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“CIVILIZATION,
MAN-MADE DISASTER AND COLLECTIVE MEMORY"
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Recensioni
bibliografiche 2003
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by Werner Bohleber | |||||
Recensioni
bibliografiche 2004
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This paper has been presented by the author at the Congress "Civilizations and their discontents" (Rome, 12-13 February 2005). An italian version of the paper shall be published in the "Frenis Zero" review as soon as possible. Our thanks to the author for the permission. | |||||
Recensioni dalla stampa 2003 | ||||||
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Rivista Frenis Zero |
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Maitres à dispenser |
In
Civilization and Its Discontents
Sigmund Freud describes how human civilization develops through
restrictions placed upon libido and aggression. This is a process set in
motion by the generation of feelings of guilt that are subject to an ever
increasing reinforcement as civilization advances, accompanied by a
forfeiture of individual happiness. Within this process, the human
inclination toward aggression represents a particular threat. Civilization
must therefore mobilize whatever it can in order to restrain it, seeking
to do so primarily through identifications with others and intimate
relationships. Should the restraints come undone, however, aggression
unmasks mankind to reveal the wild beast within. Freud points to the
horrors of history up to World War I as evidence for the factual existence
of this notion and the presence of a destructive drive. The fateful
question for the human species seems to be whether and to what extent
their cultural development will succeed in mastering the disturbance of
their communal life by the human drive for aggression and self-destruction.
In addition, Freud remarks that mankind has advanced to the point that
“they would have no difficulty in exterminating one another to the last
man”(1930, 145). This, he observes, largely helps explain humans’
unease, unhappiness, and sense of anxiety. He
does not comment, however, on how people will continue to be shaped by the
traumatic effects of the misery, unrest, and anxiety that existed ten
years after the end of World War I, the ur-catastrophe of the 20th Century.
Freud
was concerned with the anthropological foundations of civilization, the
battle between Eros and the death drive. He does not address collective
traumatizations and their consequences for cultural development. At one
point, however, he briefly touches upon the issue, though only to depart
from it soon thereafter: “No matter how much we may shrink with horror
from certain situations – of a galley-slave in antiquity, of a peasant
during the Thirty Years’ War, of a victim of the Holy Inquisition, of a
Jew awaiting a pogrom- it is nevertheless impossible for us to feel our
way into such people – to divine the changes which original obtuseness
of mind, a gradual stupefying process, the cessation of expectations, and
cruder or more refined methods of narcotization have produced upon their
receptivity to sensations of pleasure and unpleasure. Moreover, in the
case of the most extreme possibility of suffering, special mental
protective devices are brought into operation. It seems to me unprofitable
to pursue this aspect of the problem any further” (1930, 89). We
can only speculate about how Freud would have written his work Civilization
and Its Discontents in the wake of the catastrophes of the Holocaust
and World War II. It took the psychoanalytic community a long time before
it was in a position to describe and examine the extremely traumatic
consequences of these catastrophes. Analysts joined other scholars in
their persistent state of bewilderment regarding the crimes of the
Holocaust, the factory-like mass murder of the Jewish people and other
minorities. For this reason historians needed a long time to be able to
adequately identify and outline the core of National Socialism: the mass
destruction of human beings. The historian Dan Diner writes of this:
“What at first glance appears to be a pure moral state of bewilderment,
upon closer examination proves to be a much more deeply rooted fundamental
rupture. The historical event Auschwitz touches layers of civilized
certainty about the primary basic requirements for interpersonal
relations. The bureaucratically administered and industrially executed
mass destruction was a refutation of a civilization whose thoughts and
actions are guided by a rationality that assumes a minimum of anticipatory
trust ... A socially expanding trust in the social regularity of life and
survival was transformed into its opposite: Mass-destruction was certain
– survival, however, was left to chance” (Diner 1988, 7). Historical
thinking had to open itself up to the traumatic aspect of this experience
of the collapse of civilization. Embedded in the extreme trauma is the
power of the destruction of meaning, which has bearing on the nature of
historical thought itself. Generally speaking,
historiography is a cultural strategy used to lend events
historical significance and to order them into the larger meaningful
temporal context of past and present. In regard to the Holocaust and other
genocidal catastrophes, however, historians are occupied with the question
of how the authentic collective experience can be adequately recorded,
such that the horror of the experience and the shockingly brutal and
senseless historical fact of the trauma not be subsumed by historical
categories in which the traumatic character of the event dissolves. How
can the transformation of the past from the mode of remembrance and memory
into that of scientific insight take place at a time when access to direct
witness testimony is dying along with the generation of victims and
perpetrators? How can the
danger be encountered that the traumatic is thereby normalized and that
the specific nature of the experience of National Socialism falls victim? These
are questions to which historians seek answers and to which psychoanalysts
can make a substantial contribution. The threat posed by normalization is
fostered by specific defense mechanisms that we are all subjected to when
we come into contact with such massive traumata – as victims, bystanders,
listeners, or as scholars. In
the following I would like to therefore briefly summarize what we know
within psychoanalysis about traumatizations and their after-effects: 1.
The traumatic reality overruns the defense of the ego and its adaptive
resources and inevitably causes a sense of helplessness, automatic anxiety,
and a regression to archaic ego-functions. The anxiety ruptures the
psychic shield and floods the organism with unmanageable quantities of
stimuli, plunging the ego into a state of complete helplessness. The
horrific fact bursts into human life. The extreme stimulus overwhelms the
psychic structure of meaning, and
yields a nameless automatic anxiety. The trauma has the tendency to be
repeated in flashbacks, nightmares, and symptoms. This repetition bears
the character of that which is not understood and breaks in, but it also
is the attempt of the ego to get a grasp on and come to terms with the
incomprehensible. The traumatized individual seeks to tame and mitigate
the pure trauma by giving it a name and inserting it into a comprehensible
causal system of action. It is paradoxical that the trauma is actually
incidental and strange, yet as long as it remains strange, it will be
revived and returns in sudden repetitions without being understood.
Because, generally speaking, humans cannot live without explanations, they
seek to ascribe the trauma with an individual meaning and to historicize
it accordingly. These retroactive historicizations
are most commonly screen memories. If these screen memories can be
recognized as such and the authentic or truer history reconstructed, then
temporality can be re-opened and future, present, and past dimensions can
interact dialectically (Baranger u.a. 1988). 2.
We now know that in cases of extreme traumatization this process of
integration and historicization of the trauma often fails. So-called
“man made disasters”, such as Holocaust, war, ethnic persecution, and
torture, seek to annihilate the historical and social existence of the
human being. Integrating the traumatic experience in a superordinate
narrative is therefore not possible in an idiosyncratic act; instead, it
needs in addition to an empathetic listener also a societal discourse
about the historical truth of the traumatic events as well as of its
denial and the shielding defenses against it. The victims are at the same
time witnesses to a particular historical reality. The acknowledgement of
causation and guilt is primarily responsible for restoring the
interpersonal framework and brings with it the possibility of adequately
understanding the trauma. Only in this way can the undermined
understanding of the self and the world be regenerated. If defensive
tendencies dominate in the social confrontation with a traumatic event,
victims often feel isolated and blocked out, which again undermines their
sense of security, makes them susceptible to retraumatizations, or
condemns them to silence because they cannot expect any understanding. Here
we encounter the complex relation between traumatic experience and knowing.
Laub and Auerhahn (1993) have described that it is in the nature of trauma
to shield the psyche from knowing, because it exceeds and damages the
human capacity to integrate it. The traumatized individual raises a
defense against knowing the trauma, because it threatens the
re-established, yet fragile psychic integration. The memories communicated
about the trauma are in many cases not the actually disturbing experiences
themselves, in which the terror, an unspeakable disgust and horror,
overpowering fear, powerlessness and helplessness are housed. Coming into
contact with them threatens the traumatized individual with being
overwhelmed yet again. Often other aspects of the total event take their
place, functioning as screen memories for the actual traumatic experience.
This avoidance of the confrontation with traumatic experience takes place
not only among those directly traumatized, but also among all those who
took part in the trauma – as perpetrators, bystanders, or rather more
removed historical witnesses. In all of them the retroactive confrontation
with the trauma produces massive feelings of fear, pain, rage, shame, and
guilt, against which a defense is raised in order to avoid contact with
it. In order to shield ourselves from the confrontation with these affects,
we avoid knowing. Not wanting to know is not only a passive closing off of
perception, but also an active repudiation. In this way remembering and
forgetting are repeatedly and dynamically interwoven. In addition, the
memory of particular events can be used in order to repress other
traumatic aspects of reality. Hence, multiple mixtures of defense and
memory result, which range from active suppression and complete forgetting
to deferred knowing, screen memories, and re-enactments. In this way,
affective encapsulation, processing fantasies, and the acknowledgment of
the historical reality of collective catastrophes are interwoven not only
in individual memory, but also in collective memory and the political
confrontation with it. The willingness and ability to remember
intermingles with the resistance to it. 3.
Extreme traumatizations exceed the traumatized individual’s psychic
capacity to process them mentally, leading them to intrude into the lives
of their children and thereby creating specific generational conflicts.
This was studied more closely primarily through the psychoanalytic
treatment of children of Holocaust survivors. Among parents who sought
defenses against their massive traumatization, in that they denied or
derealized their traumatic experiences, their children unconsciously
registered what was suffered, processed indications with their imagination,
and acted out these fantasies in the outside world. The children lived in
two realities: their own and that of their parents’ traumatic history.
These identification processes of the second generation of Holocaust
survivors have been intensively studied and described. I will now
summarize their most important features: a.)
The identification does not take place solely with the figure or
qualities of the father or mother, but is instead a type of identification
with a history that predates the children. Faimberg (1986) characterizes
this type of identification as “télescopage”, a telescoping of three
generations. b.)
The child identifies itself in a total way with its parents, but
this identification also is forced upon him or her by the parents when
they need the child for regulation of their precarious narcissistic
balance. In so far as the history of another is projected onto the child
and he or she identifies with it, the child experiences a feeling of
alienation in part of its self. These identifications cannot be
assimilated into the self and instead come to form a foreign body. Abraham
und Torok refer to this as “endocryptic identification” (1979). c.)
It is an unconscious identification, which, however, does not stem
from repression, but rather from direct empathy with the unconscious, or
silenced experiences of a parental object. One can characterize it either
as a secret or a “phantom” (Abraham 1991) that has implanted itself
within the child’s dynamic unconscious. His or her own feelings and
actions reveal themselves as being borrowed and are actually part of the
history of the parents. 4. In the psychoanalytic treatment of children of the generation of
National-Socialist perpetrators in Germany we have seen that similar
mechanisms of the transgenerational transmission of historical
traumatizations are likewise at work. The children of perpetrators have
also become bearers of a secret, stemming from the pact of silence that
they sensed and unconsciously entered into through identification. But in
this case other secrets and a different history pervaded silently, yet
tyrannically the offsprings’ psychic reality. The untold, silenced
stories give rise to the greatest intergenerational effect. The bond
between children and their parents often necessitated that they did not
question their parents’ taboo and instead respected it. The consequence
was a schism between the childhood image of the father and that of the
father as perpetrator. The latter was denied or derealized, resulting in
compromising of the ego-ideal and the super-ego. The inability to question
damaged the transgenerational formation of identity as well as the
capacity of these children to critically internalize ideals and values
and, in turn, for them later in life to be able to critically and openly
discuss the Nazi era and values and ideals with their own children (the
third generation). Primarily
after 1968 is when members of the second generation in Germany began to
launch heavy attacks against the generation of their fathers and to
uncover their involvement with the Nazi regime. The lifelong illusion of
this generation, which often fashioned itself as victims, was to be made
apparent and the actual victims and the crimes perpetrated upon them were
to be saved from being forgotten. This involved the intermingling of
memory work and defense mechanisms. Here, as well, a divide often became
visible: The public confrontation with the father’s generation often
stopped at one’s own family, whose taboos were respected. What this
generation lost sight of was the reflection upon its own history, which
was not completely absorbed within the identifications with the parents’
generation. The history of this generation who actually experienced
National Socialism and the war as children has remained a terra incognita
scotomized until today. There are certainly several reasons why this
generation was hardly able to give voice to their own experiences. The
silence and the refusal of the generation of perpetrators to take
responsibility for and to speak out about their deeds has led many members
of the following generation to identify with this task: Hence, there a
deferral emerged in generational tasks. In view of the suffering of the
actual victims, however, many members of the second generation have kept
quiet about their own experiences, such that they have not been able to
talk about their own history and their own traumatizations. This
generation is still having difficulties stepping out of its parents’
shadows and to assimilate its own experience into an individual and
generationally specific identity. Not until quite recently have the
members of this generation, who today are between 60 and 70 years old,
begun to remember and talk about their own experiences as children during
the war. I
have outlined here some of the important findings in the study of trauma,
remembrance, and collective memory –
as well as of the particular generational conflicts involved – in
order to demonstrate how long collective catastrophes shape a civilization
and how they often do so in a particular manner more beneath the surface
than in open discourse for generations to come. The reconstruction of a
collective trauma and the uncovering of repression and denial do not take
place along a straight line, instead running its course more in waves with
highs and lows. The willingness and ability to remember and the defenses
against such memories are intertwined. Through the repeated and sudden
surfacing of facts the collective history must be worked through
discursively and publicly again and again, until the truth is recognized.
At work here we find a complex structure of relations between often
competing individual and collective memories of various social groups and
those memories that are officially sanctioned by the state. They can
mutually reinforce each other, but collective resistance or state
suppression can also hinder – if not distort, or even destroy – the
individual’s or social minorities’ capacity for remembering.
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