservation of certain theses for very long periods of time. As far as the first aspect is concerned, the case of Clemens Timpler may be considered an example of the way scholars usually then acted. Generally speaking, he used both Aristotle and the authors of the previous century in a highly eclectic way. In particular, when he agreed with the common or traditional opinion, he was critical of any novelty; when he did not agree with common or traditional opinion, he called for innovative solutions.⁴⁸ As far as the second aspect is concerned, it must not be overestimated. Seventeenth-century philosophical manuals were “conservative”, much to the same extent as today’s scientific textbooks are: it is not the task of the authors of manuals either to verify personally all the theses that they present or to support or illustrate theories that are considered, by several members of the scientific community, to be questionable or as yet insufficiently tested.⁴⁹ As for the third aspect, it must be pointed out, above all from the historical point of view, that any time a thesis was repropounded and compared with problems and hypotheses which had not previously been raised, that thesis was modified, and this can be seen to occur without taking into consideration the intentions, whether con-

48. Cf. FREEDMAN, *European Academic Philosophy...*

49. Despite all that has been said, I do not understand the judgement of FREEDMAN, “Introduction...”, according to which seventeenth-century philosophical manuals do not present any innovative doctrines, nor it was the task of their authors to develop them. In my opinion, firstly it is necessary to distinguish individual cases: some manuals tend to skip any divergences, while others tackle them analytically. Secondly, the originality of “manuals”, as of commentaries, lies not in proposing radical reorganizations of knowledge but, by overcoming the *mare magnum* of opinions, in formulating and defending the “right solution” – which hardly ever means simply repropounding a thesis that has already been expressed.

servative or innovatory, on the part of the person carrying out the “revision” of the thesis in question. In short, in Scholastics, as is still the case today in the best academic philosophy, everything is continually compared with all the known standpoints, so that everything is ceaselessly transformed into something new.⁵⁰

2.3 Lines of development of academic philosophy from the fifteenth to the seventeenth century

2.3.1 The outcome of the fourteenth century: outgrowing, yet preserving, Aristotelianism

The period between the 15th and 17th centuries presents, as we shall see, characteristics that make it possible for us to distinguish it to some extent from the previous two centuries. Therefore, a brief summary of the development in academic culture in the second half of the 14th century will enable us to comprehend better the phenomena to come.

In the 14th century, a multiplicity of speculative and institutional orientations developed within the universities. In Paris, Buridan’s Nominalism supplanted strict Ockhamism, Scotism, and Thomism. The universities in the German Empire (Cologne, Heidelberg, Erfurt, and Vienna), including those in the East (Prague and Cracow), were also characterized, to varying degrees and at different times, by a leaning towards Buridan. In England, on the contrary, a Realist tendency spread. In Italy, the Roman Curia’s desire to keep complete control over the debates concerning doctrine prevented the formation in public *studia* of fully operative theological faculties, which were nearly always to remain to some extent mere colleges of exams. This fact, paradoxically, freed philosophy in these seats of learning from having the task of preparing the ground for theology and placed it at the service of only the medical and legal professions. However, this did not mean that religious Orders did not also have in Italy their own *studia*, nor that there were no traditions of active theological

50. An example, in the Thomist field no less, can be found in the case studied by I.I. CASEY, *The Development of a Formula from Capreolus to John of St. Thomas: “Ens continet sua inferiora actu in confuso”*, diss. Pontificia Università Gregoriana, Roma 1971.

studies in this country. To this must be added that Italian Humanists began a fierce debate against the more recent and dynamic currents of philosophical thought, especially those of English origin. All this makes it easy to understand why at the same time followers of Averroës, of Thomas, of Scotus, of English logicians, and of the Mertonians circulated within the universities and religious *studia*. Aristotle's thought seemed, therefore, to have been surpassed, in different ways, times, and places in the 14th century in a multitude of fields, from logics to metaphysics, i.e. in the fields that included the whole range of human knowledge. In physics, too, noteworthy changes took place. In Mertonian and Buridan's circles, scholars became convinced that peripathetic physics should be integrated with contributions from other traditions, or even with original considerations. In particular, the method of mental experiment developed; the field of beings whose essential characteristics may be reduced to quantifiable variables was extended and, consequently, mathematics was applied not only to statics and kinematics but also to dynamics, hence Aristotle's dynamics and Archimedes' mathematical statics were combined; the doctrine of *impetus* was refined; the principle according to which everything that has a beginning must also have an end, and, vice versa, what has no beginning must have no end, was abandoned.

In the face of such a picture, one might wonder whether it has any sense to speak of "Aristotelianism", and the question is quite legitimate. However, it seems to me that one can. In the field of physics, the Buridanians and Mertonians did not reject the idea that motion is in itself a form of change and thus requires an agent in act, that is to say the thesis according to which what is mobile is intrinsically resistant and, therefore, intrinsically restrained. More radically, the Aristotelian notion of natural science was never rejected, at least as a point of reference: physics remained a science of substances and of their own accidents, carried out by enquiring into the nature of a subject and its principles through empirical observation; it was cultivated not only as a mere desire for knowledge but also, when considered as belonging to the complex of human activities, with the aim of obtaining "practical" applications of a medical or legal type. There-

fore, however much one has to abandon the fanciful conviction that Aristotelian science, and medieval science in general, was nothing but a purely theoretical activity consisting in deducing conclusions from principles given through intuition, the fact remains that this science did not comprise the notion of experiment as it is understood in modern times and possessed little capacity for prediction. More generally speaking, Aristotle's works, supported by manuals (at least in the field of logic) and commentaries, were, and continued to be, the basis of the teaching of philosophy at the universities. This was an obligation that did not end with the charter of the statutes of the faculties but belonged to the very mentality of academic authors: however radically they parted from the Stagirite's thought, they still tended to propose interpretations of it which were in accordance with their own theses.⁵¹

2.3.2 *The fifteenth century: the new traditionalism*

The 15th century inherited from the previous one a tangle of political strife, cultural dynamism, and social disquiet. The centers of political power (including the religious ones) multiplied, and along with these the universities. In conformity with the dynamic forces operating from the birth of the institution of the university (and, even earlier, of cathedral schools), the governors sought in the universities the professional figures they needed and, hence, supported financially the existing universities or promoted and financed the foundation of new centers of learning.⁵² The number of themes and theses proposed and discussed

51. Cf. E. JUNG, "Why was Medieval Mechanics Doomed? The Failure to Substitute Mathematical Physics for Aristotelianism", in *„Herbst des Mittelalters“*..., pp. 495-511; F. ZANIN, *L'analisi matematica del movimento e i limiti della fisica tardo-medievale. La ricezione della "perspectiva" e delle "calulationes" alla Facoltà delle Arti di Parigi (1340-50)*, (Subsidia mediaevalia Patavina, 6), Padova: Il Poligrafo, 2004.

52. I should like to point out, in opposition to M. GENSLER, "The Late Medieval University as an Institution of Learning: More Learning or More Institution?", in *„Herbst des Mittelalters“*..., pp. 147-156, that with this the university remained what it had always been, i.e. a structure aimed at the formation of functionaries. I do, however, agree with him in the observation that the economic effort made by the centers of political power served to instruct a person-

in the public *studia* and by the regular clergy increased far more than the seats of universities, however. The combined, unanimous answer of the ruling classes, both ecclesiastic and lay, and of the cultural *élites* to the fragility of social order, to the political fragmentation, and to the growing complexity and heterogeneity of proposed doctrines (themselves characterized by tension and conflict and containing some components and consequences from outside the universities, and thus seen to be a source of upset in the fragile social and political peace) was one of the strongest affirmations of the myth of the “golden age” in the whole history of the western world. It forged, in different ways, the characteristics of all the essential components in fifteenth- and sixteenth-century thought: the university, Humanism, Aristotelianism, Platonism, alchemy and astrology, religious pressures and movements. These are components, as we shall see, which should not be taken to mean “currents of thought”, since they were not isolated, but compenetrated, to greater or lesser degrees, so that they all accepted some aspects and parts of the others.

The university was marked by three intertwining wide-rangint phenomena: the formation and competition of the *viæ*, the formation and competition of the schools, and the birth of literal Aristotelianism. All three arose from the wish to discover in the past stable points of reference for speculation. The *viæ* were cultural trends, political and academic parties, and university institutional structures. Taken in the sense of cultural trends, they mainly consisted in providing different answers to the problem of protecting the possibility and stability of revealed theology. The *via antiqua* solved the problem by subordinating philosophy to theology; the *via moderna* by clearly separating the fields and methods of the two disciplines. The exponents of both *viæ*, in conformity with the wish to tie personal theses to figures in the past, searched for authors who might be taken as prototypes of their own standpoints. The supporters of the *via antiqua* found them in authors of the 13th or early 14th century: Albertus, Thomas, or Scotus. The upholders of the *via moderna* (or

nel that would not desert the seat or territory in which they had received their education, which led to a “localization” of the academies.

nominales) found them in the authors of the height of the 14th century: Durandus of St-Pourçain, Gregory of Rimini, William of Ockham, Marsilius of Inghen, and Buridan.⁵³ These cultural, political, and academic orientations were translated in the universities into institutional structures: some universities offered training according to the *via antiqua*, others according to the *via moderna*, others according to both *viæ*, while however keeping the courses of the different lines of study well distinct. This was made possible by creating chairs dedicated to a single specific speculative line, or even of internships characterized by a specific orientation in which students carried out the whole course of their studies.

The schools were a further subdivision of university cultural trends and of the teaching staff, besides being the concrete form that the two *viæ* assumed: according to the “master” referred to, there was thus the birth, or revival, of Albertism, Thomism, Scotism, and Nominalism.⁵⁴ On the institutional level, they qualified the different students’ courses of studies, or at least the chairs dedicated to a specific speculative line: *in via Alberti, Thomæ, Scoti, Durandi*.⁵⁵ On the political-academic and purely political

53. The *moderni* are also called *nominales* for two reasons: first, because their considerations usually started out from concepts, and, second, because they maintained that universals exist as such only in the mind. The supporters of the *via antiqua* are also called *reales* because, firstly, their considerations started out from objects and, secondly, because they maintained that universals also have some reality *a parte rei*. Strictly speaking, the fourteenth-century authors mentioned above should be defined “*nominalistæ*”, in order to distinguish them from the group of twelfth-century authors called “*nominales*”. However, the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century academic thinkers usually pay no attention to twelfth-century authors and name “*nominales*” those of the 14th century.

54. I say “revival” because between the end of the 13th and the mid-14th century at least four “schools” had arisen: Albertist, Thomist, Scotist, and Buridanian. It should, however, also be said that they had a variable level of institutionalization and, in any case, inferior to that reached in the 15th century. Furthermore, they showed a tendency to disintegrate because of the hegemony of Buridanian nominalism in universities in the second half of the 14th century and because the regular clergy concluded their own studies in the public *studia*. Cf. M.J.F.M. HOENEN, “Thomismus, Skotismus und Albertismus. Das Entstehen und die Bedeutung von philosophischen Schulen im späten Mittelalter”, in *Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter*, 2 (1997), pp. 81-103.

55. Cf. also M.J.F.M. HOENEN, “Zurück zu Autorität und Tradition. Geistesgeschichtliche Hintergründe des Traditionalismus an den spätmittelalterli-

level, they took part in the most significant conflicts of the 15th century: first of all, the conflict between the lay clergy and the regular clergy, the former being mainly followers of the *via mo-*

chen Universitäten”, in „*Herbst des Mittelalters*“..., pp. 133-146; L. HONNEFELDER, “Scotus und der Scotismus. Ein Beitrag zur Bedeutung der Schulbildung in der mittelalterlichen Philosophie“, in *Philosophy and Learning Universities in the Middle Ages*, ed. by M.J.F.M. Hoenen – J.H.J. Schneider – G. Wieland, (Education and Society in the Middle Ages and Renaissance, 6), Leiden – New York – Köln: E.J. Brill, 1995, pp. 249-262; St. SWIEŻAWSKI – M. PROKOPOWICZ, *Histoire de la philosophie européenne au XV^e siècle*, transl. by H. Rollet – M. Prokopowicz, Paris: Beauchesne, 1990. As Honnefelder observes, the history of the schools influenced the historiographical perception of them. Owing to the affirmation of Thomism (or, rather, of a peculiar representation of it) in the Roman Curia in the 19th century, this current has received an exaggerated attention compared to its true historic importance. However, it may be useful to see: S.-Th. BONINO, “La scuola tomista nel secolo XV”, in *La teologia dal XV al XVII secolo. Metodi e prospettive. Atti del XIII Colloquio internazionale di teologia di Lugano. Lugano, 28-29 maggio 1999*, (Edizioni universitarie Jaca, 111), ed. by I. Biffi – C. Marabelli, Milano: Istituto di storia della teologia della Facoltà di Teologia di Lugano – Editoriale Jaca book, 2000, pp. 57-70; P. CONFORTI, “La tradizione scolastica tomista fra Umanesimo e Rinascimento. Trecento e Quattrocento”, in ISTITUTO S. TOMMASO, *Studi 1995*, (Studia Pontificiae Universitatis a s. Thoma Aq. in Urbe, Nuova serie, 2), ed. by D. Lorenz – S. Serafini, Roma: Pontificia Università s. Tommaso d’Aquino, 1995, pp. 259-281. As far as Scotism in the 14th and 15th centuries is concerned, in addition to the above cited essay by Honnefelder see also: V. MUNIZ RODRÍGUEZ, “Pensamiento escotista en la España medieval (siglos XIV-XV)”, in *Revista española de filosofía medieval*, 3 (1996), pp. 77-84; A. POPPI, *La filosofia nello studio francescano del Santo a Padova*, (Centro studi antoniani, 12), Padova: Centro studi antoniani, 1989; Z. KALUZA, *Les querelles doctrinales à Paris. Nominalistes et réalistes aux confins du XIV^e et du XV^e siècle*, (Quodlibet, 2), Bergamo: Pierluigi Lubrina editore, 1988; *Regnum hominis et regnum Dei. Acta quarti congressus scotistici internationalis. Patavii, 24-29 septembris 1976*, ed. by C. Bérubé, vol. II *Sectio specialis. La tradizione scotista veneto-padovana*, (Studia scholastico-scotistica, 7), Romae: Societas internationalis scotistica, 1978; I. VÁZQUEZ, “La enseñanza de la doctrina de Escoto en las universidades españolas”, in *Verdad y vida*, 19 (1961), pp. 363-379; C. PIANA, “Gli inizi e lo sviluppo dello scotismo a Bologna e nella regione Romagnolo-Flaminia (sec. XIV-XVI)”, in *Archivum franciscanum historicum*, 11 (1947), pp. 49-80; D. SCARAMUZZI, *Il pensiero di Giovanni Duns Scotto nel Mezzogiorno d’Italia*, Roma: Collegio S. Antonio – Desclée e C., 1927. For the Nominalists and the Albertists, see the above-quoted essays by Kaluza, by Hoenen, and *Albertus Magnus und der Albertismus. Deutsche philosophische Kultur des Mittelalters*, (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters, 48), Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1995. For the history of the individual chairs dedicated to one author or another, the treatises dedicated to the history of the single universities are normally useful.

derna, the latter of the *via antiqua*;⁵⁶ then there was the conflict between the Papacy and the councils. The Dominican Thomists, defeated on the political-academic level and even expelled from the University of Paris thanks to the work of Pierre of Ailly, reacted by supporting papal supremacy on the speculative level, obtaining in exchange the promotion of their master of reference on the part of the pope. The followers of the *via moderna*, on the contrary, tended to be in favour of conciliatory standpoints. The defeat of conciliarism and the victory of papal absolutism were two of the causes of the decline of Nominalism at the turn of the 15th century. Finally, but closely linked to this situation, the schools took part in the struggle between the Pope and the State, or at least were involved in it. The expulsion in 1474 of the *moderni* from the University of Paris arose from the clash about the future contingents between *reales* and *nominales*, but occurred as a result of a political agreement between Louis XI and the Minorite Sixtus IV (of Scotist tendency). The growing deterioration in the relationship between Sixtus IV and Louis XI led the king first to tolerate the *moderni*, then to readmit them.

The Roman Curia did not restrict itself to favouring the supporters of the *via antiqua*. In the mid-century, it undertook a measure aiming to introduce into all the *studia* a unified methodology and ideological basis. The main elements in this act found their full expression in the statutes of the University of Paris issued by Nicholas V in 1452. In the first place, they prescribed two radical changes in didactics: the passage from teaching *per modum quæstionis* to teaching *per modum expositionis* and the recommendation that teachers should adhere as strictly as possible to Aristotle's texts. In the second place, they explicitly stated the reason for this change: to hinder the spread of *quæstiones*. The theoretical and cultural presuppositions that

56. Cf. H. OBERMAN, "Luther and the 'via moderna': the Philosophical Backdrop of the Reformation Breakthrough", in *The Journal of Ecclesiastical History*, 54 (2003), pp. 641-670. Despite what has been said, the complexity of the historical framework must not be underestimated: note, for example, that the "revival" of Thomism in German universities in the first half of the 15th century was the work of lay authors, since the German Dominicans were prevalently Albertists.

made this recommendation possible were the work of the followers of the *via antiqua*: on the one hand, the conviction according to which Albertus, Scotus and, above all, Thomas were good interpreters of the Stagirite's thought, so that the agreement between Aristotelian and Christian faith carried out in their commentaries should effectively respect the contents of Aristotle's works; on the other hand, literalism, practised by the theologians *in via Thomæ* relative to the works of Aquinas and considered the prime instrument in guaranteeing doctrinal immobility. The purpose of the changes introduced was, in the light of what the statutes themselves stated, manifest and perfectly respected the "spirit of the times": to go back to the past (and stay there), to impede the formulation of innovative doctrines and to regiment the dynamism of university culture.⁵⁷ Literal, pedantic Aristotelianism, considered by the Moderns emblematic of university teaching, was not the effect solely of the physiological resistance to change characteristic of those benefitting from the proceeds and honours at the state of affairs – as is usually the case of the well-established university teacher. It was, when considered more carefully, specifically the offspring on the one hand of the ideological choices and political action of the Roman Curia, on the other of the humanistic myth – which we shall see in a short while – of the "superior wisdom of the Ancients"; a myth that led to the search for the "authentic Aristotle" and rejected as "counterfeit" any doctrine that was not to be found by reading the Stagirite's work literally.

The picture sketched is valid from a general point of view but requires some further clarification. First of all, it must not be taken to have been excessively rigid, since the history of each region and every university seat presents its own characteristics. I have already hinted, for example, at the fact that the desire of the Roman Curia to gain complete control over the teaching of theology did have the effect that there were in the Italian public *studia* no faculties of theology until well into the 14th century and, when they were set up, it was in the form of exam colleges,

57. Cf. St. SWIEŻAWSKI, "Les débuts de l'aristotelisme chrétien moderne", in *Nova et vetera*, 53 (1978), pp. 242-259.

not teaching structures. This does not mean that there were no structures destined for the teaching of theology, but they were not, rightly speaking, part of the public *studia*. In fact, they were identical to the *studia* belonging to the religious Orders, so that in the 15th century, and for most of the 16th, the candidates for the theological doctorate took their final exam with, and obtained their degree from, the college of theologians of the public *studium*, but mainly followed courses in the *studia* of religious Orders. Finally, the chairs of theology dedicated to one or another Master, set up in the public *studia* in the second half of the 15th century, belonged to the faculty of arts. In this situation, the teaching of philosophy at the universities was propaedeutic not to that of theology, or of canon law, but to that of medicine and civil law. This explains why the teachers of philosophy at Italian universities tended to occupy themselves with logic and natural philosophy rather than with metaphysics.

As to the worth of the culture that developed in such a context of strict traditionalism, I have already partly spoken of this. I should add that, despite the enormous pressure applied by the various centres of political power, among which the Papacy, and by the anxiety of the cultural *élites* themselves in the face of the growing complication of the doctrinal framework, there was no interruption in the development of academic thought. The clashes among the schools provided the chance not only for political evolution but also for conceptual transformation. In these clashes the antagonists contaminated one another and transcended themselves in the effort to resist an adversary, to bring it down, or even to assimilate it, attempting to reduce the divergences to questions *de nomine*. On the other hand, being literally confined to Aristotle encouraged the academic authors to take an interest in the whole of the Stagirite's works, in his "authentic" words and in a correct translation of them into Latin. As far as this aspect is concerned, academic and humanistic culture penetrated each other, and this was not the only field in which this occurred.

The interaction between the universities (taken in the wider sense of both public and particular *studia*) and Humanism was intense and extensive, and the reciprocal accusations of sterility

and vacuity constituted only one aspect of it, however significant this may be. First of all, it should be noted that Humanism was part of the university insofar as its exponents were mainly, all things considered, university teachers. The principle point is that university chairs were characterized by different grades of “dignity”. The teachers who, in the faculty of arts, held lessons on Aristotle’s physical and metaphysical works were considered of higher rank; those who “read” the logical, ethical, and political works of the Stagirite inferior. Well, there were many Humanists among the latter, so much so that the very term “*humanistæ*”, when it was coined in the second half of the 15th century, designated precisely the academic teachers of grammar, rhetoric, and ethics; subjects that were considered inferior in dignity to those taught by the *artistæ*. Vice versa, however, there were “high-ranking” academic thinkers who were also interested in questions of ethics and politics. In the 15th century, one example is the Dominican Antonino Pierozzi from Florence, author of a renowned *Summa moralis*. The representation of the reality of the time expressed as a distinction between “academic philosophy, medicine, jurisprudence, or theology” and “Humanism” is not, therefore, wholly correct, as if Humanism were not also a component of the polyhedral academic culture. This leads to the further observation that there is no question that was not discussed by thinkers of every “tendency”, both within university and without the university, and that many of these questions originated in the Middle Ages. This affirmation is supported by the fact that “Humanists”, “Platonists”, and “Scholastics” often frequented the same extra-university circles. It is sufficient to think of the cultural circle that arose around Lorenzo de’ Medici. Here, the Platonists undoubtedly played the main role, yet both the Thomist Vincenzo Bandello’s criticism of the Ficinian doctrine of beatitude and the commentary by the Dominican Dominic of Flanders to the *Metaphysics* were dedicated to *il Magnifico*. Furthermore, in 1489 Lorenzo was host to a theological dispute between the Thomist Nicola de Mirabilibus OP and the Scotist Giorgio Benigno Salviati (Juraj Dragišić) OM. Salviati defended both Savonarola and Reuchlin. There were also figures who tried to master all the fields of knowledge, from grammar to physics

and beyond, making use of contributions of every origin. The works of Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, in particular his *Conclusiones* and his *De ente et uno*, are a perfect example of this.⁵⁸ Also worthy of note are the figures of Giorgio Valla, author of a *De expetendis et fugiendis rebus opus* published posthumously by Aldo Manuzio in 1501, and Wessel Gansfort: he was an academic author who became a Nominalist later in life and one of the first scholars of Hebrew, of such competence as to observe that in *Exodus* God says of himself not that “I am who I am” but “I shall be”.⁵⁹

The forms of interaction between Humanism and academic speculation will be considered, in a wider perspective, below. For the moment I shall deal only with two basic aspects of their relationship. Kristeller describes Humanism as a cultural movement oriented towards the study of the languages, literature, and philosophy of ancient Greece and Rome and towards the renewal of poetry, oratory prose, historiography, and moral thought inspired by the models provided by the Ancients. He denies, on the other hand, that it was a philosophical movement. This is undoubtedly an acute description, which from the historical point of view rightly justifies the fact that Humanism should not be confused with the relaunching of one or the other ancient author, and from the historiographical point of view does not accept the bed of Procrustes of the ideological and fictional interpretations of fifteenth- and sixteenth-century thought. However, in my opinion, Humanism bore two fundamental conceptions of a speculative nature. The first consists in the ideal of original, or seminal, wisdom. It assumed many forms, from Brunni’s mythicizing of the archetypal Latin, to Pico’s interest in cabala, and to the obsessive search for the “authentic Aristotle”; nevertheless, it is presupposed by all this forms. The second basic concept consists in the ideal of the primacy of inner purity over science in gaining access to the highest truths. This is the direct heir of the medieval monastic (and hence anti-Scholastic)

58. Cf. St. CAROTI, “Note sulle fonti medievali di Pico della Mirandola”, in *Giornale critico della filosofia italiana*, 84 (2005), pp. 60-92.

59. Cf. OBERMAN, “Luther...”.

ideal, from which it accepted some principles (including the value of fervour), the ends, and the adversaries, but of which it partly modified the instrument: it was no longer oration and privation but the rhetorical movement of emotions.⁶⁰ With this Humanism continued the conflict, which had begun in the 12th century, between monastic thought and Scholastic culture; the battle was now waged by the Humanists with the arms of early philology, historical knowledge, and the appraisal of ancient, late-ancient and early medieval texts.⁶¹ On the contrary, with the ideal of the wisdom of the ancients Humanism fully participated in the fifteenth-century tendency to seek its own models of reference in the past. The fact that this led to the rediscovery of authors, texts, and doctrines that were to have a profound effect on the history of European thought, some of which even going as far as to contribute to surpassing Aristotelian physics, does not contradict what has been said up to now. These rediscoveries were “revolutionary” in as far as the Middle Ages in general, and the 15th century most of all, could conceive of a “revolution”: the return to authentic wisdom, to a form of authentic life, which had already occurred, or at least had been approached, in the past. Some academic authors looked to the 14th century, others to the 13th; many “sons” of the *studia humanitatis* looked even further back in time: some to the “fathers of the Church”, others to pagan Roman and Greek antiquity. They all, however, shared the conviction that they could (and should) find in the past the fount of true knowledge. Moreover, what has been said above concerning academic culture is also valid here: merely looking back to the past was not – contrary to what the political and cultural *élites* in the 15th century believed – to be in itself any guarantee that the debates would be sedated.

The third basic component of fifteenth-century culture was Aristotelianism. Today it is clear that fifteenth- and sixteenth-

60. Cf. TUCKER, “Introduction...”.

61. When seen in this light, I also find valid the considerations of Ch.G. NAUERT, “Humanism as a Method: Roots of Conflict with the Scholastics”, in *Sixteenth Century Journal*, 29 (1998), pp. 427-438, and E. RUMMEL, *The Humanist-Scholastic Debate in the Renaissance and Reformation*, (Harvard Historical Studies, 120), Cambridge – London: Harvard University Press, 1995.

century culture was not dominated by an anti-Aristotelian Platonism; on the contrary, its main, decisive tendency was precisely Aristotelian. It must, however, be noted that Aristotelianism itself, like academic thought and Humanism, was a complex phenomenon and interwoven with the other components of philosophical considerations in those centuries. First of all, it should be pointed out that there were several types of "Aristotelian" texts in circulation. Some were such thanks to their direct link with the Stagirite's works: translations, commentaries, summaries, passages chosen for anthologies, tables, and indices. In other cases, "Aristotelianism" simply consisted in a few traces, to various extents, of the basic speculative outline of autonomous works. All these types of texts presented forms of evolution. As far as translations are concerned, for example, there were Humanists in the 15th century who deplored medieval neologisms and maintained that there was no Greek concept that could not be translated into the Latin of Cicero. In the 16th century, however, there were already both translations according to the pure humanistic style and attempts to safeguard the technical terminology of philosophy. At the turn of the 16th century parallel text translations were published with integrations to the text pointed out. The very *corpus* of the Stagirite's works became increasingly available in translation and the texts were relatively easy to find; among those that were of new, or renewed, acquisition the *Mechanics* and the *De partibus animalium* were of particular importance. The interpretations of this *corpus* multiplied. In the 15th century the interpretation offered by the neo-Platonic commentators of Aristotle, rediscovered in Byzantine libraries, were added to the already numerous ones formulated in the 13th and 14th. The Humanists embraced the thesis according to which the older the text was, the more it guaranteed speculative depth, and the presupposition by which the smaller the gap was between a text and its commentary, the more the latter was guaranteed to be faithful. They hence saw in neo-Platonic commentators a better means of leading them towards the authentic thought of Aristotle than was possible by following Arabic or medieval commentators. The uses of Aristotle's texts also multiplied. The translations into vernacular, for example,

and his works concerning politics, ethics, and poetry had a different readership from that of the universities.⁶²

The latter observation introduces the relationship between Aristotelianism and the universities. It is clear from what has been said above that the former was not fully exhausted in the latter. On the contrary, it might be possible to state that academic culture was contained in Aristotelianism. Yet such an affirmation calls for further elucidation. It can be observed, for instance, that in the course of the 16th century some chairs of Platonic philosophy were also instituted. Above all, it can be seen that in the universities in the 15th and early years of the 16th century all possible types and grades of combinations of Aristotelianism with theses from other origins (neo-Platonic, alchemic, Stoic, corpuscularistic) were found and that there was the constant presence of late medieval currents (Mertonian, Nominalist, Thomist, Scotist, Averroist). All this occurred in a great many cases precisely in the name of the “authentic” Aristotle. Therefore, in this case too – as was the case in the 14th century –, it makes sense to speak of Aristotelianism relative to academic philosophy in its entirety, using the term “Aristotelianism” with only a limited meaning: i.e. the custom of developing individual theories maintaining a reference to Aristotle’s texts and the persistence of a few basic speculative perspectives in the fields of physics and metaphysics. Among these there were, for example, the distinction between substance and accident, the composition through power and action, and the concept of uniform rectilinear motion as a form of change.

The difficulty encountered in defining Aristotelianism is similar to that we encounter in defining Platonism. We can say that it consists in conceiving reality as a set of metaphysical planes and relationships. Yet here, too, some aspects have to be clarified. First of all, this vision of the world can be taken in at least three different ways. Mystically: following with the heart and mind the relationships that link the various levels of reality

62. See also Luca Bianchi’s contributions collected in *Studi...*, and the essays by Kessler and Panizza in *Philosophy in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries. Conversations with Aristotle*, ed. by C. Blackwell – S. Kusukawa, Aldershot – Brookfield: Ashgate, 1999.

permits one to ascend morally to the higher planes. Magically: the relationships that link the different levels of reality permit one to join the lower levels to the higher ones theurgically. Mathematically: the mathematical nature of such a structure permits one to describe the world of sensible things with mathematical tools. To this must be added that Platonism, like Aristotelianism, also linked up in a myriad of ways with Humanism and with the currents of academic thought. Finally, it should be remembered that it, too, besides being an expression of the spirit of the times, depended to some extent on the political deeds of some sectors of the Church, which attempted to recuperate an early-medieval Platonizing perspective in order to overcome the tensions that had been generated in academic speculation.

As far as Renaissance alchemy and astrology are concerned, I hope I may be permitted to say quite briefly that, before they were reinterpreted in the 16th century from a neo-Platonic and cabalistic point of view, they constituted an important sector of late-medieval culture and interacted with all the components of that age.⁶³ One of these components was academic philosophy: to give just one example, it is enough to recall that theses deriving from alchemy were accepted by authors such as Achillini, Nifo, and Case. Let us now consider at greater length the role played by the religious pressures and movements in the evolution of fifteenth-century culture. Indeed, this is a factor that we have already encountered more than once. For example, one can recall that the conflict between the *via antiqua* and the *via moderna* was initiated by the Hussite crisis and that its outcome was decided in the end by the victory of papal absolutism over Conciliarism. Nevertheless, the manifestations and effects of this component in the culture of that century are more numerous than hinted at so far. The religious pressures, for example, were one of the main driving forces of the anti-intellectual and anti-academic movements in the 15th century. To give another example, it should be observed that Dominican Thomism in the last quarter of that

63. Cf. *Alchimia e medicina nel medioevo*, ed. by Ch. Crisciani – A. Paravicini Bagliani, (Micrologus' Library, 9), Firenze: SISMELE – Edizioni del Galluzzo, 2003.

century did not only lead to the renewed “school consciousness” provoked in the Order of Preaching Friars by the work of Jean Cabrol or by the secular masters of Cologne; it also resulted from the renewed zeal that characterized the observant branch of the Order. Savonarola belonged to this branch; but then so did all the Dominican inquisitors more involved in the analysis of the “phenomenon” of witchcraft, in identifying witches and suppressing them. In particular, one of the members of that branch was Silvestro Mazzolini da Prierio: he was a Thomist follower of Herveus, anti-Capreolist, hostile to de Vio’s thesis about the immortality of the soul, an animator of the criticism directed at Pomponazzi, and the protagonist of a dispute with Luther which, according to Erasmus, led to the break between the German reformer and the Roman Curia.⁶⁴

This case also, like many others, reveals the multiplicity and strength of the ties linking the various components of fifteenth-century thought. As far as that which is central to our interest is concerned, that is to say academic philosophy, its influence both on Humanism and on Platonism, and, correspondingly, the influence of the latter two on it, have to be underlined. One example of the influence of Scholasticism on Humanism can be found in the repercussions of the conception of theology developed by some *nominales*. For them the reciprocal extraneousness of philosophy and theology is founded on the fact that they have different sources and methodologies. In particular, the sources of theology (i.e. the Holy Scriptures) are expressed in ordinary language; therefore, Jean Gerson concludes in *De duplici logica* of 1402, they must be interpreted not according to the rules of logic but according to those of rhetoric.⁶⁵ As a result, the *studia humanitatis* are central to the theologian’s work not only indirectly, as instruments serving to reconstruct the sources, but rather directly,

64. Cf. M. TAVUZZI, *Prierias. The Life and Works of Silvestro Mazzolini da Prierio, 1456-1527*, (Duke Monographs in Medieval and Renaissance Studies, 16), Durham – London: Duke University Press, 1997. See also ID., “Valentino da Camerino, O.P. (1438-1515): Teacher and Critic of Cajetan”, in *Traditio*, 49 (1994), pp. 287-316; ID., “Hervaeus Natalis and the Philosophical Logic of the Thomism of the Renaissance”, in *Doctor communis*, 45 (1992), pp. 132-152.

65. Cf. the text from *De duplici logica* quoted by HOENEN, “Zurück zu Autorität...”.

as instruments serving to understand them. This idea was maintained in academic culture so that even Galileo heard about it, and was able to use it to his own ends. Influences of Albertist, Thomist, and Scotist Scholasticism on Platonism are present, for example, in the works of authors such as Ficino and Pico. It should be recalled that Bessarione also uses arguments taken from Scotus' texts in order to demonstrate that Aristotle and Christianity are irreconcilable. Of no less importance are the influences exercised by Humanism and Renaissance neo-Platonism on Scholastics. I have already observed that the tools of philology, the knowledge of ancient languages and, more radically, the awareness of historical distance penetrated, not without some resistance, into the "high-ranking" university culture giving rise both to a technical language remodelled on classical forms and to accurate historical reconstructions of the development of specific themes.⁶⁶ Besides these types of influence, there were others of a more strictly conceptual nature. Both Lorenzo Valla and Giovanni Pico reduced the meaning of "*ens*" to that of "*res*". Di Vona interpreted this reduction in the neo-Thomistic terms of "reification of the being" and observed that later academic philosophy would take possession of, and preserve, this conceptual transformation, whose genesis, he wrote, was hence not the work of university scholars of metaphysics. I do not agree with the historiographical thesis according to which medieval metaphysics (or, more specifically, that of Thomas Aquinas) and Renaissance and modern metaphysics consist in the "reification of the being"; however, I do recognise that Pico's work is among the models which inspired Mas and thus that, despite the obvious differences, Valla, Pico, and Mas shared some significant basic metaphysical perspectives.

If, in conclusion, we compare the 13th and 14th centuries with the 15th, we can see aspects both of continuity and of discontinuity. The thinkers in both periods were interested in ancient texts unknown to the Latin world, extended Aristotelian

66. Cf. for example D.J. NODES, "Scholasticism and New Philology: Giles of Viterbo, O.E.S.A. (1469-1532), on Divine Generation", in *Traditio*, 57 (2002), pp. 317-340.

perspectives to new areas, and mingled them with doctrines of other origins. However, there are both “quantitative” and “qualitative” discontinuities. Among the former we can mention the proliferation of the texts available, the spread of linguistic and philological competence, the growth of historical awareness, and the increase in the number and importance of the cultural circles outside the universities. As far as the latter are concerned, we have seen how within the universities a plurality of competing institutionalized currents developed, while outside the universities attention was focused on unusual approaches to Aristotle’s texts and to the works of other ancient authors.

2.3.3 *The sixteenth century: the eruption of tensions and sources*

Many of the aspects of the components of the 16th century are extensions of those of the 15th; we can, therefore, look at these very briefly. Others require deeper examination.

Fifteenth-century Aristotelianism maintained its characteristics as an international phenomenon: both teachers whose subject was part of the course of revealed theology and those whose lessons were propaedeutic to medical or legal studies were Aristotelians; academic writers and supporters of alternative approaches, Catholic and Protestant authors also adhered to Aristotelianism. It remained characterized by a myriad of configurations: from the slavish adherence to Aristotle’s texts to the use of material from the whole spectrum of ancient and medieval thought; from the simple use of medieval translations to attentive philological analyses. The whole complex of works studied varied according to the circumstances. The fifteenth-century commentaries in the vulgar tongue to the *Nicomachean Ethics* and to *Politics*, for instance, were highly successful. There were authors who also attempted to “return” to Aristotle in the fields of dialectics and rhetoric. The notion of *paideía* introduced in the prologue to *De partibus animalium* aroused a debate concerning questions about the method of the acquisition of new knowledge and the order in which knowledge already acquired should be expounded.⁶⁷

67. Cf. A. POPPI, “Zabarella, or Aristotelianism as a Rigorous Science”, in *The Impact...*, pp. 35-63; the contributions of Kessler, Lines, and Scattola in *La*

The invention and diffusion of the printing press was an event that revolutionised the spread of knowledge in Europe and expanded the “catchment area” of all the sixteenth-century cultural forces. The Humanists made extensive use of it, publishing the translations of works by Aristarchus and Ptolemy, by Euclid, Archimedes, and Hero, by Hippocrates, Galen, and Celsus, by Theophrastus, Dioscorides, and Pliny the Elder. This multitude of ancient texts opened up new horizons in every field. In particular, in the field of physics they served to encourage the influence of Archimedes, which had in fact already been present in the Middle Ages. The theologians and the *artistæ* were equally as involved as their *humanistæ* colleagues. They not only published numerous original works but also edited the publication of many texts by thirteenth- and fourteenth-century authors; quite frequently these editions are even today the only ones available. The conflict between the Catholic and the Reformed theologians led the former to promote the publication of the works by the “Fathers of the Church”. Aristotelianism also profited from the use of this instrument. In 1495-98 Manuzio published the first edition of Aristotle’s works in Greek. In the following years the texts of the Greek commentators were published too, both in the original language and in translation. In reply to this Platonizing “offensive”, in 1550-52 a new translation of all the known works by Aristotle, together with a new translation of Averroës’ commentaries to them, was published by Giunta.

The tensions and religious movements in the 16th century were even greater than they had been in the previous one. The efforts of the Roman Curia to regiment academic instruction, and the cultural world in general, were continually repeated. Even before the Reformation, the Vth Lateran Council had discussed the hypothesis of obliging academic philosophy teachers to defend, from the philosophical point of view, theses defined

presenza dell'aristotelismo padovano nella filosofia della prima modernità, ed. by Gr. Piaia, (Miscellanea erudita, 64), Roma – Padova: Editrice Antenore, 2002; those of Langer, Lardet, and Moss in *Philosophy...*; and, in general, the essays published in *Method and Order in Renaissance Philosophy of Nature. The Aristotle Commentary Tradition*, ed. by D.A. Di Liscia – E. Kessler – Ch. Methuen, Aldershot – Brookfield: Ashgate, 1997.

by dogma. The Paduan Scotist Antonio Trombetta, a fierce critic of Thomism, was in favour of this hypothesis; the Thomist Tommaso de Vio, who had defended his co-religionary Francesco Siculo from Trombetta's attacks, opposed it. In 1513 Leo X issued a papal bull, published in the 8th Session of the Council, which firstly confirmed the canon of the Council of Vienne – which had established that the soul is a form of the body, is immortal, created directly by God, and different for each human body –, secondly obliged philosophy teachers to defend these theses philosophically whenever they dealt with the question. The bull was intended as an attack on the Averroist current in academic thought, yet within a few years it was destined to fail. The cause of this failure was Pomponazzi. The latter, a teacher at the University of Bologna (a city which belonged to the territory of the Pontifical State), in 1516 at the same time supported both one aspect of the standpoint of Alexander of Aphrodisias (whose commentary on Aristotle's *De anima* had been translated in 1495) and one aspect of Averroës'. In agreement with Alexander, he maintained that every human body has its own soul, yet the operation of human intellect requires perforce the body; therefore, the soul is essentially tied to it and is mortal. With Averroës, he stated that the opinion, founded on faith, according to which the soul is immortal, is preeminent, yet was sustained by the founders of the various religions solely with an aim to lead ignorant, uncouth men towards virtue. Despite the attacks by Spina (supported by Mazzolini), Pomponazzi not only was not condemned (thanks to de Vio's support), but not even removed from his post. This permitted sixteenth-century university scholars to continue to follow either Averroës' or Alexander's standpoint and favoured a perception of the defence of Aristotle's thought as a way of defending the autonomy of rational research from religion.

The Reformation also was part of the spread of the political and religious tensions that characterized the 15th and the beginning of the 16th century. On the one hand, it inherited the anti-intellectual – and therefore anti-academic – monastic and humanistic drive. In the first phases of the Reformation, Luther wrote that soon there would be no Thomists, Albertists, Scotists, or Ockhamists left in the world, but everybody would simply be

the sons of God and true Christians. Melanchthon, writing against the *Determinatio* of the University of Paris concerning the Reformer's doctrines, accused the Paris theologians of forgetting the "Fathers" and of having recourse only to authors such as Aristotle, Scotus, Ockham, and Biel; he furthermore indicated the recent *Commentary* by John Major on the *Sentences* as a sign of the state of degradation of theology in Paris at the time. On the other hand, however, on the level of doctrine the conflict between Protestantism and Catholicism had been prepared for at least two centuries of debates on precisely those questions that were the object of the controversies between Reformers and Catholics. In 1523 Erasmus wrote that what the Lutherans and Luther were discussing were not the articles of faith; they were, instead, discussing the question as to whether the primacy of the pope had been established by Christ, whether a bishop could oblige somebody to commit a mortal sin, whether free will contributed towards salvation, whether man's deeds could be called good, and whether the Mass were a sacrifice; these were all arguments, Erasmus noted, that *solent esse themata conflictationum scholasticarum*.⁶⁸ Luther himself was neither a simple adversary to academic culture, nor a disciple of the *via moderna* or of the *via antiqua*; on the contrary, like all the other major late medieval academic authors, he was a thinker capable of accepting different doctrines from various schools of thought and of formulating his own proposals.⁶⁹ This was also true, *mutatis mutandis*, for Calvin, Zwingli, and Melanchthon, and turned, on the level of the organization and consolidation of the Reformation in the academic environment, into an institutional and cultural framework constructed on the foundations of the structures and paradigms circulating in northern Europe at the beginning of the 16th cen-

68. Cf. the passages from Luther, Melanchthon, and Erasmus quoted in OBERMAN, *Forerunners...*

69. Cf. OBERMAN, "Luther..."; E. ANDREATTA, "La presenza di Aristotele in Lutero negli anni della maturità e della vecchiaia", in *Protestantesimo*, 51 (1996), pp. 263-278; Th. DIETER, "Il giovane Lutero e Aristotele", in *Protestantesimo*, 51 (1996), pp. 247-262; S. LEONI, "Motus essentia Dei, Deus essentia beatorum. Ontologia e teologia in una predica giovanile di Lutero", in *Protestantesimo*, 51 (1996), pp. 219-246.

tury.⁷⁰ Not even the notion of “free examination” – indicated by certain historians in the past as the decisive stage in the historical process of giving greater weight to subjectivity – was an innovation in doctrine or concept. The thesis according to which the Protestant position would open the door to the liberty of individual interpretation was formulated for polemical reasons by the theologians in favour of Papacy. In actual fact, whatever its theoretical value may be, this thesis has no historical foundation. The point is that the notion of “free examination” does not express the conviction according to which the personal interpretation of the Holy Scriptures on the part of a single person would take, for that person, precedence over others’ interpretation. It expresses, on the contrary, the conviction that a truthful interpretation is shown not in the words of a presumed absolute monarch of Christians (the pope), but in the position shared by most of the faithful; furthermore, this interpretation takes objective precedence over the interpretation proposed by the minority of the faithful, or by the single believer, still holds good.⁷¹

The interaction between the surges towards a reformation prior to the rise of Protestantism and those subsequent to the need to face the various forms taken by the latter generated numerous transformations in the Catholic world. I shall merely hint here at those that concern the history of culture and of the university more closely. The most radical transformation consisted in a further consolidation of papal absolutism and in the complete incorporation of Catholicism into it. Although the Papacy was delimited by the power of other sovereign states, in fusing within itself theoretically and operatively both the government over doctrine (and over the same supra-historical justification of itself), and the powers of the State, it started to become, surpassing absolutism, the first instance of totalitarianism in history. A fundamental component in this process was the constitution in the Roman Curia of congregations given the task of keeping watch

70. Cf. C.R. TRUEMAN – R. SCOTT CLARK, “Introduction”, in *Protestant Scholasticism: Essays in Reassessment*, ed. by C.R. Trueman – R. Scott Clark, Carlisle: Paternoster Press, 1999, pp. xi-xix.

71. Cf. G.R. EVANS, *Problems of Authority in the Reformation Debates*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.

over the orthodoxy of doctrines and individuals, among which were the Holy Inquisition (1542) and the Congregation of the Index (1571). The institution of these organs had an indirect, yet profound, effect on the ecclesiastic, political, and social role of the faculties of theology in general and, in particular, of the Faculty of Theology of the University of Paris. Gradually relieved from the function of making decisions, or at least that of issuing expertises, in the field of doctrine, the faculties slowly became mere transmitters of decisions made elsewhere. No less decisive for the destiny of the faculties of theology were the institution of seminaries for the formation of the clergy and, more significantly, the creation of theological faculties within the single religious Orders. Although these structures developed and spread very slowly, eventually they subtracted from the “public” faculties of theology both the social function of the formation of the senior clergy and, above all, the dynamic force of the most innovative authors. At the end of the 18th century, when the single states, autonomously or under the impulse of the Napoleonic government, suppressed these faculties, they struck structures that were inert on the speculative level and paralysing on the social one.

The control of the Papacy over the cultural world was exercised in several other directions. For example, the figure of the isolated master of grammar and rhetoric, considered difficult to control by the ecclesiastical authority, was besieged on two fronts. On the one hand, moves were made to substitute him with new organizations faithful to the doctrines of the Roman Curia; on the other, they explicitly laid down the tasks of moral, civil, and religious education intrinsic to the master’s work directing them towards results held to be satisfactory. Some of the directives of the Vth Lateran Council had already been along these lines, but the process reached its conclusion in 1564, from when all teachers had to take an oath of faith. The control over the very religious Orders themselves and their members progressively increased. At the end of the 16th century, the Congregation of the Index imposed a census of the contents of monastery libraries. Zealous ministers, if and when there were any, saw to “expurgating” the libraries and to removing or blotting out the parts “to be corrected” in the volumes forbidden *donec corrigatur*. Access

to the very libraries was strictly controlled, in order to prevent any person of the clergy from reading anything unauthorized.⁷²

The dynamics of the “Catholic Reformation” also had direct effects on the history of philosophy and theology. The slight prevalence of Thomist theologians over the Scotists in the Council of Trent had the effect that the Conciliar documents were formulated in Thomist theological terminology, making it thus universal. For the whole of the following century, this did not impede the wider spread of Scotism compared to Thomism, but, in the long run, contributed to the creation of the neo-Thomist historiographical myth according to which the “Catholic Church” had steadily found its doctrinal point of reference in Thomas Aquinas.⁷³ The controversies with the Humanists and the Reformed churches led to important historical outcomes. In reply to the Protestants’ appeals to the “Fathers of the Church”, within the Catholic Church, as has been said, the editions of works by the latter multiplied. The radical change in the methodology of interpreting the Holy Bible was even more noticeable. Faced with the Humanists’ ability to penetrate the field of theology thanks to their competence in reading the text “to the letter”, and with the Protestants’ use of this “literal” interpretation in order to support their own understanding of the Bible, Catholic authors turned their backs on their traditional method of reading it: while they had not previously restricted themselves to a “literal” interpretation of it, they had certainly kept this as a fixed point of reference; at this stage, however, they began to attribute a “true” meaning just to the “spirit” of the text.⁷⁴ This was not

72. Most of this information can be found, if sought attentively, in the *Histoire de l'Église* founded by A. Fliche and V. Martin. Cf. also P.F. GRENDLER, *Schooling in Renaissance Italy: Literacy and Learning, 1300-1600*, (The Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science, 107), Baltimore – London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989; M. TURRINI – A. VALENTI, “L’educazione religiosa”, in *Il catechismo e la grammatica*, ed. by G.P. Brizzi, (Cultura e vita civile nel Settecento), vol. I, Bologna: Il Mulino, 1985, pp. 347-423; D. BALANI – M. ROGGERO, *La scuola in Italia dalla controriforma al secolo dei lumi*, (Documenti della storia, 20), Torino: Loescher, 1976.

73. Cf. HONNEFELDER, “Scotus...”.

74. Cf. A.S. BRETT, “Authority, Reason and the Self-definition of Theologians in the Spanish ‘Second Scholastic’”, in *Forms...*, pp. 63-89.

something that occurred suddenly and it only reached its full maturity in the 19th century, when the Roman Curia also abandoned Biblical “physics” and part of its “natural history”. However, it had its origins in the 16th century.

What has been said so far should not lead one to believe that the action of the Catholic Church – of which the Roman Curia and the Council of Trent were central elements and moments, but were not the sole components – aimed just to restrain the faithful. On the contrary, they had a propulsive and propositive nature. The gradual separation between the regular clergy’s course of studies and the public faculties of theology, on the one hand, deprived some of the latter of part of their vitality and significance, but, on the other, strengthened the *studia* within the religious Orders. In this way, the philosophical and theological schools (taking “schools” to mean something more restricted than currents) became identical to the cultural-political orientation of each single religious Order. These orientations, from the end of the 15th century, belonged to two great families, the Thomists, and the Scotists. No religious Order followed either Albertism or Nominalism, which, as schools, disappeared respectively at the end of the 15th century and in the 30s of the 16th. On the contrary, from the end of the 16th century there was a proliferation of the forms both of Scotism and of Thomism and the birth of new schools. The proliferation of the types of “classical” schools was due to the multiplicity of religious Orders that promoted them. The separation between the Conventual Minorites and the “federation” of the *simpliciter* Minorites (constituted basically by Observants, Discalced, Recollects, and Riformati) led, at the end of the 16th century, to two different Scotist doctrinal traditions. The decision of Ignatius of Loyola, the founder of the Jesuits, to tie the members of the new Order to Thomas Aquinas led to the formation of a Thomist school distinct from that of the Dominicans. This distinction was to become, between the end of the 16th and the beginning of the 17th century, very great thanks to two impulses: on the one hand, the creativity of the Jesuits and their desire to conform to the “universal” common doctrine rather than to the specifically Thomist one; on the other hand, the Dominicans’ self-esteem, that

led to the creation of “orthodox” Thomism – which was in itself, in actual fact, a complex of Thomist legacies, enriched by Scotist and Nominalist contributions, but having a different configuration from the syntheses formulated by the Jesuits. Furthermore, the Jesuit “school” branched out into several directions that were so innovative that they could no longer be considered, from the doctrinal point of view, truly a “school”, and, at the same time, be seen as the first, most vital and articulated, of the “new schools” that arose in Catholicism in the 17th century within the newly formed religious Orders.

The public *studia* in Catholic territories also presented some noteworthy aspects. From the didactic point of view, modifications were gradually introduced. Dispute became once again a central element so that it led, in the case of disputes valid as examinations, to the preliminary publication of the topics to be disputed and, later, to the publication of collections of disputes on the part of the teacher who had presided over them. Furthermore, the composition of essays and declamations were added to the disputes. On the doctrinal level, first of all the disappearance of Nominalism, as an autonomous doctrinal tradition, in the first decades of the 16th century can be observed.⁷⁵ As stated above, this can be attributed, on the political plane, to the victory of papal absolutism over Conciliarism and meant, on the speculative plane, a general loss of interest in the non-Aristotelian doctrines of logic and physics that had been introduced in the 14th century. This is not to say that the fruits of this doctrinal tradition disappeared completely, but what was left of them was preserved mainly within the theories developed by authors who formally belonged to other schools. For example, the “Thomism” of the University of Salamanca, characterized in the first half of the 16th century by the teachings of Dominicans who had studied in contact with the Nominalism in Paris, incorporated significant elements of the logic, physics, and metaphysics.

75. Cf. E.J. ASHWORTH, “Introduction”, in Robert SANDERSON, *Logicae artis compendium*, (facsimile of the ed. Oxoniae 1618), ed. by E.J. Ashworth, (Instrumenta rationis, 2), Bologna: CLUEB, 1985, pp. IX-LV. In some university seats, for example in Spain, “*in via Durandi*” chairs were maintained, but they were seen as an initial, transitory step in a teacher’s career.

ics of the *moderni* and transmitted them to the first students of the newly-born Company of Jesus.⁷⁶ Aristotelianism continued to be very lively, however, in the arts faculties of Italian universities. It was not a school (or various schools) strictly speaking, but a collection of doctrinal traditions that kept close ties with the Aristotelian texts and, at the same time, drew from them inspiration and ideas for new doctrines in the epistemological and moral fields.⁷⁷ Finally, the relationship between the university faculties and the doctrinal traditions supported by the single religious Orders was very complex and differed according to the various universities. Where there were faculties of theology in the true sense of the word, chairs of both “*in via Thomæ*” and “*in via Scoti*” theology were maintained. Where these faculties were simply examination colleges, the chairs in question continued to be dependent on the arts faculties. Chairs of metaphysics were also established either *in via Thomæ* or *in via Scoti*; these, too, depended on the arts faculties. To conclude, common to all these cases was the fact that the teachers holding these chairs were normally members of a religious Order who upheld the corresponding line of doctrine: it was generally a Dominican who held the chair *in via Thomæ*, a Minorite that *in via Scoti*.

During this century, the fruits of the influence of Humanism on academic “high-ranking” culture also reached full maturity. In this respect, many of the observations made about the relationship between Humanism and the university in the 15th century are equally valid. I should merely like to add that they are also valid for the situation in Spain,⁷⁸ and that it is precisely a Spanish

76. Cf. for example, S. ORREGO SÁNCHEZ, *La actualidad del ser en la “primera escuela” de Salamanca, con lecciones inéditas de Vitoria, Soto y Cano*, (Colección de pensamiento medieval y renacentista, 56), Pamplona: EUNSA, 2004; J. BELDA PLANS, *La Escuela de Salamanca y la renovación de la teología en el siglo XVI*, (BAC Maior, 63), Madrid: Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos, 2000; the essays by De Iuliis, Di Liso, and Lamacchia in *La filosofía nel Siglo de Oro. Studi sul tardo Rinascimento spagnolo*, ed. by A. Lamacchia, (Vestigia. Studi e strumenti di storiografia filosofica, 13), Bari: Levante, 1995.

77. Cf., for example, the essays contained in *La presenza...*, e A. POPPI, *Introduzione all'aristotelismo padovano*, (Saggi e testi, 10), Padova: Antenore, 1991.

78. Cf. V. CASTELLANO, “Il problema del Rinascimento Spagnolo. Erasmo, alumbadismo e correnti filosofico-spirituali del XVI secolo”, in *La filosofia nel Siglo...*, pp. 215-254.

author who exemplifies this interaction: Diego de Zúñiga, an Augustinian. The author of a systematic treatise on metaphysics, published in the same year as Suárez' *Disputationes* (1597), he revealed the stamp of Humanism in several places in his work. He declared that it was his wish to write in correct, classical Latin. He explicitly defended the need to know Greek and Hebrew in order to interpret the Bible in depth. He did so no less than in a work written for the purpose of putting himself in a good light with the Roman Curia; this was a remarkable fact, when one considers that the work in question was written after the Council of Trent declared that the *Vulgata* was also revealed and was sufficient for interpreting the Bible in a correct way. He rejected the rumour that said the Jews had corrupted the Hebrew text of the Bible; this was equally notable, if one considers that it occurred less than a century after the Reuchlin case. He lamented the fact that, in the past, theology had been treated by authors, *propter sui sæculi infelicitatem*, who were neither very erudite nor able to write in elegant prose, that it had been confused with many other sciences, and had been too widely extended and had become too prolix as a result of pointless questions.⁷⁹ Furthermore, in his *Commentaria in Job* (1584) he explicitly and minutely defended the Copernican system, and in the *Philosophiæ prima pars* (1597) developed a conception of metaphysics that went in the same direction as that of his contemporary Protestant authors, both Lutherans and Calvinists: it is a science of very general *rationes* that sustains the whole system of sciences.⁸⁰

The Reformation also profoundly influenced the life of the academies in the countries where it spread. The *studia* of the religious Orders, the internships and chairs in public *studia* reserved for a specific speculative course, the use of Aristotle's texts

79. Note, however, that starting at least from Gerson this type of complaint was common among academic authors.

80. Cf. J. GALLEGO SALVADORES, "La metafísica de Diego de Zúñiga (1536-1597) y la reforma tridentina de los estudios eclesiásticos", in *Estudio agustiniano*, 1974 (9), pp. 3-60. Galileo presented Zúñiga's *In Job* as a document in his own favour during the "first trial", and the Congregation of the Index censured it *donec corrigatur* (and some copies were indeed "expurgated") in the decree of 5th March, 1616, together with Copernicus' *De revolutionibus*.

as fundamental to university education, the method of dispute, and the very academic ranks disappeared almost immediately. The first two changes were to remain definitive, but the other three lasted only a short time: within a few years, lessons went back to taking Aristotle's texts as a point of reference, dispute was reintroduced as a didactic method and academic ranks were restored. It should, however, be pointed out that both anti-intellectualistic pressures and humanistic methods and ideals penetrated profoundly into the universities. Chairs of Greek and (to a lesser extent) Hebrew sprang up, and the practice of *declamatio* was introduced.

On the doctrinal plane, the works of Melanchthon, Schegk, and Crell were of great importance. All three of these authors, in exactly the same way as Luther, Calvin, and Zwingli had already done, sustained their own theological standpoints by also making use of themes and arguments taken from academic philosophy.⁸¹ In particular Melanchthon assigned to logic the role of a fundamental tool in settling theological controversies. Until the end of the 20s he developed his own thought in this sense, following a Humanistic type of approach. Later, however, he returned to a Scholastic approach, slightly mitigated by a recommendation (which had been for long customary among academic writers) to avoid the *cavillationes* and the reduction (which was also common among his contemporaries) of the room dedicated to the *parva logicalia*. His *Erotemata dialectices*, the expression of his full-fledged speculative orientation, became the most widespread text on logic in Germany in the second half of the 16th century. The separation into "schools" also reappeared in a different guise. As has already been stated, the distinctions between *antiqui* and *moderni*, or among Albertists, Thomists, Scotists, and Nominalists had already disappeared, but the Protestant world split up into the various Reformed confessions and did not succeed in finding any unity in a common line of belief. The *Concordienformel*, drawn in a definitive form in 1577, was not ac-

81. Cf. S. KUSUKAWA, "Uses of Philosophy in Reformation Thought: Melanchthon, Schegk, and Crellius", in *The Medieval Heritage in Early Modern Metaphysics and Modal Theory, 1400-1700*, ed. by R.L. Friedman – L.O. Nielsen, (The New Synthese Historical Library, 53), Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2003, pp. 143-163.

cepted in all the Protestant lands and was undersigned by even fewer local governments. From the second half of the 16th century, Protestant universities started to be distinguished on the basis of their confession. The clash between Calvinists and Lutherans became even more accentuated after the spread of the work on logic by Pierre de La Ramée (Petrus Ramus). In the 40s and 50s, La Ramée, a Calvinist, published several successful treatises on logic of a humanistic tendency, and his doctrine was used by the Calvinists as a means of penetrating Lutheran circles. Among other things, the thought of Melanchthon, opportunely interpreted (Philippism), became an instrument in the Calvinists' attack against the Lutherans, along with attempts to fuse the doctrines of Melanchthon and La Ramée (Phillipism-Ramism). The Lutherans replied to the Calvinists' attack by entrusting the task of settling theological controversies no longer just to logic but also to metaphysics. In the Lutheran universities, chairs of metaphysics were instituted, and in Wittenberg the *Isagoge in Metaphysicam Aristotelis* by Daniel Cramer were published (1594) and the *Quæstiones in primam Aristotelis philosophiam* by Jean Le Tourneur (Joannes Versor) were reprinted (1595).⁸²

82. Cf. *Ramus et l'Université*, ed. by M. Magnien – K. Meerhoff, (Cahiers V.L. Saulnier), Paris: Éditions rue d'Ulm, 2004; *The Influence of Petrus Ramus. Studies in Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century Philosophy and Sciences*, ed. by M. Feingold – J.S. Freedman – W. Rother, (Schwabe philosophica, 1), Basel: Schwabe, 2001; G. RONCAGLIA, "Palaestra rationis". *Discussioni su natura della copula e modalità nella filosofia 'scolastica' tedesca del XVII secolo*, (Biblioteca di storia della scienza, 39), Firenze: Olschki, 1996. For the anti-intellectualist Protestant thinkers the reintroduction of metaphysics as an instrument in settling doctrinal conflicts constituted such a great betrayal of the spirit of the Reformation that they were driven to formulate the historiographical thesis according to which the only cause of such a reintroduction was the "need" to fight the Jesuits with their own weapons. In 1611, Balthazar Meisner, in his work *Dissertatio de antiqua theologiae ratione, a Scholasticis primum imprudenter introducta, a Luthero ex Scholiis utiliter educta, a Jesuitis infeliciter reducta*, explicitly indicated them as being responsible for the situation. In 1655, Georg Horn, in his *Historia philosophica*, explained the reintroduction of metaphysics among the Protestants by appealing for the need to face the Jesuits. This theory was taken up again by von Elswich, followed by Budde and Brucker. Undoubtedly the Jesuits did play some role: the universities controlled by them constituted almost a ring around the Protestant lands, and the influence of their doctrines both on Calvinist and on Lutheran authors is evident. Nevertheless, a powerful drive towards this reintroduction was also caused by the conflicts

2.3.4 *Between the sixteenth and the seventeenth century:
the height of Aristotelianism*

The years at the turn of the 16th century saw the decline of the literary genre of the commentary and the development of the “systematic manual”. The term “systematic manual” is not intended in the sense of a text in which the whole field of what is real is deduced from a handful of primary principles. What is meant is a work in which the disposition of the arguments tackled is justified not by the order of the themes presented in an earlier text, but by the will to reveal to the reader the nature of the objects examined and of the ties that connect them. This type of work was not invented at the end of the 16th century. From the Middle Ages several systematic texts of logic that did not follow the distribution of the subjects offered by Aristotle’s *Organon* had been in circulation. There were also treatises on physics and metaphysics structured according to their internal requirements: just some examples of these are Pico’s *De ente et uno*, de Vio’s *De nominum analogia*, and Javelli’s *Tractatus de transcendentibus*. Nevertheless, the cultural and political tendencies of the 15th century had favoured the literary genre of the commentary. In the first half of the 16th century it was still very much in vogue; however, in the second half of the century the

among the various Protestant confessions. One first proof of this are the numerous declarations in this regard on the part of the Lutheran metaphysicists at the turn of the 15th century, starting with those of Salomon Geßner contained in the introduction to the 1595 re-edition of Le Tourneur’s *Quæstiones*. A second proof lies in the fact that Cornelis Martini’s *Metaphysica commentaria*, published, without the author’s consent in 1605, do not contain any polemical reference to the Jesuits. Finally, Christian Thomasius, a firm opposer of academic “orthodoxy”, indicates in speculative Christology, hence in metaphysics, with which the *Concordienformel* is replete, the origin of the error consisting in such a reintroduction. If, therefore, it is to be believed that the Protestant metaphysicists had learnt metaphysics also from Jesuit authors, the latter were not those whom the writers of the different Reformed confessions intended to attack by means of this discipline; they were, on the contrary, the exponents of the rival confession. Cf. also LEIJENHORST – LÜTHY, “The Erosion...”; M. LONGO, “Le storie generali della filosofia in Germania. 1690-1750”, in *Storia delle storie generali della filosofia*, ed. by G. Santinello, vol. II *Dall’età cartesiana a Brucker*, Brescia: La Scuola, 1979, pp. 327-635; SPARN, *Wiederkehr...*; H.J. DE VLEESCHAUWER, “Un paralelo protestante a la obra de Suárez”, in *Revista de filosofía*, 8 (1949), pp. 363-400.

situation changed. One reason for this change was the fact that in every discipline the quantity of data and standpoints to present to the reader increased enormously. The result was that, above all in fields such as botany, zoology, or medicine, it became increasingly difficult both to respect the sequence of the themes of the work that the university statutes set as a reference text, and to present the new orientations as simple possible elucidations of such a text. At the same time as this difficulty arose, sixteenth-century authors (not only the Aristotelians but also, for example, the Ramists) discussed with growing commitment the question of the correct procedures of acquisition and exposition of the disciplines. These debates awoke great expectations of methodological rigour and drove authors to consider Aristotle's texts as necessitating opportune rearrangement when expounded. In the 90s, for example, Giacomo Zabarella believed that the Stagirite had indeed created a theory concerning a precise order of dealing with the single disciplines, but that he had not applied it rigorously when writing his works. Consequently, the Paduan scholar considered it his own task to expound Aristotle's entire *corpus* not in the order in which it actually existed but according to the order, in the Paduan thinker's opinion, Aristotle himself had theorized. With this, the *expositio textualis* definitively gave way to the *expositio per modum doctrinæ*. Nevertheless, Zabarella himself wrote that all the knowledge unknown to Aristotle that had been acquired up to his own time, or would be acquired in the future, did not imply that the structure of science established by the Stagirite should be altered:

multæ namque sunt res naturales, quas non consideravit Aristoteles et multæ, quas non novit; attamen, si harum quoque notitiam assequeremur, non ob id alio ordine, aliove artificio tradere naturalem scientiam oporteret, sed manente fabrica, artificioque Aristotelis diceremus, scientiam naturalem earum rerum additione perfectiorem reddi quoad materiam, non quoad formam<.>⁸³

83. Cf. POPPI, "Zabarella..."; the contributions by Kessler, Lines, Perfetti, and Scattola in *La presenza...*; the contributions published in *Method and Order...*; the contributions contained in *The Commentary Tradition on Aristotle's De generatione et corruptione. Ancient, Medieval and Early Modern*, ed. by J.M.M.H. Thijssen – H.A.G. Braakhuis, (Studia artistarum, 7), Turnhout: Bre-

In the Catholic world, a second force urged writers towards this change: the higher ranks of the various bodies into which the Catholic Church was structured. The work of the teachers in the arts faculties, particularly in northern Italy, had definitively revealed that the commentaries on Aristotle's works by Albertus Magnus or Thomas Aquinas could not be considered a faithful exposition of the Stagirite's thought and that the doctrines of the latter did not correspond, in their essential traits, to Catholic doctrine. This led first to a search for ancient, or recent, commentaries that might help to overcome these difficulties, then to the formulation of a new perspective. Within this Aristotle kept his role as main point of reference, but true philosophy was no longer exposed in the form of a commentary on his works, but directly. This process reached its maturation in 1597: in that very same year the systematic metaphysics both by Zúñiga and by Suárez were published, the latter's work having far greater success.⁸⁴ In the Protestant world, the events reached maturity following a slightly different path, in which the contrasts among the various Reformed confessions played an essential role. The fact remains that in 1597-99 Cornelis Martini held a course of metaphysics in Helmstedt, the contents of which were published, with the title of *Metaphysica commentaria* and without the author's permission, in 1605.⁸⁵

pols, 1999. The text by Zabarella I have quoted can be found in: Jacobus ZABARELLA, *De naturalis scientiæ constitutione*, cap. 42 *De perfectione scientiæ naturalis ac de eius ordine*, in IDEM, *De rebus naturalibus libri XXX*, Frankfurt a.M.: Minerva, 1966 (facsimile of the ed. Francofurti: Sumptibus Lazari Zetzneri, 1607). The first edition was published in Venice in 1590), col. 131.

84. Cf. LOHR, "Jesuit Aristotelianism..."; GALLEGO SALVADORES, "La metafísica..."; ID., "La aparición de las primeras metafísicas sistemáticas en la España del XVI: Diego Mas (1587), Francisco Suarez y Diego de Zuñiga (1597)", in *Escritos del Vedat*, 3 (1973), pp. 91-162.

85. Cf. Fr. TREVISANI, "Johannes Clauberg e l'Aristotele riformato", in *L'interpretazione...*, pp. 103-126; DE VLEESCHAUWER, "Un paralelo...". Nevertheless, I do not fully agree with the (divergent) analyses of de Vleeschauwer and Trevisani. The former underestimates the influence of Suárez' *Disputationes* in the elaboration of Martini's work; the latter says nothing about the Lutherans' counterattack on the Calvinists. However, I do believe Trevisani is right in observing that, in the same years, the Calvinists were also moving in the same direction, having the precise aim of opposing the Lutherans.

In the space of very few years the passage from *expositio per modum doctrinæ* (within and along with which there were *disputationes*) to the *cursus* (organised in *disputationes*) took place. From European printers there was a flow of innumerable courses of philosophy which, while maintaining the *corpus* of Aristotle's works as the reference point for their overall organization, were structured according to the writer's own needs of exposition. Their importance was decisive for the history of European culture. In the Catholic world, the religious Orders quickly abandoned Aristotle's texts in favour of courses written specifically for their own students. The case of the public *studia* was different: in many of them the statutes continued to require the reading and commentary of the Stagirite's books until well into the 18th century; however, even in these seats teaching and study was actually carried out using new texts. Thanks to them, academic philosophy not only found itself in a condition whereby it could develop and transmit its contents more efficiently, but it also freed itself of the danger of succumbing under the weight of its own history. If on the one hand, because of its very nature, it was obliged to remain open to the comparison with the whole history of philosophical doctrines, on the other the system of the *cursus* enabled it to see all the ties in this history in perspective, give these ties an order, and set out its historical development schematically, so that it became possible to learn it, expose it and, on this basis, search for more refined solutions.⁸⁶

These courses could be of a various nature: complete (from logic to metaphysics) or dedicated to single aspects of philosophy; succinct or weighty; lightly sketched or of great speculative commitment; in Latin or (rarely, but not too rarely) in the vulgar tongue. They were also distinct in their contents. Some were the work of Catholic authors, others of Protestants. Among the former, some do not refer to any specific thinker. This was mainly the case of texts elaborated within some public *studium*. Others referred specifically to some medieval master: Scotus, Thomas,

86. These considerations lead me to reject the historiographical thesis according to which Aristotelianism collapsed under the weight of its own immense history. However, for a recent reproposal of this hypothesis cf. BIANCHI, "Una caduta...".

Bonaventure, Giles of Rome, Baconthorpe. Also thinkers such as Anselm of Canterbury, Bernard of Clairvaux, or Dionysius the Carthusian were taken by a few authors as points of reference, at least in theology. This was mainly the case of works elaborated within a religious Order and, not infrequently, in reply to the request on the part of the highest authorities of the same Order. In doing this, the religious Orders reproduced within themselves and on a smaller scale one of the main ambitions of the Roman Curia and, to some extent, of the universality of Catholic thinkers: to create the ideological unity of the “Church”. To this end, they assigned to one of their “own” masters the role of an exemplar on which to model the philosophy and theology professed by their own members. The Servites, aiming to achieve this result, even went so far as to “appropriate” Henry of Ghent, maintaining that the medieval author had been a member of their Order. The outcome of the urge to find doctrinal cohesion transmitted by the Roman Curia to the religious Orders was thus paradoxical: by transferring it into works and cultural currents conforming to their own specificities, between the end of the 16th and the mid 17th century they generated a multitude of competing orientations, thus eliminating any hope to achieve the desired cohesion.⁸⁷ There were also distinctions and divisions in the Protestant world, and here, too, the requests originating from the competition among the different “religious authorities” played a fundamental role. The contrast between Lutheran and Calvinist authors has already been recalled. It must be added that there were also particular currents within each confession, but they mainly (but not always) presented less striking characteristics

87. In the 19th century, when the Roman Curia attempted once again to enforce its totalitarian project, it did not make the same “mistake” that the seventeenth-century Papacy fell into, i.e. that of giving the various religious Orders the chance to formulate particular lines of doctrine, or even the “mistake” of delegating to them to some extent the task of conducting the fight on the cultural level. On the contrary, it elaborated without any intermediaries its own elementary, unitarian, and exhaustive ideology (which it would call “neo-Thomism”) and imposed it on all the sectors of the Catholic Church. This explains the difference between the cultural vitality that characterized the ecclesiastic world too in the 17th century and the state in which it has found itself from the 19th century until the present.

than those in the Catholic world, regarding which it may be more correct to speak of “schools”. Furthermore, even among the Protestants there were writers who cannot be collocated within any particular current.⁸⁸

The outline just illustrated requires some further details. There are some historians, for example Eschweiler, who do not assign any role to the taxonomy presented and who interpret seventeenth-century academic philosophy as basically uniform. Others, like Freedman, hold that the differences on the confessional level translated, in the field of philosophy, into just a few divergencies concerning very circumscribed themes. Still others, among whom principally Gracia, assign a greater importance to national differences. On the contrary, other authors, such as Blum, Schmidt-Biggemann, and Sparr, attribute a great importance to confessional differences.⁸⁹ The significance of the taxonomy chosen here was determined by two factors. On the one hand, no seventeenth-century academic author assigned the role of premisses in the leading arguments of his own philosophical thought to theses based on faith or authority. From this point of view, therefore, differences in confession, current, or school played no

88. Cf. also LEIJENHORST – LÜTHY, “The Erosion...”. With reference to the role played by the concurrency of various religious “authorities” in the proliferation of doctrinal proposals, the considerations of Leijenhorst and Lüthy, with which I agree, and what I have myself just written, require further explanation. If, in many cases, the requests on the part of these authorities encouraged new speculative efforts, in other cases, which became increasingly frequent as years passed, they purely aimed to prevent (and actually they succeeded in preventing) the introduction of innovative theses.

89. Besides the contributions in *Die Philosophie...*, vol. IV, cf.: FREEDMAN, “Introduction...”; J.J.E. GRACIA, *Filosofía hispánica. Concepto, origen y foco historiográfico*, (Cuadernos de Anuario Filosófico, Serie de Filosofía Española, 7), Pamplona: EUNSA, 1998; ID., “Hispanic Philosophy: Its Beginning and Golden Age”, in *Hispanic Philosophy in the Age of Discovery*, ed. by K. White, (Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy, 29), Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1997, pp. 3-27; K. ESCHWEILER, “Die Philosophie der spanischen Spätscholastik auf den deutschen Universitäten des siebzehnten Jahrhunderts”, in *Spanische Forschungen der Görres-Gesellschaft*, 1 (1928), (*Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Kulturgeschichte Spaniens*, ed. by H. Finke, Münster: Verlag der Aschendorffschen Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1928), pp. 251-325. With regard to Gracia’s thesis, I should like to observe that national differences are far less significant than those relating to the current or religious faith, except whenever the former are equal to the latter.

role in the philosophy of these scholars. On the other hand, however, belonging to a precise religious confession, current, or school, being educated in it, and wishing to defend it resulted in easily identifiable speculative orientations. Hence, the taxonomy chosen here is correct and useful, nevertheless must not be taken as an exhaustive description of the doctrines of the authors it is applied to.

This leads to a second clarification concerning the conservative or innovative, closed or open, nature of their texts. The mere fact that their authors had a point of reference in some thinker of the past or not, or that their authors belonged to a particular current or school or not, does not have any significant consequences on the level of opposition to, or acceptance of, innovation by these authors, or on the level of how open or closed these latter were to any comparison with thinkers from different schools or currents. In the first place, it should be noted that, even when the wish to refer to an author of the past plays a decisive role, this “return to the past” does not take place in the form of a commentary, but in the form of a course “*ad mentem*” of a certain author. However, what was *in mente* of an author long since dead (and frequently the object of various traditions of interpretation) was, and still is, something highly debatable. Consider, for instance, the courses of the Jesuit authors at the height of the 17th century: as imposed by the *Constitutiones* of the Order, they all showed deference towards Thomas Aquinas; however, there was much else and far more in them than the doctrines of the medieval thinker.⁹⁰ Observe then that there were writers that tended to discuss only those theses of the thinkers of their own current, but there were many others who made com-

90. The Jesuit writers benefited from two favourable circumstances. In the first place, the very nature of their Order, explicitly involved on the level of doctrinal clashes. In the second place, the recent institution of their Order, which freed it from any institutionalized and consolidated doctrinal tradition. The same dynamics would have developed, on a smaller scale, in the other recently-formed Orders: the Caracciolins, the Theatines and, later, the Piaristes. As a result of the nineteenth-century imposition of neo-Thomism on the part of the Roman Curia, the various nineteenth-century “Catholic encyclopaedias” described many of the authors in question as “Thomists”, a label that does not pay full justice to the intelligence of these writers.

parisons with standpoints of all sorts of different origins. It was quite normal, for example, for the Protestant authors to accept, or reject, the doctrines of Catholic authors of highly varied tendencies. The influence exerted in Germany, Holland, and England by writers such as Zabarella, Piccolomini, Perera, or Suárez was vast. The influence exerted in these regions by Scotism, directly or through the doctrines of eclectic authors, was probably important too, though not equally well documented. Note, for example, that Combach (a Calvinist) explicitly named as the source of his own doctrine on the (univocal) nature of the transcendental being the Scotist Pietro from Tornaparte (or from l'Aquila); who accepted theses of the Scotist Costanzo Torri from Sarnano; who followed Scotus even with regards to the distinction between *ens*, *res*, and *aliquid*. Observe also, however, that on other themes he explicitly referred to Bonaventure or to Biel.⁹¹ In the Catholic world, too, there were writers, among whom Mastri, who were amazingly erudite in the historical-philosophical field and were determined to provide an answer to any possible objection to the solutions they proposed. It must, however, be pointed out that the Catholic authors normally ignored the Protestant ones. The reason for this fact lay in the existence and efficacy of ecclesiastic censorship in Catholic countries. It was a twofold censorship, applied both to the books already published and to those of future publication. How could the writers in those regions, particularly if ecclesiastics, obtain the permission to print their own works if they mentioned in them texts that they had no right to read?

Finally, the great variety of academic authors' attitudes in facing innovative hypotheses or doctrines is obvious if one looks at the stances they actually assumed within the single disciplines. It is not possible here to consider this topic even very generally. I shall restrict myself to pointing out to readers, as a mere example, that in the field of physics they can find a multitude of theses unknown to Aristotle or extraneous to the Greek thinker's standpoint: primary matter as a principle endowed with actuality au-

91. Cf. P. DI VONA, *Studi sull'ontologia di Spinoza*, vol. II "Res" ed "ens" – *La necessità – Le divisioni dell'essere*, Firenze: La Nuova Italia, 1969.

tonomously from form; the simultaneity of primary matter and quantity; corpuscularism; the Earth as a single sphere of land and water; the rotation of celestial bodies around purely geometric points; the non-solidity of celestial spheres; the presence of corruptible matter in the interstices of the celestial spheres; the plurality of autocentric worlds; the existence of void.⁹² Equally far removed from the Stagirite are many theses of gnoseology and seventeenth-century metaphysics: the distinction between real state of the cognitive power, conceptual content, and the structure of extra-mental reality; the disjunction of ontology and rational theology; the univocal nature of transcendental *rationes*; the primacy of the demonstration of God's existence founded on universal harmony.⁹³ The doctrines in the field of ethics were also

92. Cf., merely to give some examples, the contributions in *Late Medieval and Early Modern Corpuscular Matter Theories*, ed. by Chr.H. Lüthy – J.E. Murdoch – W.R. Newman, (Medieval and Early Modern Science, 1), Leiden – Boston – Köln: Brill, 2001; W.G.L. RANGLES, *The Unmaking of the Medieval Christian Cosmos, 1500-1760. From Solid Heavens to Boundless Aether*, Aldershot – Burlington: Ashgate, 1999; E. GRANT, *The Foundations of Modern Science in the Middle Ages. Their Religious, Institutional and Intellectual Contexts*, (Cambridge History of Science), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996; H.F. COHEN, *The Scientific Revolution: a Historiographical Inquiry*, Chicago – London: The University of Chicago Press, 1994; E. GRANT, “Ways to Interpret the Term ‘Aristotelian’ and ‘Aristotelianism’ in Medieval and Renaissance Natural Philosophy”, in *History of Science*, 25 (1987), pp. 335-358; ID., *In Defense of the Earth's Centrality and Immobility. Scholastic Reaction to Copernicanism in the Seventeenth Century*, monographic number of *Transactions of the American Philosophical Society*, 74/IV (1984); ID., “‘Aristotelianism’ and the Longevity of the Medieval World View”, in *History of Science*, 16 (1978), pp. 93-106; REIF, “The Textbook Tradition...”. Furthermore, the differences in the degree of willingness to accept new theories or observations help to explain the different ways in which, in the various contexts, the new physics was met.

93. For the second theme, cf. J. FERRATER MORA, “On the Early History of ‘Ontology’”, in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 24 (1963), pp. 36-47. Ferrater Mora's essay is still today one of the most interesting, informed, and correct ones on this theme. It allows us to understand that the notion of “ontology” passed down to Kant, and criticised by him, was that developed at the beginning of the 17th century in the Protestant world: the notion of a science prior to any other science that deals with very general principles and is distinct from rational theology. It also allows us to see how, after its genesis, this notion developed independently from most of the doctrines on the nature of metaphysics formulated in the same years in the Catholic world. It is necessary, however, to add at least two specifications. In the first place, the disjunction between ontology and theology was only one of the paths followed by academic

very complex and varied: from probabilism to rigorism; from the defence of the rights of the natives of the Americas to the vindication of sacredness and of the need to send heretics to the stake.⁹⁴

*2.3.5 The decades in the middle of the seventeenth century:
the fracture of the new physics*

As has been seen, academic philosophy – the very academic philosophy that had a fundamental institutional and conceptual point of reference in Aristotle – did not lack complexity and dynamism. However, in the first half of the 17th century a change of such importance took place that it is possible for historians to distinguish in those years a moment when two eras were separated: the age of Aristotelianism and the Modern Age. This change occurred in the field of physics. The physics of an Aristotelian origin had two fundamental characteristics. In the first place, it interpreted natural phenomena as the effect of the nature of substances and of the presence or absence in them of certain qualities. The task of the physicist of an Aristotelian tenden-

philosophers in the 17th century. Secondly, with respect to this theme Protestant authors did not depend on Suárez; on the contrary, they followed – in the end, under the determinative influence of Ramus – their own path or, at most, depended on Perera.

94. Cf. the contributions contained in *Contexts of Conscience in Early Modern Europe, 1500-1700*, ed. by H.E. Braun – E. Vallance, Houndmills – New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004; those contained in *Die Ordnung...; Sv.K. KNEBEL, Wille, Würfel und Wahrscheinlichkeit. Das System der moralischen Notwendigkeit in der Jesuitenscholastik. 1550-1700*, (Paradeigmata 21), Hamburg: Meiner, 2000; S. BURGIO, “Filosofia e Controriforma in Sicilia nel secondo Seicento”, in *Archivio storico per la Sicilia orientale*, 92 (1996), pp. 109-181; D. FERRARO, *Itinerari del volontarismo. Teologia e politica al tempo di Luis de León*, (Filosofia e scienza nel Cinquecento e nel Seicento, Studi, 42), Milano: Franco Angeli, 1995. I take the liberty of remarking that casuistry and probabilism contain revolutionary traits. They presuppose, in the face of the basic uncertainty of the morality of choices, the primacy of the contemporary moralists over those of the past and the priority – if only relative – of the particular theologian’s directives over those of the Roman Curia. This explains the Papacy’s aversion to probabilism and its condemnation on the part of Alexander VII. On the other hand, rigorism, turning out victorious in the clash, in exalting the clarity and absolute nature of the law in the face of a single person’s mind, opened the door to the possibility of considering superfluous both that the law may be identified as such by the ecclesiastic hierarchy, and that the latter, after having passed the law, could also control its application.

cy was, therefore, mainly to enquire into what those qualities (which should not be confused with those immediately perceivable by the senses) were, what causes generated them in a substance, and what dissolved them. In the second place, physics of an Aristotelian origin considered uniform motion not as a state but a form of becoming, that is to say a passage from potency to act. Consequently, Aristotelian dynamics foresaw that such a type of motion was also continually caused by an agent. In the last years of the 16th and the early years of the 17th century a group of authors, among whom Galileo Galilei emerges in his clarity and linearity, rejected both the thesis concerning the nature of uniform motion and the basic perspective of physics of an Aristotelian origin. Against the former, they proposed the principle of inertia: uniform motion of a mobile object does not require any agent applied continuously to it. Against the latter, they proposed the perspective according to which natural phenomena are wholly explicable in terms of dimension, shape, and movement. This permitted Galileo to overcome the vacillations of academic authors about the possibility of applying mathematics to physics and to transform the latter into a science expressed in a formalized language whose assertions can be compared with the real state of affairs in a relatively straightforward manner.⁹⁵

The shift impressed in physics by Galileo did not arise from nothing. The grounds for his doctrine had been laid by numerous cultural and speculative traditions: Thomism, Scotism, Mer-

95. Cf., just to give some examples, JUNG, "Why was Medieval Mechanics..."; C. DOLLO, *Galileo Galilei e la cultura della tradizione*, ed. by G. Bentivegna – S. Burgio – G. Magnano San Lio, (Biblioteca di studi filosofici, 20), Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2003; U. BALDINI, "The Development of the Jesuit 'Physics' in Italy, 1550-1700: A Structural Approach", in *Philosophy...*, pp. 248-279; G. MICHELI, *Le origini del concetto di macchina*, (Biblioteca di Physis, 4), Firenze: Olschki, 1995; A. DE PACE, "Interpretazione di Aristotele e comprensione matematica della natura", in *L'interpretazione...*, pp. 271-295; J. COTTINGHAM, "A New Start? Cartesian Metaphysics and the Emergence of Modern Philosophy", in *The Rise...*, pp. 145-166; L. OLIVIERI, "Galileo e la metafisica", in *Metafisica e modernità. Studi in onore di Pietro Faggiotto*, ed. by Fr. Chiareghin – F.L. Marcolungo, (Miscellanea erudita, 54), Padova: Editrice Antenore, 1993, pp. 53-63; A. MAIER, "Die Mechanisierung des Weltbilds im 17. Jahrhundert", in ID., *Zwei Untersuchungen zur Nachscholastischen Philosophie*, (Storia e letteratura. Raccolta di studi e testi, 112), Roma: Edizioni di storia e letteratura, ²1968, pp. 13-67.

tonism, Paduan Aristotelianism, and Humanism.⁹⁶ Thomism, in taking possession of the Averroist thesis of the co-implication of matter and extension, provided the chance to understand mathematics as a science both distinct from natural philosophy and of real material beings. Scotism afforded the thesis of the minimum actuality of matter apart from form and the conviction that the knowledge of the essences of sensible things was always purely indicative. The *mertonenses* had already attempted to fuse Aristotelian physics with Archimedean physics. The Aristotelianism in Padua had described the process of the acquisition of science in terms of an *iter* which is composed both of induction and of deduction. Finally, humanistic culture had brought to light the works of Archimedes and the Greek mathematicians, who, in their turn, stimulated a climate of renewed interest in mathematics that also led some academic authors, such as the Jesuit Clavio, to dedicate themselves to this subject.⁹⁷ The shift itself ef-

96. Obviously, the list is incomplete. It should be added, for instance, the impulse represented by the Copernican heliocentric hypothesis and, through it, by late medieval dialectics. On this theme, cf. A. GODDU, "The Logic of Copernicus's Arguments and His Education in Logic in Cracow", in *Early Science and Medicine*, 1 (1996), pp. 28-68, but also the remarks on Goddu's thesis formulated by D. BUZZETTI, "Idee come idee e idee come fatti: in margine alla discussione su continuità e discontinuità tra Medioevo ed età moderna", in *Dianoia*, 8 (2003), pp. 81-101.

97. Cf. W.A. WALLACE, *Domingo de Soto and the Early Galileo: Essays on Intellectual History*, (Collected Studies Series, 783), Aldershot – Burlington: Ashgate, 2004; ID., "The Influence of Aristotle on Galileo's Logic and Its Use in His Science", in *The Impact...*, pp. 64-83; DOLLO, *Galileo...*; S. DONATI, "The Notion of 'dimensiones indeterminatae' in the Commentary Tradition of the 'Physics' in the Thirteenth and in the Early Fourteenth Century", in *The Dynamics...*, pp. 189-223; S. DI LISO, *Domingo de Soto. Dalla logica alla scienza*, (Vestigia, 19), Bari: Levante, 2000; M.J. GORMAN, *The Scientific Counter-Revolution. Mathematics, Natural Philosophy and Experimentalism in Jesuit Culture. 1580 – c.1670*, diss. European University Institute, Firenze 1998; E. MICHAEL, "Descartes and Gassendi on Matter and Mind: from Aristotelian Pluralism to Early Modern Dualism", in *Meeting...*, pp. 141-161; D. DES CHENE, *Physiologia. Natural Philosophy in Late Aristotelian and Cartesian Thought*, Ithaca (NY) – London: Cornell University Press, 1996; DE PACE, "Interpretazione..."; Chr. LEWIS, *The Merton Tradition and Kinematics in Late Sixteenth and Early Seventeenth Century Italy*, (Saggi e testi, 15), Padova: Antenore, 1980; M. SOPPELSA, *Genesi del metodo galileiano e tramonto dell'aristotelismo nello Studio di Padova*, (Pubblicazioni del Centro per la storia della tradizione aristotelica nel Veneto), Padova: Antenore, 1974.

fected by Galileo answered the aspirations not only of men of culture in general but also specifically of academic authors. Since the 13th century a whole series of writers had tried to explain the phenomena of the sensible world more efficiently than Aristotle had done. Their efforts had produced results that were less than satisfactory, yet they had fed the hope of being one day able to dispose of a new and more efficient philosophy. The very academic scholars themselves nourished the desire for a reform, for new paths and solutions. Galileo lucidly expressed the disquiet and the limitations of the academic culture of his time when he wrote that in attempting to make Aristotle's doctrine well-balanced the "Aristotelians" had added correction upon correction until they ended up by overwhelming the doctrine they wished to preserve.⁹⁸ Galileo's physics, thus, arose thanks to a precise complex of preliminary elements, and his doctrines immediately became a subject for discussion since all the scholars of natural philosophy, including those at the universities, aspired to theoretical tools of enquiry into physical phenomena that would be more adequate than those they had at their disposal. *Mutatis mutandis*, considerations of this type are also valid for any innovative physical doctrine formulated in the course of the 17th century. From Bacon to Gassendi, from Harvey to Newton, there was no author whose thought, in the field of physics, was not constituted by a series of elements, some of which were taken from one or another academic tradition, others from the new physics, and others again which were elaborated personally.⁹⁹

98. Cf. also D. GARBER, "Descartes, les aristotéliens et la révolution qui n'eut pas lieu en 1637", in *Problématique et réception du "Discours de la méthode" et des "Essais"*, ed. by H. Méchoulan, (Histoire des idées et des doctrines), Paris: Vrin, 1988, pp. 199-212. Galileo's text, collected by Favaro in *Frammenti di data incerta*, is quoted by BIANCHI, "Una caduta...".

99. Cf. St. DUCHEYNE, "Newton's Training in the Aristotelian Textbook Tradition: From Effects to Causes and Back", in *History of Science*, 43 (2005), being printed; S. MANZO, "Francis Bacon y la concepción aristotélica del movimiento en los siglos XVI y XVII", in *Revista de Filosofía*, 29 (2004), pp. 77-97; M.J. OSLER, "New Wine in Old Bottles: Gassendi and the Aristotelian Origin of Physics", in *Midwest Studies in Philosophy*, 26 (2002), pp. 167-184; E. SYLLA, "Space and Spirit in the Transition from Aristotelian to Newtonian Science", in *The Dynamics...*, pp. 249-287.

The reactions of academic thought to this shift were also complex and diversified in the course of the 17th century. Some texts completely ignored the new physics. Others examined the new doctrines merely in order to contest them. Others accepted some specific doctrines of the new physics placing them within a doctrinal framework of reference of a traditional type. Others accepted the new doctrines setting them, however, within a traditional framework of exposition. Others, finally, also reorganised the exposition on the basis of the new physics. Although there were attempts to confute the new physics, most authors tended to create a synthesis between the ancient and the new perspectives. The very creators of the new physics did not usually reject the conceptual structures of Aristotelian physics but they interpreted them in mechanistic terms. Some writers moved in a relatively free institutional context, such as those in some public *studia*; others were subject to strong disciplinary pressures. For instance, the hostility of the influential Calvinist philosopher and theologian, Gijsbert Voet, in the end led to the prohibition of Cartesianism in Dutch universities at the end of the 1640s. The decision of the highest authorities of the Company of Jesus, formulated in the 40s and maintained until the 70s, to oblige members of the Order to adhere to Aristotle impeded the efforts of the scholars of the Company to reconcile Aristotelianism and the new physics, forced them to deal with physical phenomena in terms of “odd facts”, and led them to separate mathematical research from that of physics. Despite this, from the 1680s eclectic tendencies gained the upper hand in the Catholic world too, and in particular among the Jesuits: the doctrines of Aristotelian physics were interpreted either not in terms of physics, or not in Aristotelian terms, while the room dedicated to mathematics, physics, and natural science in the systematic university courses increasingly extended its borders, even thought spiritual substances – intended as natural beings – were a matter of *physica generalis* at least until the second half of the 18th century.¹⁰⁰

100. Cf. BALDINI, *Saggi...*; M. MARSHALL AGEE, *John Sergeant and the 'New' Empiricism*, diss. University of Virginia, 2000; the contributions by Baldini and Blum in *Philosophy...*; GORMAN, *The Scientific Counter-Revolution...*; the con-

What has been said thus far does not belie the originality of seventeenth-century physics; on the contrary, it confirms it. It is testified by the awareness both the thinkers who upheld the new physics and those who opposed it had of its originality, by the intensity with which the new theories were discussed, and by the transformations these theories stimulated in fields other than physics.¹⁰¹ Among the latter were the conviction that the overall plan of sciences constructed on Aristotle's works should be redesigned and the spread of the hope that forms of formalized knowledge would be available in every field, that is to say, forms of knowledge that would have made it possible to attain certain knowledge, eliminate definitively invalid hypotheses, and put an end to the exile of human knowledge in the desert of verisimilitude.¹⁰² Despite these hopes, in the course of the 17th century the development of disciplines other than physics did not undergo any radical break. Customary historiography identifies in this century a plurality of areas of discontinuity, which should determine, taken as a whole, the birth of modern times: subjectivism, individualism, secularism, the separation of ethics from theology, the loss of the sacred nature of the State, new conceptions of society, the rise in the awareness of the specificity of the mechanisms of the economy and of the importance of controlling them, etc. This is a view that has no basis in history. Transformations and evolutions in the various fields of human knowledge in the period from the 14th to the 17th century are evident, nevertheless a mere cursory reading of the academic authors of the first half of the 17th century reveals that during that century in no field of knowledge was there any internal discontinuity comparable in its extent to that which took place in physics – and from which it spread to the “system” of the sciences –, that is to say a change more conspicuous than any of the numerous other ones that occurred from the 13th century.

tributions by Brown, Mercer, Phemister, Southgate, and Verbeek in *The Rise...*; SOPPELSA, *Genesi...*

101. Cf. the considerations of T. SORELL, “Introduction”, in *The Rise...*, pp. 1-11, on both reality and limitations of the discontinuity in seventeenth-century philosophy.

102. Cf. also BIANCHI, “Una caduta...”.

This is not the place to document case by case the above statement; it shall have to suffice here to refer readers to the vast bibliography concerning it, although it is unfortunately still very fragmentary.¹⁰³ I shall merely add one specification and one tes-

103. Of the bibliography which has now become interminable, particularly regarding the relationship between Descartes and academic philosophy, the following are simply a few indications: B. KOCH, *Zur Dis- / Kontinuität mittelalterlichen politischen Denkens in der neuzeitlichen politischen Theorie. Marsilius von Padua, Johannes Althusius und Thomas Hobbes im Vergleich*, (Beiträge zur Politischen Wissenschaft, 137), Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2005; M. SANTIAGO DE CARVALHO, “Des passions vertueuses ? Sur la réception de la doctrine thomiste des passions à la veille de l’anthropologie moderne”, in *Itinéraires...*, pp. 379-403; I. MANDRELLA, “Die Autarkie des mittelalterlichen Naturrechts als Vernunftrecht: Gregor von Rimini una das ‘etiamsi Deus non daretur’-Argument”, in „Herbst des Mittelalters“..., pp. 265-276; R. POZZO, *Logic and Metaphysics in German Philosophy from Melanchton to Hegel*, in *Approaches to Metaphysics*, ed. by W. Sweet, (Studies in Philosophy and Religion, 26), Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2004; G. COPPENS, *Spinoza en de scholastiek*, Leuven: Acco, 2003; M. SCATTOLA, *Dalla virtù alla scienza. La fondazione e la trasformazione della disciplina politica nell’età moderna*, (Per la storia della filosofia politica, 11), Milano: Franco Angeli, 2003; J.-Ch. BARDOUT, “Science divine et philosophie selon Malebranche. Contribution à l’histoire des sources du malebranchisme”, in *Le Contemplateur et les idées. Modèles de la science divine du néoplatonisme au XVIII^e siècle*, ed. by O. Boulnois – J. Schmutz – J.-L. Solère, (Bibliothèque d’histoire de la philosophie), Paris: Vrin, 2002, pp. 223-248; V. CARRAUD, “Connaître comme Dieu connaît : omniscience et principe de raison suffisante”, in *Le Contemplateur...*, pp. 249-269; C. LEIJENHORST, *The Mechanisation of Aristotelianism. The Late Aristotelian Setting of Thomas Hobbes’ Natural Philosophy*, (Medieval and Early Modern Science, 3), Leiden: Brill, 2002; E. KESSLER, “Logica universalis’ und ‘hermeneutica universalis’”, in *La presenza...*, pp. 133-171; Chr. MERCER, “The Aristotelianism at the Core of Leibniz’s Philosophy”, in *The Dynamics...*, pp. 413-440; J.-L. SOLÈRE, “Bayle et les apories de la science divine”, in *Le Contemplateur...*, pp. 271-326; Chr. MERCER, *Leibniz’s Metaphysics. Its Origin and Development*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001; P. ROSSI, “Leibniz e gli Zenonisti”, in *Rivista di storia della filosofia*, 56 (2001), pp. 15-22 (however cf. also M. MUGNAI, “Paolo Rossi, gli Zenonisti e Leibniz”, in *Rivista di storia della filosofia*, 56 (2001), pp. 653-656, and R.T.W. ARTHUR, “Lo zenonismo come fonte delle monadi di Leibniz: una risposta a Paolo Rossi”, in *Rivista di storia della filosofia*, 58 (2003), pp. 335-340); SPECHT, “Die Spanische Spätscholastik...”; Fr. TODESCAN, *Le radici teologiche del giusnaturalismo laico*, vol. III *Il problema della secolarizzazione nel pensiero giuridico di Samuel Pufendorf*, (Per la storia del pensiero giuridico moderno, 57), Milano: Giuffrè, 2001; MARSHALL AGEE, *John Sergeant...*; P. NEGRO, “Intorno alle fonti scolastiche in Hugo Grotius”, in *Dalla prima alla seconda Scolastica...*, pp. 200-251; J. SECADA, *Cartesian Metaphysics. The Late Scholastic Origins of Modern Philosophy*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000; R. ARIEW, *Descartes and the last Scholastics*, Ithaca – London: Cornell University Press, 1999; the contri-

timony. The specification concerns the historiographical thesis according to which the Cartesian doctrine of *cogito* was to inaugurate a radically new area in the awareness of the centrality of the subject. Yet, of the many historiographical stances that should

butions published in *Johannes Clauberg (1622-1665) and Cartesian Philosophy in the Seventeenth Century*, ed. by Th. Verbeek, (International Archives of the History of Ideas, 164), Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1999; the contributions of Ariew, Brett, MacLean, Hutton, Sorell, and Struever in *Philosophy...*; P. ROSSI, *Le sterminate antichità e nuovi saggi vichiani*, (Storie di idee, 7), Scandicci: La nuova Italia, 1999; I. ANGELELLI, "Aristotelian-Scholastic Ontology and Predication in the Port-Royal Logic", in *Medioevo*, 24 (1998), pp. 283-299; J.-Fr. COURTINE, "Descartes et la scolastique tardive", in *Lire Descartes aujourd'hui*, ed. by O. Depré – D. Lories, Louvain-la-Neuve: Editions de l'I.S.P., 1997, pp. 1-20; almost all contributions published in *Meeting...*; E. KESSLER, "Method in the Aristotelian Tradition: Taking a Second Look", in *Method and Order...*, pp. 113-142; A. GHISALBERTI, "La dottrina delle distinzioni nei 'Principia': tradizione e innovazione", in ISTITUTO ITALIANO PER GLI STUDI FILOSOFICI, *Descartes: "Principia Philosophiae" (1644-1994). Atti del Convegno per il 350° anniversario della pubblicazione dell'opera. Parigi, 5-6 maggio 1994. Lecce, 10-12 novembre 1994*, ed. by J.-R. Armogathe – G. Belgioioso, Napoli: Vivarium, 1996, pp. 179-201; L.W.B. BROCKLISS, "Descartes, Gassendi and the Reception of the Mechanical Philosophy in the French 'Collèges de plein exercice', 1640-1730", in *Perspectives on Science*, 3 (1995), pp. 450-479; A. BLAIR, "The Teaching of Natural Philosophy in Early Seventeenth-Century Paris. The Case of Jean-Cecile Frey", in *History of Universities*, 12 (1993), pp. 95-158; the contributions by Cottingham, Goldsmith, Martin, and Mercer in *The Rise...*; P. DI VONA, *Aspetti di Hobbes in Spinoza*, (Libertà della mente, 1), Napoli: Loffredo editore, 1990; E. RIVERA DE VENTOSA, "El Barroco español dentro de la cultura europea", in *Cuadernos salmantinos de filosofía*, 16 (1989), pp. 89-105; L.W.B. BROCKLISS, "Aristotle, Descartes, and the New Science. Natural Philosophy at the University of Paris, 1600-1740", in *Annals of Science*, 38 (1981), pp. 33-69; *La seconda scolastica nella formazione del diritto privato moderno. Incontro di studio. Firenze, 16-19 ottobre 1972*, ed. by P. Grossi, (Per la storia del pensiero giuridico moderno, 1), Milano: Giuffré, 1973; FERRATER MORA, "On the Early History..."; ID., "Suárez and Modern Philosophy", in *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 14 (1953), pp. 528-547; J. BOHATEC, *Die cartesianische Scholastik in der Philosophie und reformierten Dogmatik des 17. Jahrhunderts*, vol. I *Entstehung, Eigenart, Geschichte und philosophische Ausprägung der cartesianischen Scholastik*, Leipzig: A. Deichert, 1912 (facsimile ed. Hildesheim: Olms, 1966). The reader should be warned that not all the authors of the above-mentioned essays defend the thesis I have just maintained concerning the lack of radical discontinuity in the 17th century in fields other than those of physics and the overall system of sciences. However, I have indicated these texts because it seems to me that, if read attentively, bearing in mind the works and doctrines of 16th and 17th century authors, they will support my suggestion. Within this perspective, excellent reading is also the essay by T. GREGORY, "Pensiero medievale e modernità", in *Giornale critico della filosofia italiana*, 75 (1996), pp. 149-173. In these pages the scholar defends the

be abandoned, this is undoubtedly the first. Descartes' doctrines on the subject, on the cognitive process, and on language are simplified versions of theories that circulated quite normally in the 16th- and 17th-century academic world.¹⁰⁴ In order to see something similar to Galileo's revolution in the fields of gnoseology, or metaphysics, it is necessary to wait for the work of Kant, which was, in any case, of the same nature as Galileo's: the formulation of a radical novelty on the basis of precise antecedent elements.¹⁰⁵ The testimony consists in a letter of 1651 from the rector ad professors of the University of Groningen to Count Ludwig Heinrich von Nassau. The latter had sent a request for clarification about the orthodoxy of Descartes' thought and the disagreements that had arisen about it to a few universities. The replies sent by the various universities expressed different opinions; however, here is what the rector and the teachers of the University of Groningen wrote:

Hoc nostrum quod spectat Athenaeum, ex illius primaeva institutione, et legibus ad Aristotelis philosophiam retinendam Professores Philosophi tenentur: quod tamen, cum eo moderamine sumitur, ut in solius Dei verba juremus, nec, si quid novae lucis affulserit, Aristoteli et veteribus invisum, ad naturae phaenomena certius percipienda et commodius explicanda, solo novitatis titulo esse rejiciendum arbitremur. Amici nobis sunt Socrates, Plato, Aristoteles,

historical reality of all main aspects of discontinuity between the Middle Ages and the Modern Age that have been claimed by customary historiography, and nevertheless he portrays them so clearly that any reader being familiar with the texts of seventeenth-century academic philosophy easily perceives that, as far as those aspects concern the history of philosophy, none of them (except for the discontinuity that occurred in the field of physics and from there spread to the system of sciences) represents a cleavage greater than the several other cleavages characterizing the history of philosophical thought between the 13th and 17th century.

104. With regards to the historical place of Descartes' gnoseology, I also refer readers to the studies indicated in the bibliography to my "La distinzione tra concetto formale e concetto oggettivo nel pensiero di Bartolomeo Mastri" [<http://web.tiscali.it/marcoforlivesi/mf2002d.pdf>], 2002.

105. Cf. R. POZZO, "Kant on the Five Intellectual Virtues", in *The Impact...*, pp. 173-192; G. MICHELI, "La terminologia aristotelico-scolastica e il lessico kantiano", in *La presenza...*, pp. 445-470; J.P. DOYLE, "Between Transcendental and Transcendental: The Missing Link?", in *The Review of Metaphysics*, 50 (1997), pp. 783-815.

Conimbricenses, Suaresius, Ramus, Cartesius, sed magis amica veritas. Hanc non ex personis, sed personas ex illa aestimamus. Hoc addimus, quaedam a nonnullis ceu Cartesiani vel jactari, vel impugnari, quae ante Cartesium alii tum philosophi subtiles, tum theologi Orthodoxi tuiti sunt: ut quod omnibus innata et insita sit naturaliter Dei cognitio; quod corporis in genere natura et essentia in extensione sita sit; quod accidens quodlibet non tam ens sit, quam entis, quia illius esse est inesse, ut separatum ab omni subjecto existere non possit; quod libertas arbitrii in se sit immunitas a coactione; quod vacuum sua notione implicet contradictionem, et accidens sine subjecto, adeo ut ne quidem possint concipi duo mundi a se mutuo per merum nihil discreti et separati; etsi hunc, quem unicum creavit Deus, possit conditor pro infinita sua potentia usque et usque extendere et ampliari. Etiam diu est, quod in scholis disputatum fuit de formis substantialibus bestiarum et plantarum, an sint et quid sint; licet illa controversia occasione philosophematum Cartesianorum recruderit.¹⁰⁶

As can be seen, the questions discussed by Descartes, or those aroused by the study of his works, insofar as they belonged to the field of philosophy, were no novelty.

2.3.6 Between the seventeenth and the eighteenth century: the metamorphosis of Aristotelianism

Historians of philosophy usually write that the second half of the 17th century marked the end of Aristotelianism. This affirmation undoubtedly expresses a real aspect of the history of thought, but requires some specifications. First of all, it might be more correct to set such an event in the last quarter of the century. Furthermore, it is necessary to make a distinction among the various elements comprised in Aristotelianism that characterized the period from the 13th to the 17th century. Firstly, it consisted in a reference to a collection of texts, precisely those of the Stagirite, believed to be capable, as a whole, of providing a general plan of the structures of reality and thought and an outline of the disciplines that study them. When taken in this sense, in the *studia* of the Catholic religious Orders Aristotelianism had

106. THE RECTOR AND THE PROFESSORS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF GRONINGEN, copy of *letter* to Ludwig Heinrich von Nassau, Groningen 18th September, 1651, transcribed in BOHATEC, *Die cartesianische Scholastik...*, pp. 151-153.

already ended at the beginning of the 17th century, while it was to come to an end in the public *studia* only in the course of the 18th.¹⁰⁷ Secondly, it is a compound of doctrines or, rather, of perspectives. When taken in this sense, it is appropriate to differentiate its history in various fields. In fields other than physics, it was maintained for a long time; so long that it is possible to find traces of it in all of the later history of philosophy.¹⁰⁸ In the field of physics, the destiny of Aristotelianism was even more complex. The main point is that two fields of study, which in our consideration have been distinguished, were united: the fields of physics and of natural philosophy. To the extent in which Aristotelianism was physics, that is to say, it described natural phenomena, indicated their closest causes, and attempted to foresee them, in the course of two centuries it was confuted by a myriad of experiments and observations. To the extent in which it was a natural philosophy, its course split up into further streams. The doubts about whether it was possible to describe reality in mathematical terms, or those about the corpuscular nature of material beings, were dissolved, at times very slowly, in the direction of the positive points of the two alternatives. Other doctrines were the object of divergent interpretations. Most of the academic authors, whether lay or ecclesiastic, assumed an eclectic orientation: they interpreted the fundamental notions of Aristotelian natural philosophy in mechanistic terms and constructed, in the course of the 18th century, a type of physics that was undoubtedly mathematical, but not lacking in foundations of a philo-

107. Once again, Étienne BONNOT de Condillac, *Cours d'études pour l'instruction du Prince de Parme*, Cours d'histoire, Histoire moderne, livre 20 *Des révolutions dans les lettres et dans les sciences depuis le quinzième siècle*, ch. 14 *Des obstacles qui s'opposent encore aux bonnes études*, in IDEM, *Œuvres philosophiques*, ed. by G. Le Roy, (Corpus général des philosophes français, Auteurs modernes, 33), 3 vol., Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1947-1951, vol. II, p. 235b, complains of the fact that in the universities «La manière d'enseigner se ressent encore des siècles où l'ignorance en forma le plan : car il s'en faut bien que les universités aient suivi les progrès des académies. Si la nouvelle philosophie commence à s'y introduire, elle a bien de la peine à s'y établir ; et encore on ne l'y laisse entrer qu'à condition qu'elle se revêtira de quelques haillons de la scholastique».

108. The contributions of *The Impact...* and of *La presenza...* are an effective proof.

sophical nature. Other authors, mainly those belonging to religious Orders, adopted a traditionalistic, or “nostalgic”, approach: they interpreted the fundamental notions of Aristotelian natural philosophy in purely philosophical terms and constructed, at the same time as the eclectics’ work, a natural philosophy taken to mean a science of the basic conditions of the characteristics of material beings, and as such, tendentially extraneous and immune to the results obtained by the new physics. The work of the latter group of authors was principally of ideological significance; nevertheless, it also contributed to the history of philosophy by maintaining the possibility of a natural philosophy distinguished positively from mathematically formulated physics, intrinsically completely extraneous to mathematics, and completely incapable of being falsified by any experiment – something which could hardly be found as such in pre-eighteenth-century Aristotelianism. All this suggests that one should speak of the “metamorphosis”, or of the “diaspora” of this vision of the world, rather than of the “end” of Aristotelianism.¹⁰⁹

2.4 Some historiographical questions concerning the history of academic philosophy

In the previous pages, the history of philosophy in the universities from the 14th to the 17th century has been presented quite candidly. The reader should, however, be informed that this field of study presents numerous historiographical and methodological difficulties. This is not the place in which they can be faced with all the attention they deserve; therefore, I shall restrict myself to indicating merely the most important classes of them and to making a few considerations about each one.

The first difficulty consists in the spread and success of historical “frescos” founded basically on theoretical standpoints and, correspondingly, characterized by a simplistic interpretation of the events and of the historical documents.¹¹⁰ Some of these works,

109. Cf. also for diverse historiographical these, somewhat different from my own, besides the fundamental works by Schmitt: LÜTHY – LEIJENHORST – THIJSSSEN, “The Tradition...”; GRANT, “Ways...”.

110. To be quite precise, a more radical difficulty can be found in those theoretical stances that even refuse to call medieval considerations, and aca-

which we might call of a philo-modernist orientation, are constructed by searching for the origins of modern times in phenomena such as the secularization of theological categories,¹¹¹ man's self assertion,¹¹² the renunciation of the metaphysics of substance,¹¹³ the conquest of a formalized language and the rejection, at the same time, of any questions that could not be expressed in such a language.¹¹⁴ Others, of a neo-Thomist, or neo-Heideggerian-Thomist orientation, concentrated conversely on the loss of metaphysics,¹¹⁵

democratic thought from the late Middle Ages to the beginnings of the Modern Age, "philosophy". One example of this outlook is seen in E. GARIN, "Il filosofo e il mago", in *L'uomo del Rinascimento*, ed. by E. Garin, (Storia e società), Roma – Bari: Laterza, 1988, pp. 169-202. In this essay, Garin maintains that, unlike medieval authors, Renaissance thinkers were keener on clarity of expression, going beyond what had already been said, an ethic that was interested in man and his behavior – even in politics –, a physics aimed at operating practical effects and capable of freeing itself from the falsities of medieval physics, and the freedom from a politically-conditioned and oppressive religiosity. Garin concludes that after the Greek thinkers only those of the Renaissance can be called philosophers. Insofar as Garin's thesis is theoretical, I do not question it, yet, to the extent in which it is an historiographical thesis, I observe that it draws a veil over the history both of medieval philosophy and of academic philosophy, ignoring the complexity of both. To tell the truth, Franco Bacchelli personally told me that in the last years of his life Garin had realized that medieval and academic philosophy, along with the relationship between them, the Renaissance and the Modern Age, was more complex and profound than he had thought. To give Garin his dues, Bacchelli pointed out to me, it must be said that he had to use bad historical reconstructions of the history of medieval philosophy (and of its relationship with modern times), such as the one fancied by Gilson.

111. This is the case of K. LÖWITH, *Weltgeschichte und Heilsgeschehen. Die theologischen Voraussetzungen der Geschichtsphilosophie*, Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1953.

112. H. BLUMENBERG, *Die Legitimität der Neuzeit*, Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1966.

113. I found this thesis in COTTINGHAM, "A New Start?..."

114. Cf. E. CASSIRER, *Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff. Untersuchungen über die Grundfragen der Erkenntniskritik*, Berlin: Bruno Cassirer Verlag, 1910, pp. 3-34; L. BRUNSCHVICG, *Le progrès de la conscience dans la philosophie occidentale*, (Bibliothèque de philosophie contemporaine), 2 vol., Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1953, in particular vol. I, cap. 6 *Descartes*, sect. 1 *Les fondements du rationalisme moderne*, pp. 135-144; Fr.P. RAMSEY, *The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical Essays*, London: Routledge and Kegan, 1931, p. 269.

115. This is the case of M. CRUZ HERNÁNDEZ, "Suárez y el tránsito de la escolástica a la filosofía moderna (Al margen del libro de Enrique G. Arboleya, 'Francisco Suárez, s. J.')", in *Boletín de la Universidad de Granada*, 83 (1947), pp. 263-291.

on the loss of the authentic notion of being”,¹¹⁶ on the neutralization of being,¹¹⁷ on the subjective drift,¹¹⁸ and on the increasing stress on the personality of the philosopher himself.¹¹⁹ Many of

116. A recent reproposal of the traditional theses of Gilson and Fabro can be found in St. SWIEŻAWSKI, “Tableau du XV^e siècle”, in SWIEŻAWSKI – PROKOPOWICZ, *Histoire...*, pp. 289-298.

117. This is the case of C. ESPOSITO, “Ritorno a Suárez. Le ‘Disputationes metaphysicæ’ nella critica contemporanea”, in *La filosofia nel Siglo...*, pp. 465-573.

118. The thesis of the “subjective drift” has assumed various forms. Here are two recent ones. The first is that which characterizes the work of MARSHALL AGEE, *John Sergeant...*, which repropose the “classic” contradistinction between the “way of ideas” and the “realism” of the doctrine of intentionality. The second, more original one, is that which characterizes the texts of John Deely, who contrasts the “way of ideas” with the “way of signs”, in his opinion characteristic of the thought of João Poinot (cf. for example DEELY, *Four Ages...*). It is worthwhile noting that the “way of ideas” – taken to mean a modern way (in the proper sense) of conceiving knowledge, in contrast furthermore with medieval realism (or, according to Deely’s theories, in contrast with a sort of “semiotic presence”) – is the historiographical myth most firmly shared by the rival factions of the philo-modernist and the neo-Thomist historians.

119. This is the case of P.R. BLUM, *Philosophenphilosophie und Schulphilosophie. Typen des Philosophierens in der Neuzeit*, (Studia Leibnitiana. Sonderheft, 27), Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1998. I agree with this scholar on two fundamental points. First: the styles of philosophizing may be the subject of historiographical enquiry and may constitute a valid taxonomic criterion. Second: when modern thinkers developed their own doctrines, they did not submit to the “duty” of reconducing these doctrines to some speculative tradition; in this, they were different from the academic thinkers of the “Aristotelian era”. However, I disagree with Blum on a third, equally fundamental, point. Blum intends what I have just indicated as the “second point” in the following way: modern (and “Renaissance”, in the traditional sense) thinkers based the value of their own theses not on the reliability of a universally valid method of arguing, but on their own personal authority. Yet this does not appear to be true. It is true that the Platonizing Renaissance and modern thinkers believed that the mind could reach truth only if it was subjected to a process of moral purification. However, whenever Renaissance and modern thinkers discussed philosophical themes, they used the customary “style” in their debates: i.e. by rationally demonstrating the objective foundations of the thesis they upheld. I hence suggest the hypothesis that Blum takes part in the usual, arbitrary projection onto the historiographical level of Nietzsche’s thesis about the nature of authentic philosophy and of the authentic philosopher. This is a projection, however, that Blum overturns neo-Thomistically: authentic philosophy is not of a self-referential type, that is to say Renaissance or modern, but pre-modern. What is erroneous in this standpoint, and I repeat it more extensively, is not simply the verdict Blum states concerning the transition from pre-modern to modern philosophy, but the very historiographical interpretation underlying this transition, that is to say, the projection of the Nietzschean speculation onto

these works would deserve a detailed discussion. Furthermore, there can be no doubt that they provide valuable information and stimulating ideas. Despite this, they share the tendency to unravel history as Alexander the Great did with the Gordian knot: instead of untying it, he cut it; instead of unravelling the intricacies of ideas and works, they cut out and hide the complexities of historical development with the scythe of theoretics. Moreover, in some of these texts the speculative plan is so obtrusive that they reveal the viewpoints of their authors far better than those of the writers they are supposed to shed light on.

A second difficulty consists in the objections raised by several scholars to the use of wide-ranging historiographical categories. Some historians contest the legitimacy of this type of notion as such. Some have observed, for example, that there was no continuity in academic philosophy from the end of the Middle Ages to the beginning of the Modern Age. Neither was there any continuity in the institutions, which changed continually, or in the authors, who were constantly in conflict among themselves. The deduction made from this is that the categories used to describe this period in history have no foundations in reality and are, thus, misleading. Furthermore, they present the authors in question as if these latter had already been adequately understood and – on the basis of the negative connotations beared by those categories – they do not deserve any further enquiry. The outcome is that these notions are an obstacle to historical research and, when examined more closely, are based on theoretical considerations or on reasons of academic policy.¹²⁰ Many historians, moreover, de-

the historiographical plane. This is also, as can be seen, one of those cases in which philo-modernist and anti-modernist writers firmly share an historiographical myth and are opposed only in the evaluation of the phenomenon affirmed by this myth. Concerning Blum's thesis, I take the liberty of referring readers to the considerations I developed in "Aristotelismo e aristotelismi tra Rinascimento ed Età moderna. Lettura degli atti del convegno di Padova sulla presenza dell'aristotelismo padovano nella filosofia della prima modernità" [<http://web.tiscali.it/marcoforlivesi/mf2003a.pdf>], 2003 (printed edition: M. FORLIVESI, "Aristotelismo e aristotelismi tra Rinascimento ed Età moderna", in *Rivista di filosofia neo-scolastica*, 96 (2004), pp. 175-194).

120. Cf. mainly FREEDMAN, "Introduction...". With the standpoint taken by Freedman in this contribution, one can also associate that of REIF, "The Textbook Tradition...". Cf. also TUCKER, "Introduction...", who, while denying

nounce the inadequacy of specific notions. The category most taken as a target for criticism is that of “Aristotelianism”. It appears too simplistic to describe the complex and diverse standpoints of the authors from the 13th to the 17th century. It also appears difficult, if not impossible, to find a set of characteristics that all the “Aristotelians” had in common. There were authors who explicitly went back to Aristotle only in some fields. There were others who integrated substantial aspects of different doctrinal traditions into their thought. Furthermore, the mere fact of stating their faithfulness to the Stagirite’s thought does not seem to constitute a relevant datum: what was in question was in reality which “interpretation” of his doctrines was correct. Finally, it has to be said that the very notion of “Aristotelianism” was coined with the intention to denigrate.¹²¹ Even the notion of “scientific revolution” has been the object of severe criticism. According to nearly all the contributors to a recent publication edited by M.J. Osler, this category lacks any historical justification for two reasons. First, if the term “revolution” is taken to mean a swift, radical, and complete event, and if “scientific revolution” signifies the mathematization of the various scientific disciplines, it must be admitted that this mathematization was neither swift, radical, nor complete; therefore, it cannot be defined as a “revolution”. Second, it has been proven that there have been no scientific doctrines (in today’s acceptance of the term) in the history of thought that may be distinguished or separated from non-scientific doctrines (once again taking the expression in today’s acceptance of the term). Osler concludes from this that correct his-

any value to such a large-scale periodization, believed that an historical research based on notions such as harmony and contraposition, antagonism or convergence, eclecticism or synthesis, anacronism or synchronism, rejection or revision, absorption, repetition or renewal would be possible and fruitful. I should like to add that SCHMITT, *Aristotle...*, p. 109, had already denounced that «the genuine role of Aristotle in the Renaissance has largely been hidden from view through the diversionary tactics of well-known authorities on Renaissance cultural history».

121. Cf. also LÜTHY – LEIJENHORST – THIJSEN, “The Tradition...”; FREEDMAN, “Introduction...”; ID., *European Academic Philosophy...*; REIF, “The Textbook Tradition...”.

torical research must be restricted to the study of authors and changes within their context.¹²²

Some of the considerations just summarized concern the nature of historical research in general; the conclusion is that tackling them should not be the specific task of those engaged in the history of philosophy from the late Middle Ages to the early Modern Age. Nevertheless, I am not surprised that they have been formulated by scholars of this sector or that they are directed at them: academic customs and policies have not yet consolidated the historiographical categories relative to that period by instituting university chairs and courses, so that it is comprehensible that, when searching for certainties about these categories, there are those who have questioned the very principles of historiographical science. On the other hand, there are scholars who, when faced with these criticisms, have attempted to individuate eventual legitimate uses of the accused historiographical categories.¹²³

122. M.J. OSLER, "The Canonical Imperative: Rethinking the Scientific Revolution", in *Rethinking the Scientific Revolution*, ed. by M.J. Osler, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, pp. 3-22.

123. As far as the notion of "Aristotelianism" is concerned, although Schmitt concedes that it is not possible to find a set of elements common to all Aristotelians, he maintains that they share a *family resemblance*. He further considers it preferable to speak of "Aristotelianisms" rather than "Aristotelianism"; this is a standpoint also adopted, *mutatis mutandis*, by Vasoli and Pissavino. Grant, in "Ways...", distinguishes three different ways of conceiving a group of thinkers: essentialist, typological and aggregational. From the essentialist standpoint, the members of a group are all those for whom a given definition is valid. From a typological standpoint, the members of a group are all those who do not sway from the definition beyond a certain limit. From the aggregational standpoint, the members of a group are all those who belong to the sum of the members of that group. Grant thinks that it is possible to speak legitimately of "Aristotelianism" only according to the third way of conceiving a group: i.e. the Aristotelians are all those authors who studied in the tradition of a form of the Aristotelian paradigm and continue to refer to such paradigm even if they introduce further forms of it. If I understand it correctly, Grant's thesis foresees that only the scholar who wishes to maintain a strict tie with Aristotle can be defined as Aristotelian, excluding any others. Dollo, on the other hand, in the essays collected in *Galileo...*, prefers to rely on a criterion independent of the wish of any single author: he who does not sway from Aristotle's thought beyond any limits, he is an Aristotelian; but these limits are decided according to the various episodes in historical development. W.J. COURTENAY, "Was there an Ockhamist School?", in *Philosophy and Learning. Universities in*

The question is rooted in problems such as the foundation of universal concepts and the nature of the hermeneutic process; problems that cannot be solved in a few pages. What I can do here is add a brief proposal of my own to all the others that have already been suggested. The notions we have at our disposal, including the historiographical categories, are artificial: they are partly efficient and composite and may be modified. Their partial efficiency permits us to understand the world; the awareness of the partiality of their efficiency encourages us to understand it better; the fact that they can be modified permits us to direct our work in that direction; their composite nature permits us to construct well-founded but selective representations of the world, helping us to explore it little by little. We have nothing else at our disposal. The historiographical categories at present in use are undoubtedly inadequate. However, at the same time, it is possible to amend them or to formulate new categories, which may in their turn be amended. One valid example is the operation carried out by Kristeller on the category of "Humanism": once it had been established that it had an ideological founda-

the Middle Ages, ed. by M.J.F.M. Hoenen – J.H.J. Schneider – G. Wieland, (Education and Society in the Middle Ages and Renaissance, 6), Leiden – New York – Köln: E.J. Brill, 1995, pp. 263-292, recurs to a hybrid criterion, combining the decision of each single thinker to refer thematically to a certain author and the warning that the fact of defining himself as a disciple of a certain author may have different meanings in different contexts. Hoenen, in "Thomismus...", refines this stance even further. A school, Hoenen writes, is a tradition of thought that expressly adheres to the doctrine of the head of that school, is tied to the teaching or training in a specific discipline and is characterized by the defence, at a certain moment in time, of some definite doctrines. I should like to point out that the second characteristic (being tied to the teaching or training in a specific discipline) is precisely that aspect that distinguished a "school" from a "current"; however, the other two definitions may also be taken as the foundations of notions such as "Aristotelianism", "Platonism", "Epicurianism", "Ramism", etc. Specht, in "Die Spanische Spätscholastik...", indirectly defines a school as a circle of authors who intend to share the same literary forms as question and commentary along with the methods and principles of the head of that school. In the book edited by Osler, Westfall defends the notion of "scientific revolution" observing that the new science introduced a significant discontinuity in the history of ideas and had a profound impact on the modern world. Finally, Lüthy, Leijenhorst and Thijssen, in "The Tradition...", specifically base the notion of "Aristotelianism" on belonging to a tradition that refers to the doctrines expounded in Aristotle's texts.

tion, he did not abandon it but redefined it, removing its theoretical connotations and recuperating its connection with the historical facts. Any historian who wishes to avoid completely the risk of formulating categories that are inadequate for the study concerned, can do nothing but interrupt his work. It seems to me that Osler and, in the end, Freedman in actual fact reached the same result: in the attempt to escape the intrinsically provisional nature of human conceptual constructs – even the historiographical ones – they formulated methodological prescriptions such that, if they were followed to the letter, an historian would have to restrict himself to collecting and recopying ancient texts. The defect in these scholars' proposal is symmetric to the standpoint of those indicated at the start of this paragraph: the former conceded such room to theoretics that the historical data were quashed, while the latter denied the historian the task, and duty, of understanding what he is dealing with.

As far as notions such as "Aristotelianism", "Scotism", "Nominalism", etc. (with their corresponding adjectives) are concerned, it must be borne in mind that they have various meanings. Scholars could be "Aristotelian", for example, either because they shared the basic theses that historians (or, at least, some historian) believe belong to Aristotelianism in general;¹²⁴ or because

124. Despite the contrary opinion of many scholars, it is in my opinion possible to establish a set of theses, perspectives, or basic characteristics that can qualify Aristotelianism, just as for any other historical phenomenon. In order to clarify the meaning of this statement, I remind readers that historiographical categories are an artifice created by the historian, the result of the work dedicated to the search for structures and carried out by the historian, neither produced arbitrarily by the mind of the latter, nor a mere reflection of the real state of affairs. This characteristic of the notions used by the historian also belies Osler's thesis, according to which in the history of thought there are no scientific doctrines that are separate, or can be separated, from non-scientific doctrines (both terms – "scientific" and "non-scientific" – are taken according to the meaning which they have today). The contrary, and more than the contrary, is true: the historian explores the history of thought precisely by separating scientific doctrines from non-scientific ones (however he understands these terms), in order to elucidate their unity in the *mens* of the authors examined. This is the procedure that permits us to reconstruct the historical framework, not that of merely juxtaposing authors of the same period. It permits us to observe with Erika Jung that the explanations provided by medieval, Galilean, or Newtonian mechanics on single themes do not become more com-

they shared the basic theses that we believe belong to Aristotelianism in a specific discipline; or because they developed their own theses presenting them as an interpretation of Aristotle's texts or doctrines; or because they defined themselves as followers of Aristotle; or because they were recognised as followers of Aristotle by other authors who defined themselves as Aristotelians. Such diverse meanings of "Aristotelian" may also have been combined, and normally were, in various ways in one author, so that it is possible to define forms of more or less strict Aristotelianism; it is the historian's task to elucidate each single case. As far as the notions of events, such as the "scientific revolution", are concerned, it has to be considered that they are usually constituted by metaphors. They must, hence, be taken *cum grano salis*. It seems to me that the expression "scientific revolution" is apt: it expresses a change that, given the way in which culture usually evolves, in the field of physics was swift, radical, and complete. It is then the task of the scholar dealing with these themes to offer well-documented, articulated interpretations and presentations of them which are capable of revealing the connection and distance between the previous doctrines and the innovative theses.

A third basic difficulty relative to the history of academic philosophy from the late Middle Ages and the early Modern Age consists in the multitude of denominations it has been the object of. There are several expressions that have been used from the 17th century up to the present. In the terminology of Descartes, Mersenne, and Morin "school" and "Scholastic philosophy" indicated all of academic philosophy, no matter which religious faith the authors dedicated to it belonged to.¹²⁵ Similarly, in the terminology of Bayle, Maffei, and Condillac the adjective "Scholastic" was equivalent to "university Aristotelian".¹²⁶ Many histo-

prehensible by presupposing that their authors intended to deal with God and his creation, and at the same time permits us to gather, in conformity with the preoccupations of Osler or Cottingham, the unity of the interests of the thinkers in question.

125. GARBER, "Descartes...".

126. On Bayle cf. Gr. PIALA, "Gli aristotelici padovani al vaglio del 'Dictionnaire historique et critique'", in *La presenza...*, pp. 419-443. On Maffei cf. Scipione MAFFEI, *Ricordo per la riforma dello Studio*, [1715], in CENTRO PER LA STO-

rians, even in very recent times, have taken the noun “Scholasticism” to mean simply “Aristotelian academic philosophy” or “pre-modern”: Weber, Lewalter, Wundt, Schmitt, Grant, Roncaglia, Angelelli, Leijenhorst, Lüthy, Stone, Kusakawa. Other historians, such as de Vries and Gracia, take “Scholasticism” to mean academic philosophy in the Catholic world, or even the academic philosophy that was developed by authors who were formally Catholic (that is to say, basically, members of religious Orders). The notion of “Scholasticism” has also been the subject of various types of specifications. At the beginning of the 18th century, Johann Hermann von Elswich, followed by Budde, already called the *Loiolitæ*, i.e. the Jesuits, “*neo-Scholastic*”. Brucker extended this denomination to all the authors of Catholic Scholasticism in the 16th and 17th century, and in more recent times it has been used – according to the meaning given to it by Brucker – by Bavinck, de Vleeschauwer, and Ferrater Mora.¹²⁷ Historians such as Ariew, Courtine, and Gracia used the expression “late Scholasticism”.¹²⁸ Others preferred the term “second

RIA DELL'UNIVERSITÀ DI PADOVA, *L'Università di Padova nei secoli (1601-1805). Documenti di storia dell'Ateneo*, ed. by P. Del Negro – Fr. Piovan, Treviso: Università di Padova – Edizioni Antilia, 2002, pp. 167-168. On Condillac cf. BONNOT de Condillac, *Œuvres...*, Cours d'études, Histoire moderne, livre 20, ch. 14.

127. Ioannes Ermannus AB ELSWICH, *De varia Aristotelis in scholis protestantium fortuna schediasma*, in Ioannes LAUNOIUS, *De varia Aristotelis in academia parisiensi fortuna* – Ioannes IONSIUS, *De historia peripatetica dissertatio* – Ioannes Ermannus AB ELSWICH, *De varia Aristotelis in scholis protestantium fortuna schediasma*, cura et studio Ioannis Ermanni ab Elswich, Vitembergae apud Saxones: Sumptibus Samuelis Hannaveri – Typis Samuelis Creusigii, 1720, p. 75 (von Elswich's work spans pp. 1-112). Joannes Franciscus BUDDEUS, *Isagogæ historico-theologicae ad theologiam universa singulasque eius partes, novis supplementis auctior*, lib. 1 *Pars generalis*, cap. 4 *De propædeumatibus theologiacis*, n. 28 *De ontologia seu metaphysica quid observandum?*, 3 vol., Lipsiæ: Ex officina B. Thomæ Fritschii hæeredum, 1730, vol. I, p. 230a. Iacobus BRUCKERUS, *Historia critica philosophiæ*, periodus 3 *A restauratione literarum ad nostra tempora*, pars 1 *De studio philosophiæ emendandæ sectario*, lib. 2 *De novis laboribus veterem philosophiam revocantium*, cap. De philosophis genuinam Aristotelis philosophiam sectantibus, § 36, 4 vol. in 5 tomes, Lipsiæ: Apud Bernh. Christoph. Breitkopf, 1742-1743, vol. IV/1, p. 250. H. BAVINCK, *Gereformeerde Dogmatiek*, vol. I, Inleiding, § 5, n. 14, Kampen: J.H. Bos, 1895, p. 89. DE VLEESCHAUWER, “Un paralelo...”. FERRATER MORA, “Suárez...”.

128. Correspondingly, referring to the 13th century, STONE, “The Debate...”, uses the adjective “high scholastic”.

Scholasticism". I shall speak shortly at greater length of the history and meaning of this expression; for the moment, I should like to point out that A.S. Brett considered "Salamanca school" and "second Scholasticism" to be synonymous, meaning by "second Scholasticism" a phase in the history of Scholasticism that was supposed to have started with the Salamanca school, thanks to which it arose. Some historians have coined paradoxical expressions, or at least apparently so, which, however, thanks to their power of shedding light on real aspects of the period in question, have significantly contributed to revealing its complexity: "Cartesian Scholasticism" (Bohatec); "anti-Aristotelian Scholasticism" (Bonino); "modern Scholasticism" (Schmutz). Perhaps in order to avoid such paradoxes, generated by the ambiguity of the notion of "Scholasticism", many scholars have preferred to make use of the category of "Aristotelianism" and introduce specifications to it. Kristeller and Schmitt, followed by Baldini, distinguished between lay Aristotelianism and the Aristotelianism of the religious Orders. Stolleis speaks of Protestant neo-Aristotelianism;¹²⁹ Garber of progressive Aristotelianism. Lohr distinguishes between "Latin Scholasticism", "Renaissance Aristotelianism", "Christian Aristotelianism", "Italian secular Aristotelianism", "Lutheran Aristotelianism", and "Calvinist Aristotelianism".¹³⁰ I have already recalled that Gracia believed it was possible to determine the confines of a golden age of Hispanic philosophy. Deely speaks of "Latin tradition", "Latin philosophy", "Latin scholasticism", and "Latin Aristotelianism".¹³¹

The numerous different expressions recalled above deserve to be examined singly. However, here I am obliged to restrict myself to the analysis of only some of them. The most interesting of the notions mentioned seems to me to be that of "modern

129. M. STOLLEIS, "Die Einheit der Wissenschaften – Hermann Conring (1606-1681)", in *Hermann Conring (1606-1681). Beiträge zu Leben und Werk*, Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1983, pp. 11-32.

130. H. LOHR, "Metaphysics and Natural Philosophy and Sciences: The Catholic and the Protestant Views in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries", in *Philosophy...*, pp. 280-295.

131. Besides DEELY, *Four Ages...*, cf. also ID., *New Beginnings. Early Modern Philosophy and Postmodern Thought*, (Toronto Studies in Semiotics), Toronto – Buffalo – London: University of Toronto Press, 1994.

Scholasticism". Jacob Schmutz indicates de Lubac as the father of this expression, but I do not agree with this attribution. In *Surnaturel* – the text recalled by Schmutz – de Lubac does in fact speak of “*école thomiste moderne*” and of “*thèse moderne des thomistes*”; however, whenever he uses the adjective “modern”, he does so not in correlation to “Moderns”, but in the etymological sense of “new”, “recent”, “present-day”. In actual fact, de Lubac theorizes a taxonomy of the Thomist school which has only an indirect connection with modernity. He divides the history of the Thomist school (particularly the Dominican one) into two phases: the first when it did not consider the hypothesis of the existence in its own right of a natural order, and the second when it defended this hypothesis. It is not impossible (and there are some who have done so) to indicate in this change the turning point between the Middle Ages and modernity; however, to define Scholasticism as “modern”, thereby the whole of the Modern Age, on the basis of such a change seems to me to be a perspective that is not only historiographically dubious, but also far-removed from Schmutz’s intentions.¹³² In my opinion, the fathers of the expression “modern Scholasticism” are more likely to be Ferrater Mora and Trentman. The former sustained that the Scholastics in the 16th and 17th centuries tried to provide answers to the same problems posed by modern philosophers. The latter wrote that the way in which new Scholasticism organised the material at its disposal obtained a result that appears to be different from that obtained by former Scholasticism: «a result that looks much more like what we call early modern philosophy».¹³³ Yet the first to use the category of “modern Scholasticism” explicitly and consciously was Schmutz himself, according to whom modern Scholasticism is such because it constitutes a revival of all the medieval currents, offers new formulations of the medieval questions, and provides the way in which the mod-

132. Cf. H. DE LUBAC, *Surnaturel. Études historiques*, (Théologie. Études publiées sous la direction de la Faculté de théologie S.J. de Lyon-Fourvière, 8), Paris: Aubier, 1946, in particular pp. 281-321.

133. J.A. TRENTMAN, “Scholasticism in the Seventeenth Century”, in *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy...*, p. 833.

ern philosophers studied.¹³⁴ Afterwards, this notion was also used by Klinger¹³⁵ and by Stone, although in a weaker sense: in a purely chronological sense, I would say. Taken in its strong sense, it is highly efficient. It is a real thorn in the side to that obsolete, arbitrary historiography that represents the transition from Aristotelizing academic philosophy to modern times as a breach on all sides. However, it does present one severe limitation: it makes it impossible to use the notion of “Scholasticism” to define the borders of academic philosophy between the late Middle Ages and the early Modern Age. If, as it seems to me, modern philosophy is closely linked with its contemporary academic philosophy in every field except physics (where there was a substantial discontinuity that also spread to the system of sciences in general and partly to the relationship with Aristotle’s texts), then the category of “modern Scholasticism” is inadequate: it wipes out many inexistent discontinuities but hides the real ones.

A second notion worthy of deeper enquiry is that of “second Scholasticism”. It arose in the early 1940s in the work of Carlo Giacon, whose intentions were that the term should express a variant of the neo-Thomist historiographical paradigm. According to this paradigm, the doctrine of Thomas Aquinas represents the apex of human thought. Aquinas’ work was prepared by what had preceded it; what came afterwards stood at a distance because it was morally contemptible and intellectually of poorer quality. This outlook does indeed exalt the figure of Thomas, yet it makes the interpretation of the very doctrinal tradition inspired by him problematic. Giacon tried to overcome this difficulty by maintaining that from the mid-15th century to the mid-18th century, after a critical period that occurred in the late Middle Ages, and before a new critical period caused by the Modern Age, Thomism partly bloomed again. He called this reflowering a “second Scholasticism”.¹³⁶ Giacon’s reconstruction of

134. SCHMUTZ, “Bulletin...”.

135. E. KLINGER, “«Disputationes». Contesto e problematiche della Scolastica barocca”, in *Storia della teologia*, vol. IV, op. cit., pp. 239-299.

136. In *Galileo e la scolastica della decadenza. Conferenza tenuta sotto gli auspici della Reale accademia d'Italia all'Università cattolica del S. Cuore il giorno 12 maggio 1942*, Gallarate: Istituto filosofico Aloisianum, 1942, Giacon did

the history of philosophy was based on outdated historiographical theses and on the subordination of historical research to a theoretical plan; hence, the very notion of a second Scholasticism, as Giacom intended it, is of no use.¹³⁷ Nevertheless, it can also contribute, if reinterpreted rightly, to the understanding of the history of academic philosophy in the centuries from the 13th to the 17th. The latter may be called “Scholastic” by uniting two elements in a single notion: in the first place, the fact that it developed in close connection with the academic activities and didactic instruments (from “*schola*” meaning “classroom”); in the second place, its tendency towards Aristotelianism. The noun “*schola*” and the adjective “Scholastic” also express, however, a second aspect of pre-modern academic philosophy: the subdivisions into currents that were to varying degrees strongly institutionalized. We have seen that this second aspect of pre-modern academic philosophy was characteristic of the 15th to the 18th century. It is thus possible to distinguish between a first Scholas-

not use the term “second Scholasticism”, yet he formulated a viewpoint that was already composite about the thought which had developed in the public and particular *studia* between the end of the Middle Ages and the beginning of the Modern Age. On the one hand, he stated that there was a “Scholasticism of decadence” that started with Ockham and consisted in losing the comprehension of true metaphysics (that is to say Aquinas’ metaphysics); on the other, he added that in the 16th century there was a speculative renaissance with some great Schoolmen, who, however, dedicated themselves in actual fact to theology, at least when they were older. The extension of the thesis about this “renaissance” to the field of philosophy and the expression “second Scholasticism” appeared for the first time in C. GIACON, *Il pensiero cristiano con particolare riguardo alla scolastica medievale*, (Guide bibliografiche, serie 2 *Filosofia*, 3), Milano: Vita e Pensiero, 1943, pp. XIII-XIV. In this text, he distinguishes between a first Scholasticism, which ended with the decadence of Scholasticism, and a second Scholasticism, which was a period of a new blossoming of Scholasticism. This period, Giacom also writes, goes from «prima e dopo il Concilio di Trento, fino a tutto il secolo XVIII, quando si verifica una nuova decadenza» and it has sometimes been called «col nome di “Scolastica spagnola”». Giacom’s historiographical proposal finally reached full maturity in the three volumes of *La Seconda Scolastica*, op. cit., which established the success of the syntagma and the historiographical outlook bound to it.

137. Nevertheless, J.J.E. GRACIA, “Suárez (and Later Scholasticism)”, in *Routledge History...*, vol. III, pp. 452-474, not only re-proposed and defended the notion of “the silver age of Scholasticism”, but also introduced into it a further nationalistic bias.

ticism (proper to the 13th and 14th centuries), which is “Scholastic” only in the general sense seen above, and a second Scholasticism (proper to the centuries from the 15th to the 17th), which is “Scholastic” even in the specific sense just recalled.¹³⁸

A third notion worthy of attention is that of “Renaissance Scholasticism”. It seems to me both legitimate and profitable. It is legitimate since, as we have seen, from the 16th century academic culture of an Aristotelian bent is considered to have come later, and not as an alternative, to humanistic formation and increasingly also made use of the progress in, and tools of, history and philology. It is profitable since it is opposed to the historiographical myth according to which academic philosophy was supposed to have been indifferent and impermeable to such progress and tools.

More complex, but no less interesting, is the case of the notion of “Baroque Scholasticism”. It arose at the end of the 1920s as a result of Karl Eschweiler’s work. In his essay published in 1928 entitled “*Die Philosophie der spanischen Spätscholastik auf den deutschen Universitäten des siebzehnten Jahrhunderts*”, Eschweiler maintained three theses. First, seventeenth-century Scholasticism was the last way of thinking common to the whole Continent of Europe. Second, this way of thinking consisted in a practical intellectualism which, in the form of a schematizing “onthologism”, gave an order to the chaos of the real world within an intelligible (i.e. mental) world. Third, seventeenth-century Scholasticism may be called “Baroque Scholasticism” by transferring the denomination “Baroque” from the architectonic style to that of philosophizing. Eschweiler’s considerations do not lack perspicacity, yet they present some limitations. Studies on seventeenth-century academic philosophy have revealed that it was considerably more varied than it seemed to be to Eschweiler. Moreover, while it is true that seventeenth-century aca-

138. I point out that BRETT, “Authority...”, also repropose a reinterpretation of the notion of second Scholasticism. According to this scholar, there is a “second” Scholasticism when, and to the extent that, Scholasticism tried to redefine its own approach to the Holy Scripture on facing the exegetic methodologies of the Humanists and the Protestants.

demical authors, followed with some difficulty and frequently impoverished by modern authors, appeared to be more conscious than their medieval forfathers of the distance between the real world and that of the mind, they conceived of this distance not as the insurmountable walls of a prison but rather as an expression of the mind's "freedom of movement". Finally, I observe that Eschweiler – followed by Wundt and many others – attributed the name of "Baroque" in a purely extrinsic way to seventeenth-century Scholasticism, so that in his terminology "Baroque" simply meant "seventeenth-century". Taken in this sense, therefore, the notion of "Baroque Scholasticism" seems to be problematic and superfluous. Nevertheless, this expression, too, if opportunely reinterpreted, permits some characteristics of academic thought in the late 16th and 17th centuries to emerge. The texts that deal with the question of the nature of the Baroque period are innumerable. Some of them suggest to me that Baroque can be understood as follows: a knowledge that aims to seize and use the structures of reality on every level of universality and particularity, both in their static and in their dynamic aspects. It is not thus only an attempt to describe the world, but also to construct new entities on the basis of the rules that govern the latter and on the materials that constitute it. It is not merely an understanding of the world "in universal", but mastering it on all levels. It is not only a knowledge of things in their static component but also grasping the conflicting forces that govern them and, in some cases, constitute them. The tool and ruling expression of this project is artifice: an ability to explore reality by linking what seems to be far apart, a precious capacity to improve the world indefinitely but not without risks, to the extent that such improving is the work of humans.¹³⁹ Academic

139. Cf. J.-L. CHARVET, *La voce delle passioni*, (Le api, 9), Milano: Edizioni Medusa, 2003; S. ALVAREZ TURIENZO, "Pensamiento barroco: proyecto intelectual ambiguo con atención especial al pensamiento práctico", in *Cuadernos salmantinos de filosofía*, 16 (1989), pp. 201-240; J.L. FUERTES HERREROS, "L'influence de la méthodologie cartésienne chez Sebastián Izquierdo (1601-1681). Pour la construction d'une philosophie baroque", in *Problématique...*, pp. 253-275; J.A. MARAVALL, *La cultura del Barroco. Análisis de una estructura histórica*, (Letras e ideas, Maior, 7), Barcelona: Ariel, ²1980.

philosophy also took part in this project and availed itself of this tool. The non-deductive systematicness that characterized its *cur-sus* expressed the attempt to conquer reality by besieging it on all sides and retracing its connections in every possible direction. From the 16th to the 17th century several authors, both within and outside the universities, gradually reduced the gap between the conceptualization of the natural being and that of the artificial being, in the hope of attaining a single model of describing beings.¹⁴⁰ Zabarella did not restrict himself to discussing the nature of artificial beings, but considered the very sciences themselves, from logic to physics, *fabricæ* and *artificia*.¹⁴¹ In the 17th century authors of the most diverse leanings, from Keckermann and Timpler¹⁴² to Hobbes,¹⁴³ from Mastri¹⁴⁴ to Gassendi, up to Wolff, in the 18th century,¹⁴⁵ shared the thesis according to which science is an artifice, i.e. not a simple mirroring of reality, but a true “re”-construction of it through the work of the mind.

140. Cf. H. MIKKELI, “Art and Nature in the Renaissance Commentaries and Textbooks on Aristotle’s Physics”, in *Res et Verba in der Renaissance*, ed. by E. Kessler – I. MacLean, (Wolfenbütteler Abhandlung zur Renaissanceforschung, 21), Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2002, pp. 117-130. Notice also that in Eustachius a sancto Paulo’s *Summa* the notion of “*machina*” depends directly on that of “*artificium*”: EUSTACHIUS A SANCTO PAULO, *Summa philosophiæ quadripartita, de rebus dialecticis, moralibus, physicis, et metaphysicis*, pars <Summæ philosophiæ> 3 *Physica*, pars <Physicæ> 2 *De corpore naturali inanimato*, tract. 1 *De mundo et cælo*, disp. 1 *De mundo*, q. 1 *Quid sit mundus, et an sit unus*; Parisiis: Apud Carolum Chastellain, 2^a 1611 (first ed. Parisiis 1609), 2 vol. in 4 tomes, vol. II/1, pp. 123-124.

141. Jacobus ZABARELLA, *De natura logicæ*, lib. 1, cap. 12 *De duplici logica, et de eius origine*, in IDEM, *Opera logica*, ed. by W. Risse, Hildesheim: G. Olms, 1966 (facsimile of the ed. Coloniae: Sumptibus Lazari Zetzneri, 1597. The first edition was published in Venice in 1578), col. 27-28; ID., *De naturalis scientiæ constitutione*, op. cit., cap. 1 *Consilij ratio*, col. 1-2.

142. Cf. LOHR, “Metaphysics...”.

143. Cf. G. ROSSINI, *Natura e artificio nel pensiero di Hobbes*, (Collana dell’Istituto Universitario Europeo), Bologna: Il Mulino, 1988.

144. Bartholomæus MASTRIUS – Bonaventura BELLUTUS, *In Org.*, d. 12 *De scientia*, q. 2 *De obiecto scientiæ*, a. 6 *Quo sensu subiectum respiciat omnia considerata in scientia*, n. 48, p. 854a.

145. Cf. the texts by Gassendi and Wolff quoted under the entry “*Artificialis*” in the *Lessico filosofico dei secoli XVII e XVIII. Sezione latina*, (Lessico intellettuale europeo), Roma: Edizioni dell’Ateneo, 1992-.

3. *A book*

As we have seen, the work by Mastri (and Belluto) ranges from logic to ethics and from physics to theology; it is thus difficult to discover any philosophical theme that this author did not face. Needless to say, the identification and the sequence of the subjects as they were considered by Mastri do not always coincide with those of the scholars of later periods (among whom the present reader should be included). Nevertheless, this does not present an insurmountable obstacle for the study of this Scotist; it is, in fact, possible to approach him much as one might approach any writer of the past, and particularly those of the Middle Ages, that is to say by enquiring into the order and connections that they pose within their own theses and argumentations, and searching for the discussions on specific themes wherever they may be found.

This edition of collected papers affords a first synthesis of Bartolomeo Mastri's thought at an intermediate level. The term "intermediate level" is used because, on the one hand, this book appears after several essays dedicated wholly or partly to one or other of this author's doctrines; it furthermore attempts to set out his standpoints in an orderly manner. On the other hand, however, it does not yet consist in a systematic exposition of his thought. The word "first" is added not only because it is the first attempt, in a chronological sense, to illustrate the universality of Mastri's standpoints in the field of philosophy, but also because it does not completely satisfy this aspiration. Most of the contributions in this collection concern metaphysical themes; some tackle topics of logic and epistemology; others deal with anthropology and morals. None, however, illustrate the thought of Mastri and Belluto in the field of physics and the philosophical physics, yet it should be recalled that the physical works of these authors were printed (as a first edition) between 1637 and 1640 and that the publication of them ended when the two Conventuals were teaching in Padua. Moreover, while still in Padua, Mastri and Belluto were the protagonists, together with Fortunio Liceti, of a clash with Matteo Fr e, above all over matters belonging to philosophical physics. The lack of studies concerning

this topic is regrettable, the one consolation being that this book may stimulate new enquiries into this aspect of their work.

This collection of essays is the outcome of a conference on Mastri's philosophical thought held in Meldola and Bertinoro from 20th to 22nd September, 2002, to celebrate the fourth centenary of his birth. It contains, in the first place, the complete versions of the papers presented on that occasion, with just two exceptions. The first is the extensive presentation of seventeenth-century thought with which Jean-Robert Armogathe opened the conference. That his contribution to this book is missing afflicts me in a special way, as it would certainly have provided the reader with a much richer and acute portrayal of seventeenth-century philosophy than that which I have outlined in the previous pages. The second omission is the paper that I presented myself, which was dedicated to Mastri's conception of the reality of the real being. When I set about refining the text of my contribution, I became aware of two facts. On one hand, if I had wanted to deal with the theme I had chosen more appropriately, I should have had to extend the scope of my studies much more. On the other, the essays of Doyle, Schmutz and Anfray each offer a part of the basic elements of my interpretation of Mastri's thought concerning this topic. Therefore, also as a result of the stimulation offered by Lukáš Novák's contribution, I have preferred to explain Mastri's doctrine of the nature of the transcendental being and of its contraction. Besides the texts originating from the papers presented during the conference, this book contains three essays that were submitted to the attention of the scientific committee after the event had taken place: these are the works of Anfray, of Novák himself and of Veronesi. Not only were they gratefully accepted since they extend the range of enquiries into Mastri's thought, but they make me feel rather proud: they arise from an awareness of the importance of Mastri's thought which, in recent years, has spread, partly as a result of the conference in Meldola that I resolutely organized with the help of a number of good friends.

Along with this introduction, the volume opens with two other prefaces by Alessandro Ghisalberti and Gregorio Piaia. These are two short but fundamental texts for the volume as a

whole. Indeed, with the specific case of Mastri, they shed light on the fact that the history of western philosophy *also* passes through academic philosophy of the 16th and 17th centuries. Today it is no longer necessary to put forward this thesis in the abstract: the best international historiography has already accepted it. It is however essential to illustrate it and to put it to the test – to deny it even, or update it if need be – in the concrete case. Ghisalberti's preface, on the relationship between Mastri and the middle ages, documents the knowledge and the idea that Mastri had of the history of philosophy preceding him and the way in which he placed himself within it. We thus discover that, from his point of view, the most important phase of the history of philosophy, and the period he related to thematically, was that which developed in the European universities from the 13th century up until his times. Two specifications: the first, that, for Mastri, the flourishing of this period was prepared by writers such as Aristotle, Avicenna, and Averroës; the second, that writers from outside the Scotist tradition and who date from the middle of the 14th century to the end of the 15th century receive little attention from Mastri. Ghisalberti uses these observations to propose a revision to the customary historiographical paradigm which divides the history of philosophy into ancient, medieval, and modern. This framework does not seem adequate enough to recognize the role which recent research has attributed to the history of academic philosophy from the 13th to the 17th century; it should thus be replaced by a more articulated framework, able to accommodate the unity of philosophical thought over this period.

Piaia takes up Ghisalberti's study and agrees with its fundamental historiographical approach, identifying the dynamics that have led to the formulation of the historiographical paradigm familiar to us, and detecting its limits. The traditional periodisation of the history of philosophy has reasons, observes Piaia, which are internal to the historical evolution of philosophy and of European cultural institutions. It is born from a combination of at least four factors: the expansion of the fortune of *nouvelle philosophie*; the resistance of the academic and political world to the idea of the reform of university curricula; the anti-intellectual tendencies of considerable parts of the protestant and catho-

lic world; and the use of philosophical historiography as an instrument of cultural and political struggle. To this must be added the fact, Piaia goes on to say, that the traditional periodisation does not reflect the state of affairs as revealed by late twentieth-century historical research. It does not take into account either the complexity and vitality of academic philosophy between the 15th and the 17th century, nor its relevance to the development of modern philosophy. As a result, the historian should not feel himself constrained by the traditional periodisation; on the contrary, he should at least integrate it and supplement it with new and more complex models. From this point of view, Scotism is a case of great interest. The object of harsh criticism and historiographical ostracism ever since the late medieval period, it is not however absent, directly or indirectly, from modern philosophical debate. More radically, the comparative study of the speculative routes of seventeenth-century “Scholastics” and “Moderns” reveals itself to be important for a correct understanding of the doctrines of one and the other.¹⁴⁶

Mastri’s thought is examined in this collection in nineteen articles; the twentieth, by Ghisalberti, deals with a textbook of moral theology by the Conventual Giacomo Garzi explicitly inspired by Mastri’s *Theologia moralis*. As far as the order of the articles is concerned, it was decided to follow the order in which the subjects of the articles are discussed in Mastri’s work.

Like every rule, this too has its exception. Matteo Veronesi’s paper on the literary dimension of Mastri and Belluto’s texts deals with a subject never considered as such by the two Conventuals, and which is nevertheless in some way essential to their writings. For this reason and because it is an excellent introduction to the work of our authors, it is assigned the task of commencing this collection. Veronesi aims to examine the links that connect thought and expression on one hand, and ontological structures and sen-

146. It should be noted that Piaia is not the first scholar, in recent times, trying to develop a correct historical view about Scholasticism through a historical as well as historical-historiographical inquiry. Similar attempts are to be found also in, for example: SORELL, “Introduction”, op. cit.; MERCER, “The Vitality...”; ANGELELLI, “Aristotelian-Scholastic Ontology...”; TRUEMAN – SCOTT CLARK, “Introduction”, op. cit.; OSLER, “The Canonical Imperative...”.

tence construction on the other. Such links are possible because there is a space between things and words; a space which philosophical speculation attempts to render practicable not only by means of its own effort to understand the world, but also by reflecting on the space itself and expressing itself according to certain forms. In Mastri's texts some programmatic statements bear witness to his knowledge of rhetoric and, more radically, the consciousness he possessed of his own writing. The distinction between *dicere fuse* and *dicere confuse*, between *ubertas* and *farrago*, illustrate well the spiralling of his thought and his awareness of the force of the innumerable single positions formulated in the history of thought in response to each question. As in all baroque culture, the effort to harness the centuries-long tradition of thought translates into modes of systematisation full of intimate vitality and, from the point of view of literary form, into the segmentation into streams of opinion, the flow of subtle differences in thought, the ability to return to a position reached but endowed, by the end of the examination, with new clarity and plausibility. Veronesi also goes into detail regarding several notable passages in Mastri's work. Where Mastri measures himself against Galileo, for example, he uses vivid vocabulary and expressions used by Galileo himself. The primacy Mastri attributed to the *analogia univocationis* over the *analogia proportionalitatis* involves him in a succession of masks, games of inversion in which the search for equilibrium is overcome by the aspiration to fill every gap in explanation. His refined doctrine of distinctions conceptualizes the attempt to bring everything to unity through the unravelling of parallels and antitheses. The image of God as *pelagus omnium perfectionum* is based on the legitimacy of the metaphor, bearing witness to a conception of the word in which the context of the thinkable and its very thinkability are expressed not by a single clear word, but rather by a set of verbal forms, capable nevertheless of rendering manifest the thinkable and its thinkability according to stable forms.

The paper by Francesco Bottin examines some aspects of the thought of the seventeenth-century Scotists which prelude the development of a general hermeneutic. The link between Scotism and hermeneutics is indirectly suggested by authors such as

Rambach, Ernesti, and Wolf. On one hand, they define hermeneutics in terms of *subtilitas*: the science which leads to a sharpness in understanding and explaining sentences and words, and its method of application. On the other, they hold that *intelligere subtiliter* is a necessary precondition for correct interpretation. With this, the founders of hermeneutics establish our concepts as the primary point of reference in the activity of interpretation; and it is precisely from this point of view that the doctrines of the Scotists on the nature of the objects of knowledge and the relationship between *vox*, concept, and thing reveal themselves to be not only theoretically close to the foundations of hermeneutics, but in some way also their historical root. The first crucial issue in this journey through the history of philosophy is the distinction between formal concept and objective concept. This leads to understanding the being itself as a cognitive content. According to Mastri, on one hand the possibility of possibles derives from their non contradictoriness; on the other, this possibility is real due to the fact that possibles constitute objective concepts in the mind of God. By saying this, Mastri makes the field of the possibles and the field of the objective concepts coincide, so that being becomes the field of the possible being and this, in turn, becomes the field of that which is thought as a possible being. The world is therefore now the world which manifests itself. The second crucial issue is constituted by the doctrine regarding the conditions of signification. Mastri holds that no linguistic expression can have a valid relationship with objects if these have not been previously constituted as objects of knowledge; nevertheless, he retains that *voces* strictly signify not concepts but rather things. *Voces*, therefore, assume the task of rendering manifest the world, which has now become, however, the world of thinkable things.

Paola Müller illustrates the doctrine of the *fallaciæ in dictione* set out in the *Institutiones dialecticæ* of Mastri and Belluto's *Disputationes in Organum*. In the middle ages the diffusion of the *Sophistical Refutations* explicitly posed the problem of the nature of the persuasive force of false arguments (*fallaciæ*). Medieval writers tackled the question in the context of their development of refined semantics and logic, which in the course of the 16th

and 17th centuries however were becoming ever more neglected and studied in summarized form only. Mastri and Belluto deal with the question briefly in the short course of formal logic which introduces the noetic and epistemological section of their *Disputationes in Organum*. Conforming to tradition, they distinguish between two genres of *fallaciæ* and two causes of them. As far as the causes are concerned, one thing is what makes an incorrect argument appear valid (*causa apparentiæ*), another is what makes it false (*causa deceptionis*). As regards the genres, they distinguish between the *fallaciæ in dictione*, concerning propositions made up of conventional signs, and those *extra dictionem*, regarding propositions made up also of natural signs. The *fallaciæ in dictione* which the two Conventuals deal with are those concerning equivocation, ambiguity, composition and division of the terms in the proposition, accent, and form of expression of terms and propositions. In fact Mastri and Belluto deal with the question rather hurriedly: they do not justify the list of *fallaciæ* which they deal with, they do not refer to the late medieval developments in logic to resolve them, nor do they supply any rules for avoiding them. Paola Müller interprets the presence of this brief outline as an act of deference by the two seventeenth-century Scotists towards medieval authors. Nevertheless, she also reminds us what they write to introduce the question: this should be tackled, we read, not in order to trick, something unworthy of the *scientificus vir*, but rather in order not to fall into error and to acquire all the sciences adequately.

Paul Richard Blum tackles the question of the connection between metaphysics and reality in Mastri's thought. The fundamental question which guides Blum in his work is the same, he writes, as that which moved Kant to develop a critique of pure reason: what role does the object and what role does knowledge play in the constituting of the objects of scientific knowledge? Or, in the characteristic terms of scholastic epistemology: what justifies the abstraction that gives rise to the sciences? In particular: on what basis stands the abstraction that gives rise to metaphysical objects? The Thomist tradition answers the question by maintaining that abstraction consists of the separation of form from matter and that this separation can take place in three

degrees: from individual, sensible, or intelligible matter. However, the Thomist tradition, for example in the *Artium cursus* of the Complutenses, can also further distinguish between abstraction taken actively and abstraction taken passively: the former is the operation of the intellect; the latter is the immateriality that is created thanks to the act of the intellect in the object in so far as it is known. The problem therefore lies in the relationship between the two types of abstraction; in particular, the problem of which type of abstraction is the basis of which. Mastri sets out his position in the discussion of three alternatives: one in which metaphysics deals with the natures and quiddities of all things down to their individual properties; one in which metaphysics deals with the essences of things in general; and one in which metaphysics deals with some things (material things) only in general, and other things (immaterial things) also in particular. Mastri rejects the first two cases and accepts the third: metaphysics deals with that which is abstract from matter both by essence (i.e. it is such that it cannot be something material), and by indifference (i.e. it is such that it can be something material, but not such that it necessarily has to be something material). Blum considers the positions of Scotus and Perera to be the sources of this theory. For the former, he writes, metaphysics is a science of immaterial beings; for the latter, it is the science of a conceptual content indifferent to the material and immaterial being.¹⁴⁷ Finally Blum maintains that the notion of “abstraction by indifference” constitutes a valid basis for a possible metaphysics.

The articles by Novák, Forlivesi, and Di Vona examine, from partially different viewpoints, Mastri’s doctrine regarding the nature of the transcendental being. Lukáš Novák analyses the historical roots of the dispute between Punch and Mastri over the

147. Leaving aside the problem of the interpretation of Scotus’ position, maybe Mastri’s doctrine could be better understood if it would be examined in the light of the relations which unite it with Suárez and separate it from Perera. Furthermore, I believe that in order to understand what is specific to Mastri’s doctrine it is not enough to note that he holds that metaphysics deals both with that which is abstracted from matter by essence, and with that which is abstracted from matter by indifference; rather, it is necessary to examine also the nature of the link which he conceives between separated being, transcendental being, and the object of metaphysics.

contraction of the being common to God and creatures and detect the core of the issue. Once he had put forward the theory of the univocity of the being common to God and creatures, Scotus found himself up against a serious difficulty: if God and creatures had something in common, both of them would have to be made up of what they have in common and what differentiates them; this, however, would violate God's simplicity and perfection. Scotus resolved the problem in two ways. According to the first, the being is contracted to God and creatures not by differences, but rather by intrinsic modes; according to the second, God and creatures in reality are radically different and have something in common only if considered within an inadequate concept. Now, the first thesis raises a problem in turn: what is the nature of the distinction and the composition between modifiable and mode, and hence what difference is there between distinction and composition between modifiable and mode and that between genus and difference? More than three centuries later, Punch resolved the question in three steps: there is no difference between contraction by modes and contraction by differences, so that every contractible is contracted by differences; contraction by differences implies metaphysical composition only in the case of beings which depend on others; hence the being is contracted to God and creatures by real differences without this involving any imperfection in God, since God does not depend on anything. Mastri also answers the problem in three steps, opposed, however to those formulated by Punch: one thing is contraction by differences formally distinct from the contractible, another is that by differences only virtually distinct from it (which Mastri sometimes calls "modes"); contraction by differences of the first type implies metaphysical composition, but not every contraction to an inferior is such a contraction; hence the being is contracted to God and creatures by differences such as not to imply any imperfection in God. To conclude, observes Novák, Mastri interprets Scotus' theory regarding the contraction of the being common to God and creatures, by referring it to the doctrine which the Thomists use to describe the contraction of predicamental genres. Novák holds that both Punch and Mastri's doctrine have the historical merit of having tackled the most problematic

aspect of Scotus' position: that regarding the nature of the mode. Nevertheless, he believes that Mastri's theory has some difficulties. In the first place, Mastri's doctrine on the contraction of transcendentals and that regarding the contraction of predicamentals are such as to invalidate each other. Concerning transcendentals, he maintains that there can be contraction at a conceptual level even without a composition of *formalitates* corresponding to it in reality; regarding predicamentals, on the other hand, he holds that there must correspond in reality to their contraction at a conceptual level a composition of *formalitates*. It is not clear what justifies the distinction between the two cases. In the second place, Mastri's doctrine on modes appears incoherent and ineffective. Incoherent since he holds both that modal distinction is a type of real distinction, and that the contraction of the being by means of modes is the work of the intellect. Ineffective, because he removes from contraction by modes the capacity to explain the essential difference between God and creatures, and yet, when speaking of the contraction of the being common to God and creatures, he does not mention contractors other than modes.

Marco Forlivesi's article is divided de facto into two sections. The first provides an examination of Mastri's doctrine regarding the contraction of the transcendental being in the form of a con-futation, on a historical level, of the criticisms formulated by Novák (and Punch). The second illustrates Mastri's doctrine regarding the univocity of this being in the form of a presentation of the most delicate passages in Mastri's argumentation. As regards Novák's first criticism, Forlivesi maintains that Mastri's works are not lacking in pages which demonstrate the distinction between the nature of the extra-mental foundation of transcendentals and the nature of the extra-mental foundation of predicamentals. Predicamentals regard things not radically different from one another and such as can be made up of a potential principle and an active principle; to put it succinctly, they concern finite things, adequately conceived. Transcendentals, on the other hand, regard radically different things, of which at least one is infinite. This means that in the case of transcendentals we must admit that they are inadequate concepts, based *a parte rei*

on a simple embryonic likeness, which is conceived in the form of a conceptual content common only through the work of the intellect. On the other hand, in the case of predicamentals we must admit that they are adequate concepts, based *a parte rei* on a distinction endowed with reality independently of the work of the mind. As regards Novák's second criticism, Forlivesi maintains first of all that it arises from a misunderstanding of Mastri's doctrine regarding modal distinction. According to Mastri, the modal distinction that exists between something real (like a *formalitas* too) and its mode is a distinction which belongs to the family of real distinctions; however, the modal distinction that exists between an inadequate conceptual content (as are transcendentals) and its intrinsic mode is a distinction which belongs to the family of the distinctions of reason. Hence Mastri's theory whereby the distinction between a being and its intrinsic modes is a virtual distinction (that is a distinction of reason *cum fundamento in re*) is coherent. In the second place, Forlivesi observes that, according to Mastri, both the infinite being and the finite being are indivisible essences and that, consequently, both the concept of a being common to God and creatures and the concepts of infinity and finitude are inadequate conceptual contents. This means that the concepts of infinity and finitude explain (or rather do not explain) the essential difference between God and creatures to the same extent to which the concept of being explains (or rather does not explain) what they have in common. Nevertheless just as the latter is able to express to the human mind the embryonic likeness between God and creatures, so the former are able (to the extent to which they add a specification regarding the degrees of existence respectively of the infinite being and the finite being) to express the essential difference between God and creatures. More appropriately, we could say that the transcendental being, the mode of infinity, that of finitude, and the compositions of the former with the latter are the manifestations to the mind of the work with which the mind itself grasps the infinite being, the finite being and their relations of likeness and difference. Mastri's tortuous argumentation derives from his effort to identify a subtle but difficult middle way between nominalism, Thomism, and the Scotism professed by most

of Scotus' followers, in a field already crowded with attempts at mediation. As regards the formation of the *ratio entis* and its contraction to its inferiors, Mastri's doctrine can be thus summarized. The *ratio entis* is formed not by the grasping of a *formalitas* (against most Scotists), but rather by confusing abstraction; nevertheless such abstraction takes place not by reasoning reason (*ratio ratiocinans*) – against the *nominales* –, but rather by reasoned reason (*ratio ratiocinata*). Vice versa, the *ratio entis* is contracted not by explicitation (neither by reasoning reason – against the *nominales* –, nor by reasoned reason – against the Thomists, even the eclectic ones –), but rather by composition; nevertheless such contraction takes place not by real composition (against most Scotists), but rather by composition of reasoned reason. Mastri also looks for a middle way regarding the question of the univocal or analogous nature of being. Against those who deny that the transcendental being is unitary and univocal, he maintains that: being is perfectly distinct from its inferiors; with respect to modes, ultimate differences, and transcendental *rationes* it is predicated not quidditatively, but rather identically; the inequality of being's inferiors is not intrinsic to being. Against those who deny that the transcendental being is analogous, and maintain that it is a genus, he holds that: with respect to non-ultimate differences, being is predicated quidditatively; the inequality of being's inferiors is extrinsic to being, but the foundation of the former is intrinsic to the latter; the immediate inferiors of being are radically different. Forlivesi examines these theories and their presuppositions; nevertheless, he confesses his own difficulty in understanding some passages in Mastri's argumentation.

Piero Di Vona also refers to Mastri's theory concerning the formation of the *ratio entis*, but he concentrates his attention on Mastri's doctrine whereby being is a univocal analogous *ratio*. Mastri's theory is based on two presuppositions. In the first place, there is no middle term between univocity and equivocity; hence what is analogous is either also univocal, or is also equivocal. In the second place, univocity admits degrees. A unitary *ratio* can be present in its inferiors according to the same way of being, the same essential order and the same degree of essential perfection. If all these conditions are satisfied, there is the high-

est degree of univocation; but there is univocity, albeit in the lowest degree, even in the case in which there is only unity of the *ratio*. Now, with respect to God and creatures, being is a unitary *ratio*, but is present in them in a different way, different order, and different degree. Hence, the transcendental being is both univocal and analogous, in the lowest degree of univocity. In order to grasp what is specific to Mastri's thought, Di Vona compares it with some similar positions developed from the end of the 16th century to the 1620s. According to the Scotist Juan Merinero, univocity has degrees, but analogy is a type of equivocity. Consequently, he maintains that the transcendental being is univocal in the minimum degree, but not analogous. The Scotist Martin Meurisse believes, as Mastri was to do, that the being is both univocal and analogous; despite this, he bases this thesis on the presupposition that it is distinct from its inferiors *ex natura rei*. Raffaele Aversa too, a "neoteric" thinker, holds that being is both univocal and analogous; nevertheless, he denies (unlike Mastri) that being is perfectly distinct from its inferiors and holds that it is analogous according to all types of analogy (inequality, intrinsic attribution, extrinsic attribution, and proper proportionality). Mastri was to deny that there is analogy of inequality and to admit for being only the analogies of intrinsic attribution and proper proportionality.

Luigi Iammarrone's paper takes up a previous article by Pietro Scapin on the doctrines of Mastri and Belluto about necessity and contingency and uses them to draw a comparison with Heidegger and Sartre. According to the two Scotists, the question of necessity and contingency exists on two levels: logical and ontological. On the logical level, necessity and contingency concern the proposition. In this regard, Mastri and Belluto state that it is possible to distinguish various degrees in the force of the bond that unites subject and predicate in necessary propositions. In predication regarding essence there are four degrees (in decreasing order): *i*) the predicate includes all the intention and the extension of the subject; *ii*) the predicate represents all the subject or an essential part of it; *iii*) the predicate represents an essential property of the subject; *iv*) the predicate represents an intrinsic mode of the subject. In predication regarding existence

there are three degrees (in decreasing order): *i*) the proposition expresses a fact that occurs universally and infallibly; *ii*) the proposition expresses a fact that occurs infallibly when its causes converge; *iii*) the proposition expresses a fact that occurs most of the time. As far as the ontological level is concerned, it is possible to distinguish between two levels: one of being and one of acting. On the level of being, Mastri understands the distinction between necessity and contingency as a distinction between that which cannot not be and that which can not be. The foundation of this type of necessity can only be an infinite essence that perfectly includes existence. As regards the foundation of this type of contingency, we must distinguish between proximate and ultimate foundation. The proximate foundation of contingency is the essence itself of created things; contingency, that is, is an intrinsic mode of created things. Ultimate foundation is God's freedom. This moves the problem to the level of action. If, Mastri writes, the first cause operated necessarily, nothing would be indifferent to being or non-being. Thus there is contingency only because divine omnipotence is regulated by divine freedom. This is also the ultimate foundation both of the indetermination of created will and of its capacity to self-determinate, which is constitutive of this will to such a point as to be its intrinsic mode.

Ulrich G. Leinsle examines Mastri's position in the seventeenth-century debate on modal entities. He points out that the 17th century saw a revolution in ontology which has not yet received sufficient attention from historians of philosophy. If, up until then, the fundamental notions for describing reality were "substance" and "accident", in the course of the 1600s the pair "*res – modus*" acquired greater and greater importance. To the eyes of seventeenth-century metaphysicians, the doctrine of "*modus*" had several important advantages: it allowed the conceptualisation of a real distinction between extremes not really separable; it made it possible to describe processes on an ontological level; it clarified the nature of determinations such as "location", "temporality", "causality", and "connection". Despite this, the doctrine took on different forms in different authors and became the object of broad debate. Orthodox Aristotelians rejected it as a useless novelty. Some Thomists upheld the existence of modes,

others rejected them. The nominalists interpreted modes in terms of extrinsic denominations. The Scotists believed that what most people call “modes” were in reality *formalitates*; vice versa, those who opposed Scotus’ doctrine believed that to speak of *formalitates* was an improper way of speaking of modes. Mastri’s position has four fundamental points. *i*) A mode is a relative entity, but it is not a relation. A mode refers structurally to what changes; hence it is a relative entity. Nevertheless it is not, in itself, either a categorial relation or a transcendental relation (that is a relation based on the modified and identical to it). *ii*) There are both extrinsic modes and intrinsic modes. The former relate to the *res*, the latter to the *formalitas*.¹⁴⁸ *iii*) A mode is being not *formaliter*, but rather *identice*. A mode is the ultimate reason of the modal determination of being; therefore it cannot include being quidditatively. Nevertheless, it receives reality from the being that determines; therefore it is being. *iv*) The distinction between *res* and extrinsic mode is a modal real distinction, that between *formalitas* and intrinsic mode is a modal formal distinction.¹⁴⁹ Having clarified Mastri’s doctrine regarding the nature of the mode in general, in the context of the seventeenth-century positions, Leinsle illustrates Mastri’s theories regarding some modes and the nature of the distinctions between these and what they modify: location, union, finite and infinite, existence.

Michael Renemann examines Mastri’s doctrine on the different natures and the different types of extra-mental foundation of those distinctions which, although they are produced by the work of the mind, require, according to Mastri, a further foundation in addition to such activity. Mastri’s theory is divided into two parts: a confutation of the various positions of nominalist tendency and a clarification of the connection between acts of thought and real states of affairs. The authors who are criticized by Mastri express differentiated theories, but have in common the fact that they believe that all distinctions are integrally consequences of the work of the mind. Against this position, Mastri

148. And, it should be added, to inadequate concepts too.

149. It may be appended that the distinction between an inadequate concept and an intrinsic mode of it is not a formal, but a virtual distinction.

observes first of all that a distinction is something that takes place on the side of the cognitive content; it is necessary therefore to weigh up whether it can always be explained by the mere activity of the mind, or whether it is necessary to have recourse to a further foundation in addition to such activity. Renemann examines Mastri's arguments concerning formal distinction and virtual distinction. According to Mastri, in the case of the formal distinction, the mind limits itself to noting a distinction that already exists in reality. The case of the virtual distinction is more complex. It is possible for two reasons. As far as the contents of knowledge are concerned, it is observed that there are concepts whose content is not constituted independently of knowledge itself; hence not all cognitive contents manifest to the mind something that exists *ex parte rei* in the same form in which it is presented to the mind. As regards that which exists in reality, it is observed that there are virtual causes which cannot be, taken as an object, the reason for a plurality of acts of thought, but in so far as they are causes, can provoke a plurality of acts of thought. Knowledge contributes to the formation of virtual distinction by means of a complex process. Direct knowledge grasps different things that are virtually distinct precisely as virtually distinct; nevertheless, by setting them opposite itself in the very act of knowing, it makes them – taken as cognitive contents – become actually distinct. Subsequently, reflected knowledge can know such things precisely as actually distinct. In conclusion: before they are known, virtually distinct things exist in reality just virtually and like in something that receives them and sustains them (*subjective*); after they are known, they are in the mind as objects and in reality as in that which is the foundation of their distinction in front of the mind.

The paper by Sven K. Knebel offers us a detailed study of Mastri's doctrine of the distinctions of reason. Knebel provides a brief history of the theories regarding these types of distinctions and examines Mastri's positions. With a creative spirit, even opposing some doctrinal traditions of his own school, Mastri defends, besides the existence of distinctions of reason, both the existence of a difference between the distinction of reasoning reason (*distinctio rationis ratiocinans*) and the distinction of rea-

soned reason (*distinctio rationis ratiocinatæ*), and the existence of a difference between the distinction of reasoned reason and the formal distinction. As far as the distinction of reasoned reason is concerned, Knebel illustrates Mastri's position in the context of the criticisms that Mastri made to the theory of Zaccaria Pasqualigo. According to Pasqualigo, the distinction of reasoned reason exclusively regards conceptual contents (*conceptus obiectivus*), considered in their being distinct from objects. Mastri rejects this conception with two remarks. In the first place, he holds that an objective being (that is a being which belongs to the conceptual content) must not be admitted apart from the real being either of the object or the cognitive act. Secondly, he observes that when something is known as something, it is not known only in the properties which it possesses in its being known. It follows that the properties of known things do not depend only on the mind. There can therefore be distinctions of reason *cum fundamento in re*, that is distinctions of reasoned reason. On the other hand, Mastri continues, the properties of known things also depend on the mind. This consideration leads him to oppose the doctrine of the distinction of reasoning reason formulated by Pedro de Tomás (which had become common among Scotists thanks to Syrrect), according to which this distinction exclusively concerned second intentions and was situated on a grammatical plane. The fact is, Mastri believes, that the object effectively acquires in the mind an objective being. Thanks to this, the mind has the power of conceiving the identical differently and, therefore, can institute distinctions of reasoning reason both in the context of second and in that of first intentions.¹⁵⁰

150. I believe that the sense of Mastri's statement that an objective being must not be admitted apart from the real being of the object or of the cognitive act could be the following. The objective being (i.e. the being belonging to every conceptual content – i.e. *conceptus obiectivus* – in so far as it is present to the mind that grasps it) is constituted thanks to the real existence of the act of knowledge (*conceptus formalis*, i.e. real mental state) and – remotely and unnecessarily – of the real object on which that act depends. It follows that there is no objective being – taken for what it is on the plane of reality – other than the real being of the formal concept or of the object and, hence, independent of (but also, in Mastri's view, other than) the former, or both, of them. That is why it is not true that the distinction of reasoned reason (taken in its being a distinction

John P. Doyle examines Mastri's position regarding the question of the nature and foundation of the possibility of possibles. Doyle focuses on three fundamental elements in Mastri's position. The first concerns the nature of the divine ideas of creatures. According to Mastri, these are objective concepts, which God contains in himself according to two different modalities: on the plane of being, according to their transcendental *rationes*; on the plane of knowing, according to all their *rationes*. The second fundamental element concerns the cause of the divine ideas of creatures. In the first place, it is necessary to distinguish the being that the possibles possess before the act of divine knowledge from that which they possess after it. In the first case, possibles have merely a virtual being within the divine essence; in the second, they acquire a known being. This known being is not an extrinsic denomination deriving from the act of knowing; it is instead a "*quod*", which has reality only within the divine mind and which possess some *quasi*-causes. In the second place it is necessary to distinguish the logical from the physical plane. On the logical plane, possibles possess merely a diminished real being and have a formal cause and a *quasi*-efficient cause.¹⁵¹ The former consists of possibles themselves, which are such as not to involve contradiction. The latter consists of the divine science of vision, which is that which causes the non-contradictoriness of possibles. On the physical plane, possibles possess a real (albeit

different from that of reasoning reason) only regards the objective content and is independent of any reference to the act of knowledge and the object. I believe, in saying this, that I am also expressing the thought of prof. Knebel. The reader can consider this note as a revision of what I wrote in "La distinzione tra concetto formale e concetto oggettivo nel pensiero di Bartolomeo Mastri" [<http://web.tiscali.it/marcoforlivesi/mf2002d.pdf>], 2002 (previous printed edition in French: "La distinction entre concept formel et concept objectif: Suárez, Pasqualigo, Mastri", transl. by O. Boulnois, in *Les Études philosophiques*, 2002, n. 1, pp. 3-30; in which, furthermore, a small but substantial note concerning this point was lost).

151. Doyle maintains, as I have written, that according to Mastri the logical possible possesses a real but *diminutum* being. In my opinion, however, according to Mastri, the *esse diminutum* in question is not a type of real being; on the contrary, it is a particular type of being of reason (*esse rationis materiale et derelictum*). I would add that, in Mastri's thought, only the physical possible possesses a real being. On this question, may I refer to my "La distinzione..."

not actual) being and their possibility derives from divine omnipotence. It must be observed however that such a possibility presupposes the possibility on the logical plane. If, therefore, one were to ask Mastri what the logical possibility of possibles consists of and how possibles differ from impossibles, he would reply thus. The logical possibility consists of the positive and almost conditional connection between two extremes, so that if such a connection really existed there would be nothing contradictory. The difference between possibles and impossibles lies in the fact that if the former existed there would be nothing contradictory; if the latter existed, on the other hand, there would be something contradictory. Finally, the third fundamental element of Mastri's theory concerns the connection between God and possible creatures. According to Mastri, the possibility of creatures is something positive, necessary, and independent of divine omnipotence; nevertheless, the necessity of this possibility descends from the necessity of God.

The question of the connection between God and the possibility of possible creatures is the subject of Jacob Schmutz's paper. Once we admit that possible creatures are dependent on God, we may ask whether such dependence is mutual. Moving our discourse from the ontological to the logical plane, once we admit that the possibility of possible creatures is necessary, we may ask whether such a necessity is on the same plane as divine necessity. Baroque Scholastics were divided over this theme into two fundamental camps: the connectionists and the anti-connectionists. Despite even significant differences between individual authors, the connectionists basically put forward three theories. The first held the mutual dependence of God and possibles. All essences are present in the divine essence; therefore the connection between such essences and the divine essence is necessary. Furthermore, the active capacity to produce something and the passive capacity to be produced are correlated; hence divine omnipotence supposes the possibility of creatures. The second thesis maintains the modal equality of God and possibles. God knows essences starting from the knowledge he has of himself. What is more, the non-contradictoriness of possibles is, on the real plane, none other than God. Hence the necessity of the for-

mer is equal to the necessity of the latter. The third thesis maintains that in God there is also the foundation of the impossibility of impossibles. The impossibility of the impossible is eternal and necessary; but there is nothing eternal and necessary outside God; hence the impossibility of the impossible is a denomination which comes from divine omnipotence. A fourth thesis can be added to these three, whereby the connection between God and possibles is not only valid for universal essences, but also for individuals. Mastri did not know all the authors of the connectionist current, but he nevertheless developed arguments against all its fundamental theses. Against mutual dependence he observes that the dependence of creatures on the divine attributes relative to them is real, nevertheless precisely for this reason the relation of such attributes towards creatures is a relation of reason. Against modal equality, he observes that the possibility and the necessity of creatures are participated. Finally, against the foundation in God of the impossibility of the impossible he observes that such an impossibility is based not on a lack of active power in God, but rather on a lack of passive power in creatures. It follows from this, according to Mastri, that God has no real relation with possible creatures, his existence does not depend on any possible creature, nor is he the reason why possibles are made up of certain properties or certain other ones.

Fabio Gambetti's contribution introduces us to Mastri's treatment of the problems of the existence, the nature, and the knowability of God. As far as a demonstration of the existence of God is concerned, Mastri develops five arguments. The scheme generally recalls that of Aquinas' *Summa theologiae*, but also presents some significant corrections. The argument which is based on change is held valid only if interpreted on the level of the connection between cause and generation. The argument which is based on order and finality is divided into two distinct arguments. The argument which is based on finality – which, I would point out to the reader, Mastri held to be the most obvious – has as its foundation the connection of the parts of the whole universe. The problems of the knowability of God *pro statu isto* and of the possibility of beatitude are tackled on the basis of three theses. Man can form for himself both concepts common to God

and creatures, and concepts proper to God (such as, for example, the concept of infinite), but not concepts peculiar to God. For the same reason, man cannot contemplate God with the powers of his natural reason alone. Nevertheless, a finite intellect can be perfected to the point where it can grasp an infinite object. Gambetti does not tackle the question of the foundation of these theories; he nevertheless considers numerous other themes. He recalls, for example, that according to Mastri, supernatural theology is not properly a science; he touches on Mastri's reflections regarding some divine attributes; he outlines Mastri's considerations on the nature *non quanta* of divine relations. There is scope for further study here. Illustrating Mastri's reflections on the question of the order among the divine persons, Gambetti reminds us that, according to Mastri, causality gives rise to temporality, whereas emanation does not give rise to temporality. Concerning the possibility of grasping the divine properties separately, Mastri clashes once again with Punch and sheds light on the profound characteristics of his own gnoseology. Finally, what our Scotist writes regarding the connection between essence and existence in God and regarding the connection of the parts of the universe seems to me to merit further analysis.

Jean-Pascal Anfray examines Mastri's doctrine on the relationship between the freedom of the will (not only of man, but also of God) and divine prescience. Our Franciscan develops the question in the context of a double comparison: that with Scotus' texts and the history of their interpretation; and that with the main theories on this theme elaborated in the universities from the 13th century up until his times. Scotus maintains on one hand that the divine science of contingent events is based on decrees of the divine will, which establish what effectively happens in each situation; on the other hand, that an event is contingent only if, at the same instant in which it takes place, it is possible for the contrary event to happen. Mastri rejects both those interpretations that make Scotus a forerunner of physical pre-determination, and those which make him a precursor of the doctrine of middle knowledge; in his opinion, Scotus proposes a solution which can be defined "of concomitant decrees". He also rejects all the principal theories on the relationship between pre-

science and freedom formulated since the middle ages. They base prescience either on the simultaneous physical presence of God and future events, or on divine knowledge of created causes and conditions, or on the conceptual presence of contingents in the divine mind, or on middle knowledge, or on antecedent divine decrees. According to Mastri, these hypotheses either undermine the effectiveness of the divine decree, and hence also compromise divine prescience, or they suppress the effective possibility that, at any given moment, the contrary to what happens take place. Mastri tackles the problem on both the logical and the ontological plane. On the logical plane, he argues that the determination and the immutability of the truth value of a proposition does not imply that this proposition is necessary. On the ontological plane, he develops his own doctrine in four points. *i*) Contingent propositions assume a certain truth value only following a divine decree. *ii*) Divine decrees precede contingent events not because of a real causal priority, but rather only from the point of view of knowledge. *iii*) On the real plane, divine decrees and contingent events are concomitant. God decrees since eternity that a free agent *X* does *p* to *t* only because *X* freely does *p* to *t*; if *X* were to do non-*p* to *t*, God since all eternity would decree that *X* do non-*p* to *t*. According to Mastri then, Anfray comments, free action does not have a causal, but rather a counter-factual power on the divine decree. *iv*) The agreement between divine essence, which contains virtually future contingents determined by the divine will, and future contingents themselves is based on a sort of “pre-established harmony” (the expression is Anfray’s): God in his decrees conforms to the will of creatures due to the fact that the divine intellect knows every order of things in which they may find themselves and every choice that they can make.

The articles by Quinto and García introduce us to some of Mastri’s doctrines on supernatural theology. Although such doctrines refer to a non-philosophical context, they nevertheless develop, and apply to theological discourse, considerations and tools of a specifically philosophical nature. Consequently, the articles in question have right to appear in this volume. Riccardo Quinto’s article illustrates Mastri’s theory concerning the nature

of supernatural theology. Our Scotist tackles the following problem: whether the theology of men *in statu viæ*, for that part of it which regards necessary theological truths, is properly a science. Taken in a strict sense, Mastri observes, science is a knowledge which is certain and relating to a necessary object, caused by a cause evident to the intellect, and in which the dependence on its cause of the object investigated is demonstrated with rigorous syllogistic deduction. This means that, for knowledge to be scientific, it is not enough for it to be certain; it must also be evident. Furthermore, for knowledge to be evident, it is not enough for its principles to be evident to any mind; they must be evident to that mind which develops that certain science. Finally, the evidence in question is not only that of the connection of the propositions in the reasoning, but also that of the principles. Mastri further specifies that there can also be a science of single objects, taken, however, not in so far as they are single, but rather in so far as they have a nature. Moreover, he clarifies that the necessity proper to the objects of science must be located at the level of the object itself, and not, for example, of the mind that considers that object. On the other hand, writes our author, for the *viator*, even though he be a theologian, the articles of faith are not evident. Notwithstanding, unlike opinion, faith is certain. What is more, it is a constant and reasonable state of man. Finally, theology is not a simple declarative *habitus* of the truths of faith; it is a deductive *habitus*. Mastri draws two conclusions from these considerations. First of all, theology is not a science. It lacks one essential requirement: its principles are not evident. Nevertheless, neither is it a form of opinion: it is explicit faith, and therefore possesses the same degree of certainty and reasonableness as the latter. To this must be added the fact that it does not coincide, even partially, with philosophy: even though some theological truths are materially identical to some philosophical truths, the reason for assent is, in the two cases, formally different. By doing this, Quinto observes, Mastri ties faith and theology tightly together, accords them dignity, and assigns theology a field of investigation independent from that of philosophy.

The paper by Bernardino (García) from Armellada gives an account of Mastri's solution to the problem posed by the connec-

tion between grace and justification. Mastri develops his doctrine on the basis of two presuppositions. The first, whereby grace is a created accident (belonging to the category of quality) which has its material cause in the soul and its efficient cause in God. The second, whereby justification consists of a state of friendship between man and God; a state in which both partners accept the love of friendship of the other by loving in return. Given this, there arises the problem of the nature of the connection which ties grace and justification. According to the Thomists, grace is an accident whose very physical nature makes it capable of uniting man to God. Like all Scotists, Mastri holds such a thesis to be untenable: as a created accident, grace has no connection in its being with God; hence it is not able to produce any unifying effect on a physical level. It follows from this that the reason for the effectiveness of grace lies elsewhere. Grace is grace, that is, it justifies and unites not because of what it is in its being, but rather because of a free divine decision: the decision to accept as a friend he who possesses that quality. The presence of this quality, therefore, is neither sufficient, nor, absolutely, necessary. The friendship between two subjects, observes Mastri, cannot be forced by anything and can arise independently of the existence of new qualities; likewise, nothing can force God to love, while he can love and justify independently of any created “mediating” quality. To this we must add, however, that God’s decision is not totally arbitrary: grace, according to Mastri, is identified with *caritas*, that is with the love for God; indeed, Mastri observes, all things being equal, it is more reasonable to love he who loves you than he who does not.

The papers by Poppi and Burgio introduce us to Mastri’s reflections on ethics. Antonio Poppi examines Mastri’s doctrines regarding the nature and the foundation of freedom and morality. According to our seventeenth-century Scotist, freedom is the very essence of morality. It consists, all things considered, in the dominion of the will over one’s acts and exists both with respect to the intellect (which has a merely advisory power), and with respect to the object (which is merely the extrinsic formal cause of the choice), and in the exercise itself of the act of will. This,

writes Mastri, explains the fundamental reason for rejecting the Thomists' attempt to demonstrate *a priori* the freedom of the will on the basis of the fact that some objects are such as not to attract it necessarily: no object, he writes, is such as to attract the will necessarily; hence freedom can be demonstrated only *a posteriori*. Nevertheless, Mastri concedes to the Thomists that the freedom of specification requires that the intellect judge the possible alternatives to be indifferent. Furthermore, he specifies that although the awareness of the goodness or evilness of a certain act is not required by freedom in a physical sense, it is required by freedom in a moral sense. As far as the nature of morality is concerned, Mastri writes that moral goodness consists in the conformity between rational nature and the object of a certain act. A few considerations must be added to this definition, however. The object in question is one of the extremes of the relationship of conformity not for what it is in reality, but rather for what it is in the mind. This for two reasons. In the first place, the morally good act is not that which conforms to a good that is such *ex parte rei*; it is, instead, that which conforms to a good that is conceived as such. In the second place, the moral quality of an object is decided not simply by its nature, but rather with reference (i.e. subordinately) to a rule, that is a law. The law, or rule of reason, exists on two levels: *a priori* and *a posteriori*. Eternal, natural, and positive law are *a priori* rules of the morality of an act; however, such rules are remote and extrinsic. Human reason is an *a posteriori* rule, but it is proximate and intrinsic. It follows from this that not only does the judgement on conformity or lack of conformity of a certain act with respect to a certain object depend on human reason, but so does, to some extent, the very rule on the basis of which the judgement is formulated. All this leads Mastri to hold that the moral qualification of an act is something real, and yet is not intrinsic to it. The conformity or lack of conformity of an act with the rational nature of the agent is dictated by the practical judgement of the intellect; hence it is really impressed in the act. Nevertheless this does not mean that such a judgement is true; furthermore, the same rule of morality can depend on the free will of a legislator. It follows that the mor-

al quality of an act is extrinsic to the act, that is to say, it has no “physical” consistency.¹⁵²

Santo Burgio identifies one of the fundamental characteristics of Mastri’s ethics in moderate probabilism. In the early 17th century, there was a clash in the catholic world between two conceptions of ethics: one rigorist and one probabilist, which its adversaries classed as laxist. The former was professed by those orthodox Thomists, in particular the French, who attempted to develop a rigorism distinct from Jansenism. The latter was upheld chiefly by Theatines and Jesuits. At the centre of this probabilist tendency was the theory that it is permissible to follow a simply

152. Poppi concludes his paper by judging this position negatively. He maintains that after having placed the essence of morality in its relationship with the rule of reason, Mastri equates this relationship with the conventionality of linguistic meanings or the arbitrariness of legal institutions. What is more, Mastri conceives moral goodness in terms of an obedience to the commandments of the law, to such an extent that even the moral goodness or evilness of objects that are good or bad by nature depends on a law. Poppi concludes that, from a historical point of view, Mastri forces Scotus’ position in an extrinsicist direction, and moves towards Kant; from a theoretical point of view, he shifts the foundation of morality from the order of finality, i.e. of being, to that of the law, i.e. the legal code. I do not dispute the speculative value of these considerations, however, from a historical point of view, maybe they leave Mastri’s fundamental preoccupations in the shade. Mastri attempts to take into account the multiple moments of moral activity which do not simply mirror real connections. According to Mastri, some norms at least (including some divine norms) are arbitrary or conventional. Furthermore, the object whose conformity to the norm must be judged is a conceptual content. Finally, the judgement on conformity between norm and object is the work of the mind, which when judging has to take into account a plurality of factors and the concrete possibility of making a mistake. To this it must be added that Mastri does not deny the existence of a connection between obligation, rational nature, and the nature of things, nevertheless he holds that “the end” is the foundation of morality only to the extent to which it becomes a “duty” before rational nature; a step, this, that requires the introduction of the figure of the “law”. Nevertheless, he puts forward a refined conception of the connection in question: in so far as the formal cause, the goodness of objects that are good by conformity to natural law is based on the objects themselves; in so far as the efficient cause, and only in relation to it, such goodness is based on the judgement of divine law. Moreover, it could be noted that Mastri transposes to possible moral objects the scheme that he uses regarding the distinction between proximate and remote foundation of contingency and, more radically, regarding the two causes (on the logical plane) of possible beings: possibles themselves, in so far as the formal cause; the divine science of vision, in so far as the *quasi*-efficient cause.

probable solution. This tendency had other characteristics, however: the conviction that the ultimate criterion of judgement when two *auctoritates* diverge resides in the doctrine elaborated by modern authors; the idea that the moral theologian is a specialist and that his principal tool is casuistry; and an interest in themes of a political and economic nature. In the second half of the century the situation changed. Papal condemnations reduced the freedom of action of the “professionals” who directed consciences; casuistry declined; the solutions put forward by the “neoterics” were marginalized; probabilism was re-written in a more moderate form; economic and political themes were neglected. Mastri’s ethical work fits into this new context. According to our author, the probable conscience is that which on one hand is supported by authorities or serious reasons, and which on the other hand does not invalidate the opposed solution. The solution it proposes is not evident or demonstrated; hence it is different from certain conscience. Nevertheless, such a solution is supported by authorities and reason; hence probable conscience is distinct from purely dubious conscience. Degrees of probability are also possible. Furthermore, one thing is the position furthest from danger, that is the safest; another is that whose truth is the most exhibited, i.e. the most probable. Given these considerations, Mastri holds that it is permissible to act on the basis of a merely probable conscience. He also observes that what we are held to do is not the best and perfect choice, but rather merely the correct and sure one. Furthermore, the greater probability of one solution does not mean that a less probable solution is not probable. Hence, Mastri concludes, there can be cases where, when faced with an alternative between a more probable and a less probable solution, it is permissible to choose the latter.

Mastri’s work was read and meditated on even after its author’s death.¹⁵³ Two particularly interesting cases are the *Compendium* and the *Compilatio* of his *Theologia moralis* drawn up respectively by the Conventual Giacomo Garzi and the Obser-

153. I have tried to give an account of Mastri’s posthumous fortune in “*Scotistarum princeps*”..., pp. 311-327.

vant Raphael Guitart.¹⁵⁴ I do not know of anyone having studied the work of the latter. From what little that I have seen of it, it is not a simple summary of Mastri's volume of moral theology; rather, it would seem to be a textbook freely inspired by our Scotist's text. The work by Garzi, on the other hand, is the object of the paper by Alessandro Ghisalberti. The *Compendium* is a true summary of Mastri's work. Structured by *dubia* and *casus*, it presents itself as a tool for education and consultation by the clergy engaged in the care of souls. Part of Ghisalberti's paper is devoted to an examination of Garzi's doctrines regarding erroneous and doubtful conscience. We thus see that Garzi believes that mistaken conscience must be followed, but he adds that it is less binding than the order of a superior. As far as doubtful conscience is concerned, it is necessary to add a number of distinctions. In the case of pure doubt, there is the obligation to choose the most certain alternative: this because we must avoid the possibility of sin. In the case of doubt between probable alternatives, it is necessary to add a further distinction. On a pastoral level the most probable alternative is always to be proposed. In the context of individual spiritual direction and in questions which do not concern salvation or the good of one's neighbour, on the other hand, it is also possible to follow the opinion which is least favourable to the law. Ghisalberti does not simply present some of Garzi's doctrines; he also outlines their historical place and significance. The cultural context which generates and receives them is characterized by two factors. On one hand, post-Tridentine ecclesiastical policy, which develops a rigid social control through spiritual direction and the practice of confession. On the other, the proliferation, in the field of moral theology, of texts and debates ever more mindful of the role of subjective judgement. Garzi's work, like post-Tridentine casuistry in general, certainly aimed at controlling meticulously individual consciences, by means of the control not only of the norm but also of its application. Nevertheless he obtained a two-faced result which her-

154. The reader will find a brief biography of the two authors and a bibliographical account of the editions of their works in *Id.*, at pp. 321-322 and pp. 435-440 respectively.

alded future tensions: on one hand, the annulment of the subjectivity of the individuals liable to the care of souls; on the other, a stimulus to the growth of that same subjectivity, and not only in the theologian (as author of moral-theological speculation) but also in the simple faithfuls, who are now made conscious of the centrality of their own subjectivity and of the importance of its formation.

Ghisalberti concludes his article with some interesting considerations. He believes that Garzi's work, and Mastri's before it, has three characteristics worthy of special note. In the first place, it leads to a re-evaluation of the subject; a re-evaluation which not by chance is situated at the dawn of the Modern Age. In the second place, it expresses a probabiliorist tendency, which aimed at removing the application of ethical norms from the intellectualist pretences of the rigorists. Finally, it gives civil law a power, with respect to the conscience, that is certainly binding, but not more than probable. I agree with these observations, but they outline a situation which is perhaps more tortuous than that which emerges from the final pages of Ghisalberti's paper (though mitigated by his considerations on disciplining seen above). The "re-evaluation" of the conscience proceeds at the same pace as the theorisation of its rigid disciplining. The probabiliorist tendency does not express a slackening of such disciplining, or a will to slacken its grip; rather, it implies a clash of theologians, religious orders, and individual confessors. I do not deny that such a clash was such as to erode the restraining power of the hierarchy, and in fact within a short space of time this conflict was also firmly disciplined. Nevertheless, this concerned not so much directly the individuals who lived in the age of Ancien Régime, but rather the theologians whose work during the 17th century brought forward, despite everything and against the very intentions of the individual thinkers, that process of the break-up of Christian ideology which had been developing since the Middle Ages. Finally, I do not believe that Mastri and Garzi's doctrine on the limit of the value of civil law is to be read as an intentional and simple defence of the freedom of conscience with respect to the State. Instead, it should be seen as a proclamation of the superiority of the Roman Catholic Church (conceived both as the pro-

mulgator of the norm and as arbiter of its application) with respect to every subjectivity and every law established by human agreements. Perhaps this dissonance between Ghisalberti's considerations and my own is also a reflection of the many faces of the soul of Baroque Scholasticism.