Conference of Silo in the University of San Salvador de Jujuy 30/10/95
 

The Position of New Humanism


Mr President of the Fifth Conference, professor Mario Vica, Mr José Lazcano, Students President.
Thank you for your invitation to talk in this Fifth Conference organised by lecturers and students of the schools of Philosophy, Psychology and Pedagogy of the Instituto de Enseanza Superior (University level, NT) Jose Ignacio Tello.

Thank you also for allowing me to make the concluding presentation of this Conference, taking into account the important dissertations and thematic discussions that  took place in preceding days.
I must also tank the presence of the teaching establishment, students, journalists and friends.
Today we are speaking about a current of thought that proposes a  transforming action, which is beginning to be taken into account due to  the profound changes operating at present in society. This current is Humanism. We will review very briefly its historical antecedents, its development and its present situation.
We must establish first a difference between humanism as a current of  thought and humanism as an attitude. The latter was already present in various cultures before the word humanism was coined in the West. The humanist attitude is common to different cultures in certain stages of  their history and it is characterised by: 1- Location of the human being as the central value, 2- Affirmation of the equality of all human  beings, 3- Recognition of personal and cultural diversity, 4- A tendency to develop knowledge beyond that accepted as the absolute truth, 5- Affirmation of freedom of ideas and beliefs and 6- Rejection of violence. This attitude is central to our New Universalist Humanism and we look to the teachings from different cultures to construct and practice this position in life. For those interested in the theme I refer you to the study of humanism in different cultures (Yearly Book 1994 published by the World centre for Humanist Studies, in particular to Professor Serguei Semenovs contribution on precolombian humanism of Central and South America).
We should make also a, perhaps puerile, distinction between the humanities studied at Universities or Colleges and the personal attitude not defined by a professional commitment but by a position about the human as a central concern. Those who define themselves as humanist do not do it with reference to their knowledge of the humanities and, conversely, students of those subjects would not consider themselves to be humanists purely on that account. We slip in this comment as some have linked in the past humanism to a particular type of knowledge or cultural level.
In the West the word humanism is given two accepted meanings.
Humanism is spoken of to refer to any form of thinking that affirms the value and dignity of the human being. Within this meaning humanism may be interpreted in the most diverse and contrasting ways. In a more restricted meaning, but locating it in a more precise historical perspective, the concept of Humanism is used to refer to the process of transformation that began towards the end of the XIV century and the beginning of the XV, which, during the following century and under the name of Renaissance, dominated Europes intellectual life. Suffice to mention Erasmus, Giordano Bruno, Galileo, Nicolas de Cusa, Thomas More, Juan Vives y Bouille to comprehend the diversity and extension of historical Humanism. Its influence lasted throughout the XVII century and a large part of the XVIII, leading into the revolutions that opened the door to the Contemporary Era. This current appeared to dwindle progressively until the middle of this century, when discussions amongst thinkers concerned with political and social questions set it again in motion.

The fundamental aspects of historical Humanism were, approximately, the following:
1.- A reaction against the Medieval life. Here starts a strong recognition of other cultures, in particular the Greek and Roman ones, in their art, science and philosophy.
2.- The proposal of a new image of the human being that extols their personality and transforming actions.
3.- A new attitude with respect to nature, accepting it as a man's environment rather than a sub-world full of temptation and punishment.
4.- Interest for experimentation and research into the surrounding world, as a tendency to search for natural explanations without having to recourse to the supernatural.
These four aspects of historical Humanism converge towards a common objective: to allow confidence in human beings and their creativity arise and to consider this world to be man's kingdom, a kingdom that can be dominated by means of scientific knowledge. This new perspective expresses the need to construe a new vision of the universe and history.
In the same way the new conceptualisations of this historical Humanism led towards the reappraisal of the religious question in its dogmatic and liturgical structures as well as in its organisational ones which, in fact, impregnate Mediaeval social structures. Humanism correlates to the modifications in the economic and social forces of the epoch, in a way that represents an increasingly conscious revolutionary thinking that orientates itself more and more towards discussion about the established order. But the Reformation in the German and Anglo-Saxon worlds and the Counter-reformation in the Latin one try to put a stop to new ideas by proposing again in an authoritarian way a traditional Christian vision. The crisis moves from the church to the structures of the State. Finally the monarchy and the empire by divine right are eliminated by way of the revolutions that take place towards the end of the XVIII century and during the XIX.
However, after the French Revolution and the American wars of independence Humanism practically disappears in spite of remaining in the background of social ideals and aspirations that inspire political, scientific and economic transformations. Humanism retreats in front of conceptions and practices that reign until the end of Colonialism, World War 2 and the alignment of the planet in two fronts. In the midst of the situation the old debate re-opens about the meaning of the human being and nature, about the justification for political and economic structures, about the orientation of science and technology and, in general, about the direction of historical events.
Philosophers of Existence give the first signs: Heideggar disqualifies the human being as one more Metaphysic (in his "Letter about Humanism), Sartre, instead, defends such position (in his conference "Existentialism is a Humanism") and Luypen gives precision to the theoretical framework (in "Phenomenology is a Humanism"). On the other hand Althusser raises an Antihumanist position (in "Pour Marx") and Maritan appropriates Humanism from a Christian perspective (in his "Integral Humanism").

After travelling this long road and in view of the latest discussions in the field of ideas, it is clear that humanism must redefine its position not only as a theoretical conceptualisation but also in its actions and social practice. For this we will refer basically to its foundational Document.

The state of the Humanist question should be presented today with reference to the conditions in which the human being live. Such conditions are not an abstraction. Therefore it is not legitimate to derive humanism from a theory about Nature or a theory about history, or a faith in God. The human condition is such that the immediate encounter with pain and the need to overcome it is unavoidable. Such condition, common to so many other species, finds in the human one the additional need to foresee in the future how to overcome pain and achieve pleasure. Its provision for the future is supported on past experience and the intention to improve its present situation. Its work, accumulated in social productions is passed and transformed from generation to generation in a permanent struggle to overcome the natural and social conditions in which it lives. Because of this Humanism defines human beings as historical beings with a mode of social action capable of transforming the world and their own nature. This point is of utmost importance because by accepting it, it will not be possible to affirm later the existence of natural rights, or natural property or natural institutions nor, finally, that human beings shall be in the future identical to those who exist today, as if the latter were already in their definitive form.

The ancient theme of human beings in relation to nature becomes again important. As we face it anew we encounter this great paradox in which human beings appear without a fixed mode of existence, without a nature, at the same time that we observe in them a permanent feature: their historicality. Stretching the point we may therefore say that the nature of human beings is their history; their social history. Therefore each human being that is born is not a first sample, equipped genetically to respond to his/her environment, but rather a historical being who develops his/her personal experience in a social landscape, in a human landscape.

We see that in this social world the common intention of overcoming pain is denied by the intention of other human beings. We are saying that some humans naturalise others by denying their intention: they transform them into objects to be used. In this way the tragedy of being subjected to natural physical conditions impels social work and science towards new realisations that overcome such conditions; but the tragedy of being subjected to social conditions of inequality and injustice impels human beings towards rebellion against such situation where it is perceived the presence of other human intentions rather than the interplay of blind forces. Those human intentions which discriminate against others are put into question in a field that differs from that of natural tragedy where no intention exists. Consequently every form of discrimination makes a monstrous effort to establish that differences between human beings are due to nature, whether physical or social, carrying out its interplay of forces without the intervention of intentions. Racial, sexual and economic differences are in this way justified by genetic or market laws, but in all cases distortion, falsehood and bad faith are at work.

The two basic ideas presented above: the human condition subjected to pain and the impulse to overcome it, and the definition of the human being as a social and historical being are at the centre of the question for  present day humanists. I have refereed to these particular themes in my "Contributions to Thought", in the essay "Historiological Discussions".

The foundational Document of the Humanist Movement declares that what is necessary to pass from pre-history to a true human history is to eliminate the violent animal appropriation of some human beings by others. In the meantime it will not be possible to depart from any central value other than human beings fulfilled in their achievements and their freedom. The proclaim: "Nothing above the human being and no human being below another", is a synthesis of all that. If God, the State, Money or any other entity are placed as the central value, human beings become subordinated creating in this way conditions for their future control or sacrifice. Humanists have this point clear. Humanists may be atheists or believers, but atheism or faith are not our point of departure to give foundation to our vision of the world and our actions. We begin from human beings and their immediate needs.

Humanists present this basic point: to know whether we want to live and to decide in which conditions we want to do so.

All forms of physical, economic, racial, religious sexual and ideological violence that have blocked human progress are repugnant to humanists. All forms of discrimination, whether overt or covert are denounced by humanists.

This draws the dividing line between Humanism and Antihumanism Humanism gives priority to the question of work in front of great capitals; the question of real democracy before formal democracy, decentralisation before centralisation, anti-discrimination before discrimination, freedom before oppression, and meaning in life before resignation, complicity, and the absurd.

Because humanism is based on freedom of choice, it offers the only valid ethic of the present time. And because humanism believes in intention and freedom, it distinguishes between error and bad faith.

We, humanists state our position. We do not believe ourselves arising from a void  but rather as tributaries of a long process and collective effort; we commit ourselves to the present moment and propose a long struggle towards the future. We support diversity in open opposition to the regimentation imposed till now and justified by explanations that diversity creates dialectics between the elements of a system in such a way that by showing respect for all particularities centrifugal and disintegrating forces are given free way. Humanists think the opposite and, at this precise moment, suppression of diversity leads to the explosion of rigid structures. Because of this we emphasise the need for a convergent direction and a convergent intention and we oppose the idea and practice of eliminating supposedly dialectic conditions in a given human group.

In the Document, we acknowledge the antecedents of historical Humanism and we are inspired by the contributions of different cultures, not only those that occupy at present the central place. We think about what is to come trying to overcome the present crisis. We are optimistic, we believe in freedom and in social progress.

Humanists are internationalists, aspiring to a universal human nation. While understanding the world they live in as a single whole, humanists act in their immediate environments. Humanists seek not a uniform world, but a world of multiplicity: diverse in ethnicity, languages and customs; diverse in local and regional autonomy; diverse in ideas and
 aspirations; diverse in beliefs, whether atheist or religious; diverse in occupations and in creativity.

Humanists do not want masters, they have no fondness for authority figures or bosses. Nor do they see themselves as representatives or bosses of anyone else. Humanists want neither a centralised state nor a para-state in its place. They want neither a police state nor armed gangs in its place.

Humanism enters into a debate about economic conditions. It maintains that the present moment is not about clarifying details about feudal economies, national industries  or regional groups as these historical survivors try to adapt to the dictates of the international financial capital, a speculative capital concentrating progressively at world scale. In this way even the national state requires credits and loans for its survival. They all beg for investment and offer guaranties so that the banks acquire ultimately all the decision making power. The time is coming when companies, land and cities will be the banks undisputed property. The time of the Para-State is coming when the old order will be annihilated.

At the same time old style solidarity vanishes in parallel with the disintegration of the social fabric, and in its place we find millions of isolated human beings living disconnected lives, indifferent to each other despite their common suffering. Big capital dominates not only our objectivity, through its control of the means of production, but also our subjectivity, through its control of the means of communication and information. Under these conditions, those who control capital have the power and technology to do as they please with both our material and our human resources. They deplete irreplaceable natural resources and act with growing disregard for the human being. And just as they have drained everything from companies, industries, and whole governments, so have they deprived even science of its meaning  reducing it to technologies used to generate poverty, destruction, and unemployment. Humanists do not overstate their case when they contend that the world is now technologically capable of swiftly resolving the problems of employment, food, health care, housing, and education that exist today across vast regions of the planet. Of this possibility is not being realised, it is simply because it is prevented by the monstrous speculation of big capital.

By now big capital has exhausted the stage of market economy in developed countries, and has begun, in its technological transformation, to discipline society to accept the chaos it has itself produced. Growing unemployment, recession and the excesses in the political and institutional frameworks signals the beginning of another epoch in which the groups in power and leaders must be adapted to the new times. These changes of schemes represent one more step in the general crisis of the System in its process towards globalisation.

Yet in the presence of this growing irrationality, it is not the voices of reason that we hear raised in dialectical opposition. Rather, it is the darkest forms of racism, fundamentalism, and fanaticism that are on the rise. And if groups and whole regions are increasingly guided by this new irrationalism, then the space or constructive action by progressive forces will diminish day by day. On the other hand, millions of working people have already come to recognise that the centralised state is as much a sham as capitalist democracy. And just as working people are standing up against corrupt union bosses, more than ever citizens are questioning their governments and political parties. But it is necessary to give a constructive orientation to these phenomena, which will otherwise stagnate and remain nothing more than spontaneous protests that lead nowhere. It is necessary to move to the central theme of factors of production.

For humanists, labour and capital are the principal factors in economic production, while speculation and usury are extraneous. In the present circumstances, it is imperative to totally transform the absurd relationship that has existed between these factors. Until now we have been told that capital receives the profits while workers receive wages, an inequity that has always been justified by the "risk" that capital assumes in investing  as though working people do not risk both their present and their future amid the uncertainties of unemployment and economic crisis. Another factor in play is management and decision making in the operation of each company. Earnings not set aside for investment in the enterprise, not used for expansion or diversification, are increasingly diverted into financial speculation, as are profits not used to create new sources of work. The struggle of working people must therefore be to require maximum productive return from capital. But this cannot happen unless management and directorships are co-operatively shared. How else will it be possible to avoid massive layoffs, business closures, and even the loss of entire industries? For the greatest harm comes from under-investment, fraudulent bankruptcies, forced acquisition of debt, and capital flight  not from profits realised through increased productivity. And if some persist in calling for workers to take possession of the means of production following nineteenth-century teachings, they will have to seriously consider the recent failures of real socialism. As for the argument that treating capital the same way work is treated will only speed its flight to more advantageous areas, it must be pointed out that this cannot go on much longer because the irrationality of the present economic system is leading to saturation and crisis world-wide. Moreover, this argument, apart from embracing a radical immorality, ignores the historical process in which capital is steadily being transferred to the banking system. As a result, employers and business people are being reduced to the status of employees, stripped of decision-making power in a lengthening chain of command in which they maintain only the appearance of autonomy. And as the recession continues to deepen, these same business people will begin to consider these points more seriously.

Humanists feel the need to act not only on employment issues, but also politically to prevent the State from being solely an instrument of international capital, to ensure a just relationship among the factors of production, and to restore to society its stolen autonomy.

In the field of politics the situation shows that the edifice of democracy has fallen into ruin as its foundations, the separation of powers, representative government, and respect for minorities have crumbled.

The theoretical separation of powers finds itself in practice severely compromised. Even a cursory examination of the practices surrounding the origin and composition of the different powers reveals the intimate relationships that link them to each other. And things could hardly be otherwise, for they all form part of one same System. Frequent crisis in which one branch gains supremacy over the others, functions are usurped, corruption and irregularities come to the surface, all correspond to the changing global economic and political situation of a given country.

As for representative government, since the extension of universal suffrage people have believed that only a single act is involved when they elect their representative and their representative carries out the mandate received. But as time has passed, people have come to see clearly that there are in fact two acts: a first in which the many elect the few, and a second in which those few betray the many, representing interests alien to the mandate they received. And this corruption is fed within the political parties, now reduced to little more than a handful of leaders who are totally out of touch with the needs of the people. Through the party machinery, powerful interests finance candidates and then dictate the policies they must follow. This state of affairs reveals a profound crisis in the contemporary conception and implementation of representative democracy.

Humanists struggle to transform the practice of representative government, giving the highest priority to consulting the people directly through referenda, plebiscites, and direct election of candidates. However, in many countries there are still laws that subordinate independent candidates to political parties, or rather to political manoeuvring and financial restrictions that prevent them from even reaching the ballot and the free expression of the will of the people. Every constitution or law that prevents the full possibility of every citizen to elect and to be elected makes a mockery of real democracy, which is above all such legal restrictions. And in order for there to be true equality of opportunity, during elections the news media must be placed at the service of the people, providing all candidates with exactly the same opportunities to communicate with the people. To address the problem that elected officials regularly fail to carry out their campaign promises, there is also a need to enact laws of political responsibility that will subject such officials to censure, revocation of powers, recall from office, and loss of immunity. The current alternative, under which parties or individuals who do not fulfil their campaign promises risk defeat in future elections, in practice does not hinder in the least the politicians second act  betraying the people they represent.

As for directly consulting the people on the most urgent issues, every day the possibilities to do so increase through the use of technology.
This does not mean simply giving greater importance to easily manipulated opinion polls and surveys. What it does mean is to facilitate real participation and direct voting by means of todays advanced computational and communications technologies.

In real Democracy, all minorities must be provided with the protections that correspond to their right to representation, as well as all measures needed to advance in practice their full inclusion, participation, and development. Today, minorities the world over who are the targets of xenophobia and discrimination make anguished pleas for recognition. It is the responsibility of humanists everywhere to bring this issue to the fore, leading the struggle to overcome such neo- fascism, whether overt or covert. In short, to struggle for the rights of minorities is to struggle for the rights of all human beings.

Under the coercion of centralised states  today no more than the unfeeling instruments of big capital  many countries with diverse populations subject entire provinces, regions, or autonomous groups to this same kind of discrimination. This must end through the adoption of federal forms of organisation, through which real political power will return to the hands of these historical and cultural entities.

In sum, to give highest priority to the issues of capital and labour, real Democracy, and decentralisation of the apparatus of the State, is to set the political struggle on the path toward creating a new kind of society  a flexible society constantly changing in harmony with the changing needs of the people, who are now suffocated more each day by their dependence on an inhuman system.

In this prevailing state of confusion it is necessary to discuss the theme of spontaneous or naive Humanism and to consider it in relation to what we understand as conscious Humanism. It is clear that humanist ideals and aspirations exist in our societies with a vigour unknown up until a few years ago. The world is changing at great speed and such change, apart from sweeping away old structures and old terms of reference, is also demolishing old forms of social struggle. Spontaneous outbursts appear with more in common with cathartic phenomena and riots than with processes with a clear direction. For this reason, when we include groups, associations and progressive individuals within the humanist field, although they do not participate in the Humanist Movement, we are looking to a union of forces that converge in the same direction rather than to a new hegemony that continues to impose old uniforming points of view and procedures.

It is at the base of society, in the places where people work and where they live that humanism must convert what are now only simple isolated protests into a conscious force oriented toward transforming the economic structures. The struggles of spirited activists in labour unions and progressive political parties need not distance themselves from their bargaining bodies to participate in this Humanist Movement.
 On the contrary, they will become more coherent as they transform the leadership of their entities, giving their organisations a new orientation that, above short-range grievances, gives the highest priority to the basic proposals advocated by humanism.

Vast numbers of students and teachers, already sensitive to injustice, are becoming conscious of their will to change as the general crisis touches them. And certainly, members of the press in contact with so much daily tragedy are today in favourable positions to act in a humanist direction, as are those intellectuals whose creations are at odds with the standards promoted by this inhuman system.

In the face of so much human suffering, many positions and organisations today encourage people to unselfishly help the dispossessed and those who suffer discrimination. Associations, volunteer groups, and large numbers of individuals are on occasion moved to make positive contributions. Without doubt, one of their contributions is to generate condemnations of these wrongs. However, such groups do not focus their actions on transforming the underlying structures that give rise to the problems. Their approaches are more closely related to humanitarianism than to conscious humanism, although among these efforts are many conscientious protests and actions that can be extended and deepened.

In the same way that there exists a wide and ill defined social sector which we could call the "humanist field" there exists another sector which could be called the "antihumanist field". Unfortunately there are millions of humanists we have not yet undertake the task of transformation in a clear direction, at the same time that we witness the surge of regressive phenomena once considered to have been surpassed. As the forces mobilised by the great capital start to suffocate the peoples we see the birth of incoherent positions which strengthen themselves by exploiting the unrest channelling them by pointing the finger towards false culprits. At the root of all such neo- fascism is a profound negation of human values. Similarly, there are certain deviant environmental currents that view nature as more important than human beings. No longer do they preach that an environmental catastrophe is a disaster because it endangers humanity: instead to them the only problem is that human beings have damaged nature. According to certain of these theories, the human being is somehow contaminated, and thus contaminates nature. It would have been better, they contend, had medicine never succeeded in its fight against disease or in prolonging human life. Earth first! some cry hysterically, recalling Nazi slogans. It is but a short step from this position to begin discriminating against cultures seen to contaminate or against impure foreigners. These currents of thought may be considered anti- humanist because at bottom they hold the human being in contempt, showing the regressive background of an "original sin", of having been "expelled from the natural Paradise", for having tasted "the forbidden Tree of Science". Their supporters begin to revive ancient myths and wish for the Apocalypse reflecting in this way the same nihilistic and suicide tendencies observed in other fields.

There is, however, a significant segment of society made up of perceptive people who consider themselves environmentalists because they understand the gravity of the abuses that environmentalism exposes and condemns. And if this environmentalism attains the humanist character that corresponds, it will direct the struggle against those who are actually generating the catastrophes  big capital and its chain of destructive industries and businesses, so closely intertwined with the military-industrial complex. Before worrying about seals they will concern themselves with overcoming hunger, overcrowding, infant mortality, disease, and the lack of even minimal standards of housing and sanitation in many parts of the world. They will focus on the unemployment, exploitation, racism, discrimination, and intolerance in a world that is so technologically advanced, yet still generates serious environmental imbalances in the name of ever more irrational growth.

One need not look far to see how the right wing functions as a political instrument of anti-humanism. Dishonesty and bad faith reach such extremes in these representatives of anti-humanism that some exponents periodically present themselves shamelessly is their semantic banditry trying to cloak themselves with the term humanist.

It would of course be impossible to list the full range of resources, tools, instruments, forms, and expressions that anti-humanism has at its disposal. But having shed light on some of their more deceptive practices should help unsuspecting humanists and those  newly realising they are humanists as they re-think their ideas and the significance of their social practice.

With the intention of becoming a broad-based dynamic social force, the Humanist Movement is organising action fronts in the workplace, neighbourhoods, unions, and among social action, political, environmental, and cultural organisations. Such collective action makes it possible for varied progressive forces, groups, and individuals to have greater presence and influence, without losing their own identities or special characteristics. The objective of this movement is to promote a union of forces increasingly able to influence broad strata of the population, orienting the current social transformation.

Humanists are neither naive nor enamoured of  empty declarations. They do not view their proposals as the most advanced expression of social consciousness or think of their organisation in an unquestioning way. Nor do they claim to represent the majority. Humanists simply act according to their best judgement, focusing on the changes they believe are most suitable and possible for these times in which they happen to live.

I would like now to share with you my personal concerns. I do not believe in any way we are going towards a dehumanised world in the way it has been suggested by some Science Fiction authors, some salvationist currents and some pessimistic tendencies. I do believe, though, that we find ourselves precisely at the point, reached many times before in human history, where it is necessary to choose between two paths that lead to opposite worlds. We must choose in which conditions we wish to live and I believe in this dangerous moment humanity is getting ready to make its choice. Humanism has an important role to play in favour of the best option.

I must consider, too, the context in which I am giving these explanations.
This Conference has created a space for scientific and philosophical reflection. We may believe that this sole fact makes our knowledge grow.
 Such position places us, in my view, in a perspective akin to that of a sport carried out without regard for its consequences, of art exercised solely for aesthetic enjoyment and of Philosophy taken in its classical sense of love of knowledge. If, instead, these discussions have had and still have as an objective the search for practical solutions to concrete problems, I think that the ideas being debated here must contribute to an understanding of the situation we happen to live in and the evaluation of the means available or possible to modify such situation. It must be understood that we are not disqualifying speculative knowledge nor are we subordinating it to empirical knowledge. We are trying to clarify interests, to fix the position from where to view these discussions. Morover, it is no longer appropriate to remain anchored in the Mediaeval aphorism stating simply that light is born out of discussion.

The situation that faces today Philosophy, Psychology and Pedagogy students is not alien to the social context. Those who would wish to insulate themselves from it to dedicate themselves strictly to their particular subject of interest should remember that their studies have been organised according to guidelines dictated by a particular Ministerial programme, that they are developed in institutions and that they are exercised later in fields which are also predetermined. Learning, teaching and application of knowledge all happen within a System. Naturally, events affecting those students and professionals will derive from the dynamics and changes of interests of that System.

The purpose of teaching institutions and Universities is to qualify new generations to develop techniques and knowledge in accordance with the demands of that particular social moment. In this way progressively more specialised quadres are formed led more by  guidelines imposed by the needs of the system than by epistemological organisation. The situation does not appear to me to deserve complete disapproval but rather it makes me reflect about false needs that may be given impetus from a situation of power (political, economic, cultural, etc.) neglecting the true needs of the social context and the individuals personality.

The present proliferation of professions and specialisation shows us on the one hand the crisis in a type of knowledge that ruled the field for a long time and on the other the emergence of new interests, concerns and urgent matters. Information becomes more widespread and diversified and it is necessary to organise, classify and define knowledge and its institutions for training and application. Simultaneously with this process some professions are given priority whilst others are relegated.

We are already very far from those epochs in which Philosophy was considered mother of all sciences. This process of emancipation began a long time ago to reach today a situation where Philosophy itself appears to ignore its own objectives. We know that the professional status of Philosophy is a relatively recent event. Before Kant philosophers were not professionals in the modern sense. Obviously it is important to acknowledge that the systematic approach to the subjects to qualify our students is today unavoidable. It is important also to recognise the difference between a Philosophy lecturer and a philosopher, in the same way we discern between a plastic arts lectures and an artist. We all wish to see professionals who teach about thinking matters develop their thinking potential as we would wish art teachers to develop and attempt to express their artistic creativity. However the process of diversification and specialisation taking place in the professional world in general is also showing within the field of Philosophy as a profession. We can verify in this context the growing prestige bestowed upon Logic leading to the specialised analysis of language in detriment of Metaphysics, relegated to the field of inconsistencies scornfully tolerated by some academic currents. This process does not appear to me to deserve complete disapproval either, but rather it makes me reflect upon the false needs of philosophical thinking open to manipulation by the leadership giving direction to that system and neglecting to pay attention to the real needs of the social context, profound thinking and individual personality.

If students or teachers of Philosophy and related subjects undertake their task in a sound manner they should ask themselves what purpose serve their efforts, what they intend to achieve through them and what chances they have to attain results in keeping with their objectives. If those engaged in such activities think they are utilising an instrument
 that interprets reality we will see different consequences than if they think this instrument should be put at the service of transforming reality. Conditions are set in such a way that students and professionals of the field of Philosophy may either comply with set guidelines or reflect beyond them. In fact, we are asserting an attitude that goes beyond (or comes closer to) professionalism and puts us in the presence of human beings reflecting soundly about the meaning of their life and actions, and about the conditions in which they wish to live.

If this activity is thought as a discipline useful to human beings to improve their existence we cannot avoid making proposals, for better living conditions and to struggle against those conditions that worsen existence, which derive from this exercise. This becomes even more patent when we refer to subjects such as Psychology and Pedagogy.

What are the criteria to be used in clarifying terms such as  improvement of existence or life improvement? If it is thought that a certain type of economy is the foundation for life improvement, then Philosophy will have to concern itself with interpreting and justifying such economic form, Psychology will have to deal with adapting citizens to that economic form and Pedagogy should perfect the methods to teach clearly and convincingly the basic educational points intended by that economic form. We have already became acquainted with the economicist position which restricted itself to regard these subjects as coadjuvant propaganda techniques and today, in the midst of another economicist variant, sees their use only if they demonstrate their efficiency in entrepreneurial applications.

If, instead, human beings are considered to be the central value, terms become reversed, starting with the Economy (from Greek oikonomia, that is, the steward of a house economy ). Such Economy looses thus its ruling character and is placed instead as just another technique at the service of society. It no longer escapes anybody that this Economy does not possess the quality of a ruling science but rather it exists as an applied technique which requires a precise orientation from outside itself. Here it seems appropriate to remind ourselves of the difference between episthmh and tecnh.

Here I would like to take a small digression to make reference to the crisis in Science in general. We all know that the times of the great systems is gone for Maths, Physics and Philosophy alike. However, Technology continues to advance at great speed showing that none of those constructions nor great constructors are necessary at the present moment. It suffices to take advantage of their principles and to apply them, it is enough just to have those who teach us to use them. I do no state this with nostalgia but rather to prepare the ground for the times yet to come, times that will require that thoughts and actions find new foundations as todays have been lost in the turmoil of the generalised destructuring. At present philosophers, psychologists and pedagogists are beginning to experience a glimpse of the terra incognita  and that such uncharted territory contains a new way of thinking and acting.

Returning to our theme.
A system in which everything is regulated by market forces is a market. Today great cultural regions become supermarkets, nations become markets and families become mini-markets. This interplay of forces between producers and consumers leaves no room for a community organised on the basis of different criteria. If teaching institutions do not adjust to the demands of this market they will be privatised lest they should produce losses for the State. According to this logic no private enterprise would open a little rural school where there is no sufficient market. What company would want to give equipment to a new University whose students acquisitive power is seriously limited? Staff, teaching and administrative, as well as students would have to be reduced. And if that place has a reasonable affluent layer of population, then an exclusive and restrictive teaching institution will be created to qualify that minority. The State will not be responsible for the remaining population. What is the role of the State, then? We, humanists think that such cowardly State should be replaced by another which takes charge of responsibilities so many times stated in declamatory speeches. This State should make available an important budget, basically, for Health and Education, and supposed market forces will have to subordinate themselves to the needs of the people. Private health and education centres are welcome in a system where both health and education are free and public. Nobody will prevent the former to do their business nor will affluent people be prevented from paying their fees to private institutions. We could speak then of real competition without feelings of inferiority in relation to the baloney and supposed efficiency of private enterprising.

With reference to the state of labour within a system ruled by a model of private enterprise we already know its consequences in terms of unemployment and recession. It is not the case of looking at what there is today but what there should be: to give priority to an increase in social productivity and co-management of productive forces in the direction of the productive process... This leads us to a field that although it reflects our concerns and relates to immediate needs it deserves to be considered in future talks and debates.

I hope that  the position of New Humanism has been sufficiently explained  to this Fifth Conference and  to other proposals.

Thank you very much.
San Salvador de Jujuy 30/10/95